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Abstract 
Collaborative completions are among the strongest evidence that dialogue requires  coordination 
even at the sub-sentential level;  the study of sentence completions may thus  shed light on a 
number of central issues  both at the `macro’ level of dialogue management and at the `micro’ 
level of the  semantic interpretation of utterances. We propose a treatment of collaborative 
completions in PTT, a theory of interpretation in dialogue that provides some of the necessary 
ingredients for a formal account of completions at the ‘micro’ level, such a theory of incremental 
utterance interpretation and an account of grounding.  We argue that an account of semantic 
interpretation in completions can be provided through relatively straightforward generalizations of 
existing theories of syntax such as Lexical Tree Adjoining Grammar (LTAG) and of semantics such 
as (Compositional) DRT and Situation Semantics. At the macro level, we provide an intentional 
account of completions, as well as a preliminary account within Pickering and Garrod’s alignment 
theory.   
Keywords: completions, coordination, incremental interpretation, PTT, grounding 
1 Introduction  
Utterances such as 1.2, 1.3, and 2.2 in the following fragment of a transcript from the Bielefeld 
Toy Plan Corpus of task-oriented dialogues (Skuplik, 1999) are examples of the constructions 
that Clark (1996) called COLLABORATIVE COMPLETIONS.  
(1.1)    
1.1 Inst So, jetzt nimmst Du [pause] 
Well, now you take 
1.2 Cnst eine Schraube 
a screw 
1.3 Inst eine <-> orangene mit einem Schlitz. 
an <-> orange one with a slit 
1.4 Cnst Ja 
Yes 
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2.1 Inst Und steckst sie dadurch, also 
And you put it through there, let’s see 
2.2 Cnst von oben 
from the top 
2.3 Inst von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden dann 
 from the top, so that the three bars get fixed then 
2.4 Cnst Ja 
Yes 
 
 That agents cooperate is a fundamental assumption in many theories of dialogue (see, e.g., 
the papers in Cohen et al, 1990, or (Clark, 1996)). That cooperation requires coordination is a 
central theme particularly in the work of  Clark (e.g., 1996) and Garrod (e.g., (Garrod & 
Anderson, 1987)). Collaborative completions such as those in the example dialogue are among 
the strongest evidence for the argument that dialogue requires  coordination even at the sub-
sentential level (Clark, 1996;  Garrod and Anderson, 1987; Pickering and Garrod, 2004).  More 
generally,  studying  collaborative  completions may shed light on a number of central issues  for 
models of the semantics and pragmatics of dialogues, both at the `macro’ level of dialogue 
management and at the `micro’ level of the  semantic interpretation of utterances. At the macro 
level, this type of data may be used to compare competing claims about coordination—i.e., 
whether it is best explained with an intentional model like Clark’s and the models discussed in 
Cohen et al’s book, or with a model based on simpler alignment mechanisms like Pickering and 
Garrod’s.  At the micro level, completions are clear evidence that intention recognition in 
dialogue proceeds incrementally, and may provide insights about semantic composition.  
 In this paper we propose a treatment of collaborative completions  in PTT (Poesio and Traum, 
1997, 1998; Poesio and Muskens, 1997; Matheson, Poesio and Traum, 2000) a theory of 
interpretation in dialogue incorporating ideas from (Compositional) DRT  (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; 
Muskens, 1996),  Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983), and Lexical Tree Adjoining 
Grammar (LTAG) (Abeillé and Rambow, 2000; Joshi 2004).  Our main ambition is to 
demonstrate that it is possible to provide an analysis of completions covering a great many of the  
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of these constructions, but relying for the most part  
on  already established and independently motivated formal devices incorporated in PTT, 
supplemented by either a theory of intentions such as Tuomela’s  (2000) or  an alignment-based 
account  such as  Pickering and Garrod’s (2004). We also argue that PTT provides  certain  
ingredients that are essential  for a formal account of completions yet  are missing from existing 
accounts, such as  (Purver et al, 2006) –e.g,  an explicit account of  grounding (Clark and 
Schaefer, 1989; Traum, 1994), required to understand   the interaction of completions with 
grounding. Finally, we explore in some detail  the debate between ‘intention-based’ and 
`alignment-based’ models of dialogue, providing both a more traditional ‘intentional’ account and  
an alignment-based treatment of the phenomenon.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly summarize Clark’s theory of 
coordination in dialogue and our main empirical evidence on completions, data from the Bielefeld 
Toy Plane Corpus.  In Section 3 we introduce PTT; readers already familiar with the theory may 
skip this Section, or perhaps consult only those parts they need to understand Section 5. 
(Additional formal details are provided in the Appendix.) .  In Section 4 we present an intentional 
account of completions. The first part of this Section is background, introducing recent ideas 
about intentions and shared plans that are required to explain completions; whereas the second 
part provides an explanation of the example based on these ideas.  Section 5 is the main Section 
of the paper; in it, we use the notions introduced in the previous two Sections to provide an 
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intentional account of  completions in PTT taking into account the incremental nature of the 
phenomenon and its interaction with grounding. . In Section 6, we provide a preliminary 
treatment of continuations in terms of the Pickering and Garrod alignment model. Finally, in 
Section 7 we discuss alternative theories of dialogue including  KoS (Ginzburg, 2009), SDRT 
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003) and  Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al, 2001; Cann et al, 2005) and 
compare our analysis with that proposed  by Purver et al.   
2 Coordination, Grounding, and Completions  
2.1 Coordination and Grounding in Dialogue  
The theory of interpretation in dialogue developed in this paper relies heavily on the views on 
dialogue developed by Herbert Clark and colleagues, and summarized, e.g., in (Clark, 1992; 
1996). Clark points out  that the traditional view of speech acts  as developed primarily by Searle 
(e.g., 1969) and exposed in  (Levinson 1983)  ignores the role of listeners. He views conversation 
as  a form of joint activity like playing football or playing in a string quartet (Clark 1996, ch. 3), 
in which participants engage in joint projects at all communicative levels, from uttering sounds 
to performing illocutionary acts. He argues that speech acts are really  joint projects between the 
speaker and the listener (Clark 1996, ch. 5). 
In order for these joint communicative activities to be successful,  agents need to coordinate 
both on matters of timing (e.g., to avoid speech overlap) and on matters of content, developing 
together what Clark calls joint construal (joint interpretation) of these actions, that need not be 
the interpretation the speaker originally intended.  This coordination is only made possible by the 
common ground (Stalnaker, 1978) between the participants; yet Clark points out that the 
establishment of a common ground is not automatic (“the common ground isn’t just there, ready 
to be exploited” – Clark 1996, p. 116). Common ground has to be established with each agent 
with whom we interact; this is particularly the case for that part of the common ground that has to 
do with the present conversation.  The participants to a joint action need to establish the mutual 
belief that they have succeeded well enough for current purposes (Principle of joint closure, 
Clark 1996, p. 226).  
This establishment does not occur by default, but through a process called grounding in 
which positive evidence of understanding at different levels is required (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991).  Such evidence may consist of signals 
of understanding like nods or “uh huh”, of presuppositions of understanding like taking up the 
relevant part of the joint project—e.g, answering the question just asked—etc.  This process is 
structured around contributions to discourse—signals successfully understood. Contributions are 
organized into a presentation phase, in which conversant A presents the signal to B, and an 
acceptance phase, in which B gives evidence that she believes she understands what A meant 
(Clark & Schaefer, 1987, 1989). Presentations and acceptances organize dialogues according to a 
`collateral’ structure which is separate and independent  from the types of  structure traditionally 
studied in computational linguistics (Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Asher and Lascarides, 2003), which 
are focused on what Clark calls the ‘official business’ of the conversation; yet they are still (meta-
communicative) acts (Allwood et al, 1993;  Bunt, 1995;Clark 1996).  Traum (1994) developed 
this view by providing a systematic theory of the grounding process articulated around 
grounding acts, which is the basis of the account of  grounding adopted in this paper. Traum’s 
account also provides a solution to the problem of infinite regress incurred by the Clark and 
Schaefer formulation of grounding:  if every presentation needs an acceptance, how can dialogues 
ever end? We will discuss Traum’s solution in Section 3.  
2.2 Coordination on Utterances and Completions  
The typical conversational utterance is not a flawless delivery by the speaker of a complete 
sentence. Speakers generally do not plan utterances in their entirety, and as a result often realize 
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mid-way that their delivery is being less than ideal (Schegloff et al, 1977; Clark,  1992, 1996;  
Alwood et al, 1993; Traum, 1994; Ginzburg, 2009, inter alia). In addition, speakers need to 
coordinate with listeners and ensure that the signal is understood.  As a result, the typical 
utterance has a non-linear structure with interruptions, and restarts, and with collateral utterances 
whose objective is to ensure grounding.  
When a speaker cannot produce a faultless delivery, a disruption may ensue in the form of a 
repair.  Such disruptions have a fixed structure that includes a suspension point, often indicated 
by a pause, a word cut-off, or a lengthened syllable; a hiatus during the period in which the 
speaker plans how to resume, often occupied with fillers or editing sequences; and a resumption 
performing an operation that Clark calls replacement , which may involve simply continuing 
what came before the suspension point, repeating it, substituting it, deleting it, or adding new 
material to it (Clark 1996, p. 264).  
The listener, as well, may interrupt the performance of an utterance, either by initiating a 
repair when a problem is perceived (see Clark’s ‘Principle of Repair’, Clark 1996, p. 284) or by 
initiating a collaborative completion (Lerner, 1987; Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) providing their own 
completion of the utterance, as in (2.1)  (from (Lerner, 1987), reported in  (Clark 1996, p. 238)) or 
a truncation –interrupting the speakers because they think they already understand the rest of the 
utterance (Conversely, a speaker may decide to fade out an utterance when she perceives that the 
rest isn’t needed.)  
(2.1)   Marty: now most machines don’t record that slow. So I’d wanna-when I make a tape, 
 Josh:  be able to speed it up 
 Marty: Yeah 
Completions are the focus of this paper. As we will see in Section 4, completions may be 
performed for a variety of reasons, including signaling understanding, or the desire to be 
cooperative.   
2.3 Completions in the Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus  
2.3.1 The Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus  
The Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus (BTPC)  is a collection of 22  filmed, speech recorded and 
transcribed construction dialogues between two agents, the Instructor  and the Constructor,  
whose task is  to interactively construct a “Baufix” toy airplane (see Figure 2.1). The instructor 
(Inst) explains  to the constructor (Cnst) how to assemble the airplane.  The airplane that Cnst is 
meant to produce in the conversation in question is shown in Figure 2.1 (a), whereas the state of 
the assembly at the beginning of (1.1) is shown in Figure 2.1 (b).  
                                               
                                                
         (a) The Baufix model Constructor has to assemble in the dialogue under examination. 
 
 
(b) Constructor's state of assembly at the beginning of (1.1) 
 
Figure 2.1. The Baufix plane to be produced by Constructor and its state at the  beginning of (1.1).  
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Instructor and Constructor sit at separate tables, have the same collection of  “Baufix”-
components (and know this), and can communicate freely.  The dialogues were recorded in 
different conditions so as to set up different contexts for the production and understanding of 
referring expressions.  One dimension of variation concerned visibility: total screen, face to face, 
half-screen allowing eye contact.  Different conditions concerning the instructions to be followed 
by the instructor were also tested. (In some cases the Instructor had to direct the Constructor on 
the basis of a building plan, in others using an already completed model.) 
The corpus consists of 3675 contributions, counting everything except non-verbal events like 
groans or laughter. 
2.3.2 Collaborative completions  in the BTPC: Some statistics  
Skuplik (1999) carried out a corpus study of collaborative completions in the BTPC. She 
classified a contribution as as a collaborative completion (or, to use her term, SENTENCE 
COOPERATION)  if at least two dialogue participants participate in its  production.  Following 
Wilkes-Gibbs’s dissertation (1986),  Skuplik distinguished between two types of  sentence 
cooperations: COMPLETIONs proper,  when a sub-sentential structure is filled up by obligatory 
constituents; and CONTINUATIONs, when material gets added to an already existing sentence.    
(We will keep using the better-known term completion to cover both completions and 
continuations, except in this Section.) Skuplik identified  126  sentence cooperations (54 
completions (43%) and 72 continuations (57%)) and classified them along the dimensions (1) 
producer, (2) type of phrase, (3) grammatical function, (4) syntactic  category of completing 
utterance,  (5) resulting syntactic construction, (6) gapping construction, (7) acceptance or denial 
with respect to part added by other agent, (8) wording of  acceptance or denial, (9) indications for 
change of speaker.  The statistics Skuplik obtained  for  the dimensions  we are primarily 
interested in (1, 2, 4,  7, and 9) were as follows.  (The figures below are for completions and 
continuations together, except where noted.) 
(1) Producer: In 79% of the cases it was Cnst who produced the completing or the 
continuing part;  Inst provided the expansions in only 21% of the cases.  
(2) Type of phrase: 61% of sentence cooperations are complete phrases (German 
“Satzglieder”);  
(4) Syntactic category of completing utterance:  Prepositional phrases (37%) are 
the most common form of completing utterance; they are followed by noun 
phrases (24%), adverbial phrases (7%), nouns (6%) and fragments with finite 
verbs (5%).  
(7) Acceptance or denial of added part by other agent: 84% of the completing or 
continuing utterances were accepted by the other participant. 41% of  the  
completing or continuing parts were not explicitly accepted or denied. Explicit 
acceptance is indicated by e.g. ja/yes (28%) and other affirmative particles. In 
addition, acceptance can be indicated by various forms of resumption or by 
paraphrase.  
(9) Structural clues  for change of speaker: Only in 31% of the sentence 
cooperations  the change of speaker is indicated by prosodic or other means such 
as various forms of hesitation; in the remaing case no clue is apparent.  
2.3.3 Collaborative completions  in the BTPC: Some statistics  
The statistical evidence collected by Skuplik suggests that (1.1) is a typical illustration of 
collaborative completions  in the Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus.  79% of completions are performed 
by Cnst. Cnst’s completion in this example, eine Schraube, is an obligatory NP (as in 30% of the 
cases),  yielding  a single complete construction (i.e.,. German “Satzglied”, as in 46% of the 
cases), making up a sentence  if merged with Inst’s production (as happens in 50% of the cases). 
In  31% of sentence cooperations a request for a turn release is signalled by prosodic means such 
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as lengthening of German Du and level tone (37% for completions in the strict sense).  Here the 
evidence is not conclusive that the completing part is not accepted by Inst (9%), who extends it 
with an <->   orange one with a slit (9%). Inst’s contribution is in turn accepted by Cnst. 
In the second joint construction, 2.1-2.4, we find a use of (German) also in 2.1, which might 
indicate that a change of the speaker role will be accepted by current speaker. German also  
frequently indicates a planning pause. However, this time we have a continuation by Cnst, 
forming a single complete sentence unit of category AdvP, adding finally up to a sentence 
without extraposition. Inst acknowledges by resuming the phrase and extending it with a 
subordinate clause. In 1.2 Inst’s extension acts as a repair, in 2.2 it provides the description of a 
causal consequence in the domain.  
3 Incremental Meaning Composition in Dialogue: The PTT Approach  
An essential prerequisite of  any account  of completions is  a theory of semantic interpretation in 
dialogue explaining how the meaning of fragmentary utterances performed by different speakers 
is  incrementally combined to derive more complex interpretations. Our own account is based on 
such a theory,  PTT  (Poesio, 1994; Poesio and Traum, 1997; Poesio and Muskens, 1997; Poesio 
and Traum, 1998; Matheson, Poesio, and Traum, 2000) , a theory of dialogue semantics and 
dialogue interpretation that originated from work on the TRAINS-93 system (Allen et al, 1995).  
PTT was developed to explain how utterances are incrementally interpreted in dialogue, crucially 
considering  both their semantic impact  (e.g., how the occurrence of the pronoun “Sie” in 
utterance 2.1 of our example dialogue is interpreted) and their impact on other aspects of dialogue 
interaction traditionally considered as outside the scope of semantic theory (e.g., the role of the 
two “Ja”s in 1.4 and 2.4), building on the work of Clark (1992, 1996) and on ideas from Situation 
Semantics  (Barwise and Perry, 1983; Cooper and Poesio, 1994; Cooper, 1996, Ginzburg, 2009) . 
The first distinctive feature of PTT is the assumption—derived from ideas developed in 
Situation Semantics but also central to Clark’s work, as seen in Section 2—that the common 
ground doesn’t simply record the propositions asserted or the questions raised, but the whole 
variety of facts about the discourse situation shared between conversational participants (Barwise 
and Perry, 1983; see also Ginzburg, 2009; Ginzburg, To Appear). Among these facts is  the 
occurrence of  certain utterances of sub-sentential constituents in a certain order. Furthermore, 
the theory assumes that the occurrence of these so-called micro-conversational events  also leads 
to immediate updates of the participants’ information states  (Larsson and Traum, 2000; Stone, 
2004) which in turn leads to the initiation of semantic and pragmatic interpretation processes.  
Other facts recorded in the common ground include what Clark called ‘meta-communicative’ 
acts: dialogue acts which have to do with coordination issues such as turn-taking and  the process 
by which the common ground is established, or grounding (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Brennan, 
2005; Traum, 1994). A second feature of PTT that is key for the purposes of this paper is that it 
provides an explicit account of such meta-communicative acts, and in particular of grounding, 
building on (Traum, 1994).   It is assumed in PTT that new utterances result in the introduction of 
new Discourse Units—the formal correspondent of Clark and Schaefer’s (1989) contributions--
which only become part of the common ground as a result of explicit or implicit 
Acknowledgments, and may be cooperatively repaired or revised (as in  utterances 1.3 and 2.3 of 
the example dialogue). 
These ideas are formalized using tools derived from Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) 
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993) – specifically, from  Muskens’ Compositional DRT (Muskens, 1996), 
with additional axioms for specifying the anaphoric behavior of dialogue acts and a simple 
formalization of events based on (Muskens, 1995).  (A brief discussion of  Compositional DRT 
can be found in Appendix B.1.) This means that PTT shares many features with  SDRT (Asher, 
1993; Asher and Lascarides, 2003); but as we will see, there are crucial differences between the 
two theories with respect to issues central to this paper such as incrementality and grounding. 
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3.1 Conversational Events and Discourse Situations  
The idea that the shared `conversational score' in a conversation consists only of information 
about the propositional content of assertions, on which much modern work on the semantics of 
discourse rests,   is clearly an idealization (Stalnaker, 1978; Barwise and Perry, 1983; Clark,  
1992, 1996; Allwood et al, 1993; Traum, 1994; Ginzburg, 2009,  To Appear). The participants in 
a conversation also share a great  deal of  information that they need to coordinate: e.g.,  whose 
turn it is to speak, how what is being said fits in within the structure of the rest of the 
conversation, and whether what has been said has been properly understood (Clark, 1996).  
As a result, an ordinary conversation does not consist only of actions performed to assert or 
query a proposition, but also of actions  whose function is to acquire, keep, or release a turn, to 
signal how the current utterance relates to what has been said before, or to acknowledge what has 
just been uttered. Bunt (1995) proposed for these utterances the term DIALOGUE CONTROL ACTS. 
(See also Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Poesio and Traum, 1997; Ginzburg, 1997, 2009). The 
execution of these actions may involve both linguistic and  non-linguistic tools.  The linguistic 
tools include CUE PHRASES such as so or (one sense of) okay; KEEP-TURN SIGNALS such as filled 
pauses ( umm) or in a minute in the following  fragment reported by Coulthard (1977): 
A  They have at their disposal enormous assets // and their policy 
B  //look can I just come in on that// last year 
A  //YES IN A MINUTE IF YOU MAY AND WHEN  I’M FINISHED //  
      then you’ll know 
B  // yes I’M SO SORRY 
and GROUNDING SIGNALS such as okay again, right or uhuh.    Non-verbal means include gaze, 
gestures such as nods or other head movements,  and pointing.  
The context update potential of non-assertoric speech acts and of dialogue control acts is easy 
to formalize in terms of a speech act-based theory (Bunt, 1995; Traum and Hinkelman, 1992; 
Traum, 1994), particularly one in which speech acts are viewed as components of a joint project 
(Clark, 1996). Poesio and Traum (1997) proposed that the conversational score consists of a 
record of all actions performed during the conversation, i.e., what in Situation Semantics is called 
the DISCOURSE SITUATION (Barwise and Perry, 1983; Cooper, 1992;  Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; 
Ginzburg, 2009, To Appear).  Furthermore, Poesio and Traum argued that this view of the 
conversational score could be formalized using the tools already introduced in DRT (Kamp and 
Reyle, 1993; Muskens, 1996), because  speech acts- CONVERSATIONAL EVENTS, in PTT terms- are 
in many respects  just like any other events, and because conversational events and their 
propositional  contents can serve as the antecedents of anaphoric expressions.  So, whereas the 
ordinary DRT construction algorithm would assign to the text in (3.1.1) an interpretation  along 
the lines of (3.1.2) – i.e., a single DRS containing the merged propositional content of both 
assertions (using the syntax from Muskens (1996) and his equality operator is for equality in 
DRSs) Poesio and Traum hypothesized that the common ground resulting from (3.1.1)  would be  
as in (3.1.3). 1 
(3.1.1) a. A: There is an engine at Avon. 
b. B: It is hooked to a boxcar. 
(3.1.2) [x,w,y,z,s,s’|  
engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w), boxcar(y), s’:hooked-to(z,y), z is x] 
(3.1.3) [ce1,ce2| 
                                                     
1
 In this paper, discourse referents will be named according to the following conventions. We will use terms with the 
prefix ce (ce1, ce2, etc) for conversational events; terms with the prefix u  for utterances; terms denoting other events 
will be indicated by the prefix e. We will indicate terms denoting states by the prefix s; all other terms will have 
prefixes x, w, y, and z.   
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ce1: assert(A,B,[x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)]) 
ce2: assert(B,A,[y,z,s’| boxcar(y), s’:hooked-to(z,y), z is x])] 
(3.1.3) records the occurrence of two conversational events, ce1 and ce2, both of type assert 
(Poesio and Traum, 1998; Matheson, Poesio, and Traum, 2000) whose propositional contents are  
separate DRSs specifying the interpretation of the two utterances in (3.1.1).  The discourse entities 
ce1 and ce2 can serve as antecedents both of implicit and explicit anaphoric references.  
Implicit anaphoric references include `backward’ acts like accepts,  as we will see shortly; 
certain types of clarification requests (Ginzburg, 2009, To Appear), and grounding acts, as we 
will see later in the section. One example of explicit anaphoric reference is the following 
example, where the that uttered by B in 2 appears to be referring to the action of insulting, as 
opposed to  the propositional content of A’s utterance (as in 2’)  or to the locutionary act (as in 
2’’). 
1. A: You’re an idiot. 
 2. B: That was uncalled for. 
 2’ B: That’s not true. 
 2’’ B: I didn’t hear that.  
As in (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Muskens, 1995), a Davidsonian treatment of events is 
assumed, in which each event- or state-describing predicate p such as hooked-to or assert   has 
an additional argument for the event (or state). (We follow Kamp and Reyle’s (1993) notation and 
write e:p(x,y) rather than p(x,y,e) for these predicates.)  
One immediate advantage of this view is that it can be used to explain the updates to the 
common ground resulting from conversational events other than assertions, as well as to the all 
too common situation in which an utterance performs more than one type of conversational event  
(Traum and Hinkelman, 1992). Even if we ignore the fact that interrogatives and imperatives 
have non-propositional contents (Poesio and Traum, 1997; Ginzburg and Sag, 2000, Portner 
2007)—in this paper, we will for simplicity assume that all contents of conversational events are 
propositional, as done, e.g., in SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003)—clearly such contents cannot  
be viewed as providing restrictions on the same set of assignments / worlds as assertions. In 
(3.1.3’), for example, neither the content of the open-option conversational event generated by 
the first utterance in (3.1.1’) nor  the content of the info-request resulting from (3.1.1’b) express 
statements about the current state of the world, and should not therefore be evaluated at that 
index, as they would be using standard DRT semantics if the dialogue were to be assigned the 
interpretation in (3.1.2’).  Notice that (3.1.1’b) may be viewed as achieving at least two purposes: 
accepting the option proposed with ce1, and performing an info-request. Notice also that accept  
is implicitly anaphoric to a previous conversational event (ce1), as is generally the case with 
backward-looking acts --one argument for assuming that conversational events introduce 
discourse markers just like normal events do. 
(3.1.1’) a. A: We should send an engine to Avon. 
b. B: Shall we use engine E3? 
(3.1.2’)   [x,w,e, y,e’|  
engine(x), Avon(w), e: send({A,B},x,w) 
engine(y), E3(y), e’:use({A,B},y)] 
 
 
(3.1.3’)  [ce1,ce2,ce3| 
ce1: open-option(A,B,[x,w,e| engine(x), Avon(w), e: send({A,B},x,w)]) 
ce2: accept(B,ce1) 
ce3: info-request(B,A,[y,e’| engine(y), E3(y), e’:use({A,B},y)])] 
COMPLETIONS, COORDINATION AND ALIGNMENT IN  DIALOGUE 
 9 
Assert, open-option and info-request in the example above are all examples of CORE 
SPEECH ACTs (Traum and Hinkelman, 1992; Poesio and Traum, 1997, 1998) – conversational 
events that express the primary, domain-oriented intention the participant intends to convey. The 
repertoire of core speech acts assumed in PTT has been changing over the years; the later versions 
of the theory have been based on the DAMSL repertoire of dialogue acts (Allen and Core, 1997), 
and core speech acts for which formalizations are provided in PTT include, in addition to assert 
and open-option, the forward-looking acts statement, influencing-addressee-future-act, 
directive, committing-speaker-future-action, commit, and offer , and the backward-looking 
acts agreement, accept, answer, and reject (Matheson, Poesio and Traum, 2000). In addition to 
core speech acts, utterances may also be used to perform dialogue control acts and grounding 
acts; we will see examples of these below. 2 
In subsequent work (e.g., (Poesio and Muskens, 1997)), a revised view of the interpretation of 
speech acts was introduced in PTT, in which the contents of conversational events are associated 
with propositional discourse referents (discourse referents whose values are DRSs)  as  proposed, 
e.g., in SDRT (Asher, 1993; Asher and Lascarides, 2003) and by Geurts (1995). According to this 
view, the discourse situation resulting from the two utterances in (3.1.1) being interpreted as 
performing assertions (and nothing else) would be as in (3.1.4), where the propositional contents 
of ce1 and ce2 also become available for subsequent anaphoric reference. 
(3.1.4) [ce1,ce2,K1,K2| 
K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], 
K2 is [y,u,s’| boxcar(y), s’: hooked-to(u,y), u is x], 
ce1: assert(A,B,K1), 
ce2: assert(B,A,K2)] 
This type of representation requires complicating the semantics in order to ensure well-
foundedness, but at least in principle, there are  a number of ways of doing this (Asher, 1993; 
Geurts, 1995;  Poesio and Muskens, 1997); and this representation has the advantage of providing 
antecedents  for references to contents of conversational events—whether explicit as in,  e.g., the 
case in which B follows ce1 with a denial like That’s not true, which in PTT would be interpreted 
as a reference to proposition K1; or implicit, as in the case of grounding acts. We will assume this 
type of interpretation here and exploit it in our formalization of grounding acts. 
Finally, it is assumed in PTT that dialogue acts are generated (Goldman, 1970; Pollack, 1986) 
by locutionary acts (Austin, 1962), which we represent here as events of type utter. These events 
are assumed to become part of the discourse situation as well, at least for a time;3 indeed, they 
play an important role in our account of incrementality, as discussed below. We further assume 
(a) that locutionary acts have a (conventional) semantics associated to them according to standard 
compositional semantics rules, as we will see in detail in the next subsection; (b) that this 
semantics is the value of a sem function (in fact, a family of functions sem[], sem[pi], etc.); and (c) 
that the content of the core speech act generated by a locutionary act with semantics K is also K.   
After taking  these additional  assumptions into account, we obtain the picture of the information 
in the discourse situation after the second assertion in (3.1.1) shown in (3.1.5). 
                                                     
2
 The version of PTT discussed in (Poesio and Traum, 1997) also assumes a class of dialogue acts called argumentation 
acts (Traum, 1994) that capture some of the information expressed in SDRT by  rhetorical relations. We will not have 
the space to discuss intentional structure and rhetorical structure in this paper, but these issues are discussed in the 
follow-up paper (Poesio and Rieser, in preparation).  
3
 An important simplification made in PTT is to ignore the issue of forgetting—i.e., the fact that information, 
particularly linguistic information, only remains `activated’ for a relatively short period. There is quite a lot of evidence 
that at least certain types of information disappear after a period (Sacks, 1967) although the speed at which this happens 
is unclear (Fletcher, 1994). A number of utterances in dialogue – so called informationally redundant utterances 
(Walker, 1993) are also planned with the goal of preventing important information from being forgotten.  
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(3.1.5) [u1,u2,ce1,ce2,K1,K2| 
u1: utter(A,”there is an engine at Avon”), 
K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], 
sem(u1) is K1, 
ce1: assert(A,B,K1), 
generate(u1,ce1), 
u2: utter(B,”it is hooked to a boxcar”), 
K2 is [y,u,s’| boxcar(y), s’: hooked-to(u,y), u is x], 
sem(u2) is K2, 
ce2: assert(B,A,K2), 
generate(u2,ce2)]] 
Therefore, to a first approximation—i.e.,  simplifying the representation of contributions and 
leaving aside all sub-sentential locutionary acts (see next)—the interpretation  of the example 
dialogue according to the view  just presented is as follows. 
(3.1.6) [K1.1, up1.1, ce1.1, K2.1, up2.1, ce2.1  | 
                          K1.1 is [e,x,x3| screw(x), orange(x), slit(x3), has(x,x3), e:grasp(Cnst, x)], 
                          utterance(up1.1), sem(up1.1) is K1.1, 
             ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1), 
             generate(up1.1, ce1.1), 
             K2.1 is[x6,e’,s,w,y|  x6 is x, e’:put-through(Cnst,x6,hole1), 
      w is wing1, y is fuselage1, 
  s: fastened(w,y), purpose(e’,s)],   
                          utterance(up2.1), sem(up2.1) is K2.1, 
             ce2.1:directive(Inst,Cnst, K2.1) , 
              generate(up2.1, ce2.1)] 
3.2 Micro Conversational Events  
A second distinctive feature of PTT, in particular with respect to SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 
2003), is that it takes as a central fact about dialogue that utterances are interpreted incrementally, 
as   suggested by  most psychological work on sentence processing (Frazier, 1987; Swinney, 
1979; Tanenhaus et al, 1995),  and that many contributions to dialogue are fragmentary and non-
sentential, as shown by corpus evidence (Poesio, 1995; Fernandez, 2006).     
As a result, one of the fundamental hypotheses underlying PTT is that the information state of 
a conversational participant is updated whenever any new event is perceived, including events 
such as sub-sentential or even sub-word utterances, and irrespective of whether this event is 
verbal or non-verbal: non-verbal events such as gestures or nods (McNeill, 1992; Allwood et al, 
1992; Clark, 1996; Rieser, 2004) update the information state, as well. Psychological research 
suggests that such updates can take place every few milliseconds, and that perceiving a phoneme 
is sufficient to cause an update—in fact, for interpretive processes to begin (Tanenhaus et al, 
1995). Here we will simply assume that the view of the discourse situation contained in the 
information state is updated at least after every word. We use the term MICRO CONVERSATIONAL 
EVENTS (MCEs) to refer to events of uttering sub-sentential constituents (Poesio, 1995). Also, we 
will only discuss here updates caused by linguistic events, although other types of updates have 
been examined in past PTT work – e.g., to the focus of visual attention (Poesio, 1993) and 
pointing gestures (Rieser, 2004). 
This  incremental update hypothesis is motivated not only by psychological findings about 
incremental interpretation in sentential utterances, but also by the fact that in dialogue many types 
of conversational acts hardly if ever require  full sentences (Clark, 1996; Fernandez, 2006; 
Ginzburg, 2009). Among the core speech acts, answers to questions and clarification questions 
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are often non-sentential. The utterances used to perform DIALOGUE CONTROL ACTS such as  take-
turn, keep-turn and release-turn –actions whose function is to synchronize the two participants 
in the conversation as to who is holding the floor  (Sacks et al 1974;  Traum and Hinkelman, 
1992; Traum, 1994; Bunt 1995; Clark, 1996)—and GROUNDING ACTS, i.e., acts whose function is 
to keep the common ground synchronized between  the two participants (grounding acts are 
discussed  in greater detail below) are also typically non-sentential. These conversational actions  
are occasionally generated by sentential utterances that also generate a core speech act (e.g., the 
second utterance in  (3.1.1)), but more commonly they are generated by single-word discourse 
markers—like okay, well, now, all of which may be used to perform a keep-turn dialogue control 
act, or indeed  jetzt in 1.1 in the example dialogue (1.1),  which arguably is used to   perform  a 
keep-turn function as well as (possibly) a temporal sequencing one. Non-words such as filled 
pauses  (umms and the like) may also be used (Sacks et al, 1974;  Clark 1996).  To account for 
the fact that non-sentential utterances may result in updates of the discourse situation it is 
necessary  to have a theory of update in which the effects of these utterances can be modelled. In 
PTT, it is hypothesized that observing such utterances may result in adding to the discourse 
situation keep-turn events (as well as other possible events), via updates like those  in (3.2.1): 
(3.2.1)   well→   [u,ce|u: utter(A,”well”), ce: keep-turn(A), generate(u,ce)] 
umm→  [u,ce| u: utter(A,”umm”), ce: keep-turn(A), generate(u,ce)] 
In this paper we assume that the  utterances of  so at the beginning of 1.1 in the example 
dialogue (1.1)  has  primarily a dialog control function, so that observing its  occurrence results in 
the following update to the discourse situation. (See Section 5 and Appendix B.2.3.) 
(3.2.2)  so→    [u,ce|u: utter(A,”so”), ce: take-turn(A), generate(u,ce)] 
We instead assume that jetzt in the same utterance is interpreted solely as contributing to the 
specification of the propositional content of ce1.1, the core speech act generated in that 
contribution (see (3.1.6)). Of course one could also hypothesize that jetzt has a keep-turn 
function instead, as in (3.2.2’), or perhaps both functions, but this is not essential for our 
purposes. 
(3.2.2’)  jetzt→   [u,ce|u: utter(Cnst,”jetzt”), ce: keep-turn(A), generate(u,ce)] 
3.3 Incremental Interpretation with Micro Conversational Events  
By combining the hypothesis that the information state is updated after every micro-
conversational event with the view of semantic composition found in Compositional DRT (as 
opposed to that of standard DRT) we can explain how utterances whose main function is to 
express part of the content of a core speech act, like the rest of the utterances in 1.1 -  nimmst, Du, 
etc. - do so incrementally, as well, instead of  assuming  that (3.1.5) or (3.1.6)  are  derived  all at 
once after the entire mini-dialog in (3.1.1) or the example dialogue  have  been syntactically 
analyzed (as it would be necessary when assuming the construction algorithm from (Kamp and 
Reyle, 1993)). 
As shown by Muskens (1996), using only tools already present in Compositional DRT one 
could already show how (3.1.5)   could  be derived  compositionally and incrementally by 
concatenating separately produced interpretations for the two utterances in (3.1.1), as in (3.3.1): 
(3.3.1) [ce1, K1| K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], ce1: assert(A,B,K1)] ; 
 [ce2, K2 | K2 is [y,u,s’| boxcar(y), s’: hooked-to(u,y), u is x], ce2: assert(B,A,K2)] 
But if we accept the two assumptions that locutionary acts are recorded in the common ground, 
and that single word utterances can lead to updates as well, we can take advantage of 
Compositional DRT to explain how the utterances of nimmst and Du can initiate syntactic and 
semantic interpretation before an entire sentence has been perceived. Psychological research on 
priming at different levels (as summarized, e.g., in Pickering and Garrod, 2004) and work on 
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clarification questions such as (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2004; Purver and Ginzburg, 2004) provide 
evidence concerning these updates.  This evidence suggests that perceiving an utterance results in 
the record of the discourse situation being updated with the fact that this utterance just occurred, 
as well as the results of lexical access – i.e.,  that utterance’s syntactic classification, and its 
conventional meaning,  which in PTT is identified with the compositional meaning as specified in 
Compositional DRT  (Poesio, 1995; Poesio and Traum, 1997; Poesio and Muskens, 1997; Poesio, 
To appear). Observing an utterance of the noun boxcar, for example, results in an update of the 
discourse situation which, in first approximation, we will represent as in (3.3.2).   This update 
records the utterance of a new locutionary act u (as said above, we use  discourse referents with 
prefix u to indicate utterances), of type utter (the type of locutionary acts), syntactically classifed 
as a noun, and with semantic content λx [|boxcar(x)]. 
(3.3.2) [u | utter(A,”boxcar”), Noun(u), sem(u) is λx [|boxcar(x)]] 
(We will often use the abbreviated notations u:”boxcar”:Noun to indicate the information 
added by the  utterance of a word  to the discourse situation,  omitting its lexical semantics, and 
u:”boxcar”: λx [|boxcar(x)] that specifies its lexical semantics but omits its syntactic 
interpretation). 
A key assumption that  PTT derives from psycholinguistic results on lexical access (Swinney, 
1979; Tanenhaus et al, 1979) and shares with modern Computational Linguistics  is that lexical 
access—in fact, all of utterance interpretation—is  a process of defeasible inference in which 
competing hypotheses are activated, one of which is rapidly selected, whereas the other ones are 
discarded  (Poesio, 1994, 1995, To Appear).  A good case can be (and has been)  made that the 
defeasible inferences that constitute  language interpretation are a form of statistical inference 
(Jurafsky, 1996), and  all recent work in Computational Linguistics is based on  this assumption.  
However, it is still an open problem how to combine the logics used in formal semantics with 
statistical inference (for preliminary work on the matter, see, e.g.,  (Hwang and Schubert, 1993)), 
so PTT follows the more traditional approach adopted by virtually all theoretical approaches 
attempting to combine a theory of performance with a theory of semantic competence based on 
formal semantics in using  a form of logic to model defeasible inference (Perrault, 1990; Hobbs et 
al, 1992; Hwang and Schubert, 1993; Poesio, 1994, 1995; Asher and Lascarides, 2003).  
Specifically, in PTT interpretation is modeled in terms of Prioritized Default Logic (PDL) 
(Brewka 1989). We would like to be very clear however that we are not claiming here that natural 
language interpretation is a process of inference in PDL: only that PDL is the simplest and more 
standard theory of nonmonotonic inference that makes it possible to us to provide an explicit 
account of the properties of natural language interpretation in which we are interested here –
namely, of the conclusions that we expect to be derived by the ‘real’ processes behind  language 
interpretation (which are almost certainly specialized in carrying out certain types of inference 
and therefore, for instance, not likely to suffer from the efficiency problems of PDL). 
The lexicon in PTT is thus modeled as a Default Theory consisting of prioritized default rules 
specifying lexical updates activated by each utterance, such as (3.3.2).4  The PTT view of the 
interpretive processes that follow lexical access – syntactic interpretation (parsing) and semantic 
composition—is very much inspired by current work on grammar in frameworks like Tree 
Adjoining Grammars (Abeillé and Rambow, 2000; Joshi, 2004) for what concerns incremental 
interpretation, and Categorial Grammar (Pereira, 1990; Carpenter, 1994) in that syntactic 
interpretation is also viewed as an inferential process, the only difference being that in PTT  
interpretation is viewed as an inferential process resulting in updates of the discourse situation. 
                                                     
4
 A more complex view of defeasible inference is adopted in SDRT, with multiple (default) logics for different types of 
interpretation. A much more radical reconsideration is however needed to incorporate insights from recent work in 
Psycholinguistics and Computational Linguistics. For discussion see (Poesio, To Appear). 
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Specifically, parsing in PTT is  a process during which hypotheses about the results of lexical 
access  combine together in phrasal hypotheses through default inference. Such phrasal 
hypotheses are viewed as hypotheses about utterances of phrases: e.g., the occurrence of 
contiguous utterances of type Det and N results in a phrasal hypothesis about the occurrence of an 
utterance of type NP. 
These hypotheses are the result of a second set of defeasible inference rules that encode 
syntactic competence.5 As in (Poesio, 1995; Poesio, 2001; Poesio, To appear), we assume here 
the syntactic framework of Lexicalized Tree Adjoining Grammar (LTAG) (Schabes et al, 1988; 
Schabes, 1990; Sturt and Crocker, 1996; Abeillé and Rambow 2000), since it lends itself to a very 
natural account of the process by which syntactic interpretations are constructed incrementally  
(Sturt and Crocker, 1996).6 In LTAG, the lexical interpretations of words are elementary trees. In 
the case of sortal nouns like boxcar or Schraube these trees are atomic and take the form in 
(3.3.3): 
(3.3.3) N 
| 
   Schraube 
In the case of words whose semantic interpretation takes arguments, such as verbs and 
determiners, the elementary trees are more complex, and already contain ‘attachment points’ for 
such arguments. The  example in Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the lexical interpretation of the 
determiner eine according to LTAG.  In PTT, the utterance of this determiner results in the 
discourse situation being updated  not just with  the observation that an utterance uspec occurred, 
but also with the expectation that uspec is going to be part of the performance of the utterance u of 
an NP, of which uspec will occupy the specifier position, as well as the performance of an 
utterance u of type N and (possibly) of a complement  ucompl. (This node is the attachment point 
for nominal arguments of relational nouns.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.3.1. The update to the discourse situation resulting from an observation of article eine 
 
The elementary trees introduced into the discourse situation by the performance of 
utterances of single words are combined by means of the two basic TAG operations: substitution 
                                                     
5
 This view of parsing as defeasible inference in Prioritized Default Logic is not of course intended as an alternative to 
the modern view of parsing as statistical inference, but only as the simplest possible account of how the interpretations 
we are proposing could be obtained via defeasible inference.   
6
 The LTAG framework has also been adopted in other modern frameworks concerned with semantic interpretation, 
such as Muskens’ Logical Description Grammar (Muskens, 2001), although it is not used there to provide an account of 
incremental processing. 
uspec  u u u ucompl   
                              u :NP 
 
         uspec :Det                                                   u: N   
        “ eine” 
  sem(uspec)= λP’λP([y| ]; P’(y); P(y)) 
 
                                        u:N                                    ucompl 
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and adjunction.   Substitution is the operation by which arguments—the `expected’ components 
of the syntactic structure of an utterance, such as the  nominal head of the NP expected as a result 
of the observation of eine—are `slotted into’ non-atomic elementary trees. For example, assuming 
an LTAG translation for Schraube  analogous to that for boxcar, observing an utterance of 
Schraube, and subsequently substituting the associated elementary tree into the interpretation in 
Figure 3.3.1, results in the interpretation in Figure 3.3.2. 
Adjunction is the operation by which adjuncts and non-arguments are incorporated into the 
syntactic interpretation being inferred.  In our fragment for the example dialogue, we propose that 
adjunction is used to incorporate appositions, i.e., to attach eine orangene, mit einem Schlitz to 
eine Schraube. We hypothesize for this apposition the syntactic structure in (3.3.4)(b); this 
structure is attached to the interpretation of NP eine Schraube in (3.3.4)(a) by ‘splitting’ the N’ 
node into two nodes, resulting in the structure in (3.3.4)(c). 
(3.3.4)    (a)          NP                        (b)                  N’                        (c)                NP 
 
                     eine               N’                  N’                 NPapp                   eine                   N’ 
 
                          Schraube                                  eineapp                 N’                 N’                   NPapp 
 
                                                                                                  NAdj          Schraube       eineapp     NAdj 
 
TAG in general, and LTAG in particular, have become widely used by psychologists as a 
syntactic framework in that adjunction provides an explanation for how modifiers can be 
incrementally attached to a single syntactic interpretation (Sturt and Crocker, 1996). Ferreira and 
colleagues have argued that LTAG also provides an ideal framework to account for disfluencies 
(Ferreira et al, 2004). A complete LTAG fragment for the example dialogue is provided in 
Appendix B; the treatment of appositions assumed in this paper is discussed in B.4.2 
 
 
uspec  u u u ucompl                              
 
                             
                            u :NP 
 
uspec :Det                                              u: N   
“ eine” 
sem(uspec) is λP’λP([y| ]; P’(y); P(y))] 
                                                        
                                                          u:N                                    ucompl 
                    “Schraube” 
   sem(u)= λv([ |screw(v)]] 
 
Figure 3.3.2. The updates resulting from the observation of eine Schraube, after 
substitution of the elementary tree for Schraube into 3.3.1 
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The remaining aspect of the interpretation process, semantic composition—the process by 
which phrasal utterances receive an interpretation—is  also viewed in PTT as an inference process 
(Poesio, 1995; Poesio, To Appear), in accordance with the view  adopted in Categorial Grammar 
and related work on `Parsing as inference’ (Pereira, 1990; Carpenter, 1994), where the 
combination of utterances in larger utterances  and the specification of the meaning of these 
larger utterances are provided by inference rules. PTT hypothesizes that semantic composition, as 
well, is the result of defeasible inferences over the DRS obtained by concatenating the updates 
resulting from the utterances of single words (Poesio, To Appear). These default inference rules 
have the effect of the semantic composition rules introduced by Muskens (1996) for 
Compositional DRT.  For example, the rule BINARY SEMANTIC COMPOSITION  below 
specifies that if u1 and u2 are the (only) two constituents of u3 (we used ↑ to indicate 
dominance),  one of them (say, u1) has a semantic interpretation  of type 〈α,β〉, and the other has 
a semantic interpretation of type α, the semantic interpretation of u3 is derived by applying the 
semantic interpretation of u1 to that of u2. (Cfr. Muskens’ Application rule (Muskens, 1996, p. 
166).)  We also assume a Unary Semantic Composition inference rule achieving the effect of 
Muskens’ Copying rule. 
BINARY SEMANTIC COMPOSITION (BSC): 
β
α
βα
ψϕ
ψ
ϕ
)()3(
)2(
,)1(
,32,31
,
=
=
=
↑↑
usem
usem
usem
uuuu
 
We can now return to our example dialogue (1.1) and see how it is interpreted according to 
PTT, using the LTAG + Compositional DRT grammar from Appendix B together with the micro-
conversational events hypothesis. We will deal here with a slightly simplified version of the 
series of utterances that result in the first directive: Jetzt nimmst Du eine orangene Schraube mit 
einem Schlitz,  ignoring so, merging Cnst’s completion (eine Schraube) with Inst’s refashioning 
of it via an apposition (eine orangene … mit einem Schlitz) (completions and refashioning are 
discussed in Section 5; appositions in Appendix B.2). Each of these micro conversational events 
causes an incremental update of the discourse situation; the concatenated sequence of updates is 
shown in diagrammatic format in (3.3.5) and using linear notation in (3.3.5’), where we have used 
↑ to indicate dominance. We used the prefix up to name phrasal utterances and the prefix ub to 
name Xbar projections.7   
(3.3.5)  [u1.2, up1.1, up1.2 |  
                                               up1.1:S 
 
                  u1.2:“jetzt“:Advp               up1.2:S  
                 sem(u1.2) is λp. now(p)]; 
             [u1.3, up1.4 , up1.2’, up1.3, up1.5, up1.6| 
                                                 up1.2’:S 
 
                                 up1.3:NP                            up1.4:VP 
                                                       
                                                           u1.3:”nimmst”:V       up1.5:NP              up1.6:NP 
                                   sem(u1.3)= λQλx(Q(λx’[e| e: grasp(x, x’)]))]; 
                                                     
7
 The complete lexical and grammatical rules for the fragment of German we are considering, broadly based on 
Muskens (1996), are given in Appendix B. 
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            [u1.4, up1.5’ | 
         up1.5’:NP 
       
      u1.4:”Du”:Pro 
 sem(u1.4)= λP.P (you)]; 
[u1.5, up1.6’, ub1.6, u1.6’| 
         up1.6’:NP  
             
 
               u1.5:”eine”:Det                                                    ub1.6:Nbar 
               sem(u1.5)= λP’λP([y1|];P’(y1);P(y1))                        
             
                                                                                               u1.6’:Noun]; 
          [u1.8, ub1.6’, ub1.6’’  | 
         ub1.6’:NBar 
       
                        u1.8:”orangene”:Adj                                  ub1.6’’:Nbar 
                   sem(u1.8) = λPλz([ |orange(z)]; P(z))]; 
[u1.6| u1.6:utter(Cnst,"Schraube"), Noun(u1.6), sem(u1.6)= λv([ |screw(v)]]; 
 [u1.9, ub1.6’’’, ub1.6’’’’, up1.9, up1.10| 
                    ub1.6’’’’:NBar 
 
                                 ub1.6’’’:NBar                             up1.9:PP 
                                                       
                                                               u1.9:”mit”:Prep           up1.10:NP 
                                                  sem(u1.9)= λP λy(P (λx[ |with(x,y)]))]; 
 [u1.10,  up1.10’, ub1.10, u1.11’| 
          up1.10’:NP 
 
                         
     u1.10:”einem”:Det                                           ub1.10:Nbar 
                  sem(u1.10)= λP’λP([y2| ]; P’(y2); P(y2))       
                      
                                                                                            u1.11’:Noun]; 
[u1.11| u1.11:utter(Inst,"Schlitz"), Noun(u1.11), sem(u1.11)= λv([ |slit(v)]] 
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(3.3.5’) [u1.2, up1.1, up1.2 |  
u1.2: utter(Inst, “jetzt“), Advp(u1.2),   
sem(u1.2) is λp. now(p),  
S(up1.1) , S(up1.2), u1.2 ↑ up1.1,  up1.2 ↑ up1.1]; 
 [u1.3, up1.4 , up1.2’, up1.3, up1.5, up1.6|   
u1.3: utter(Inst,"nimmst"), Verb(u1.3),  
sem(u1.3)= λQλx(Q(λx’[e| e: grasp(x, x’)])), 
VP(up1.4), u1.3 ↑ up1.4, S(up1.2’), up1.4 ↑ up1.2’,     
NP(up1.3), up1.3 ↑ up1.2’,  NP(up1.5), up1.5 ↑ up1.4,  
NP(up1.6), up1.6 ↑ up1.4]; 
 [u1.4, up1.5’ | 
  u1.4: utter(Inst,"Du"), Pro(u1.4), u1.4 ↑ up1.5’, NP(up1.5’),  
  sem(u1.4)= λP.P (you)]; 
 [u1.5, up1.6’, ub1.6, u1.6’| 
  u1.5: utter(Inst,"eine"), Det(u1.5),  
sem(u1.5)= λP’λP([y1| ]; P’(y1); P(y1)), 
NP(up1.6’), Nbar(ub1.6), Noun(u1.6’), 
u1.5 ↑ up1.6’,  u1.6’ ↑ ub1.6, ub1.6 ↑ up1.6’]; 
[u1.8, ub1.6’, ub1.6’’ | u1.8: utter(Inst, “orangene”), AdjP(u1.8),  
sem(u1.8) = λPλz([ |orange(z)]; P(z)), 
u1.8 ↑ ub1.6’,  ub1.6’’  ↑ ub1.6’,   
Nbar(ub1.6’), Nbar(ub1.6’’)]; 
[u1.6|  u1.6:utter(Cnst,"Schraube"), Noun(u1.6),  
sem(u1.6)= λv([ |screw(v)]]; 
[u1.9, ub1.6’’’, ub1.6’’’’, up1.9, up1.10|  
u1.9:utter(Inst,”mit”), Prep(u1.9), 
sem(u1.9)= λP λy(P (λx[ |with(x,y)])), 
PP(up1.9), Nbar(ub1.6’’’), Nbar(ub1.6’’’’), NP(up1.10), 
u1.9 ↑ up1.9,  ub1.6’’’ ↑ ub1.6’’’’, up1.9 ↑ ub1.6’’’’, up1.10  ↑ up1.9]; 
[u1.10,  up1.10’, ub1.10, u1.11’|   
u1.10:utter(Inst,"einem"), Det(u1.10),  
sem(u1.10)= λP’λP([y2| ]; P’(y2); P(y2)), 
NP(up1.10’), Nbar(ub1.10), Noun(u1.11’), 
u1.10 ↑ up1.10’,  ub1.10 ↑ up1.10’, u1.11’  ↑ ub1.10]; 
[u1.11| u1.11:utter(Inst,"Schlitz"), Noun(u1.11),  
sem(u1.11)= λv([ |slit(v)]]  
After each of these updates, parsing and semantic composition inference rules  apply to 
combine phrasal utterances together through substitution and adjunction and to assign an 
interpretation to such phrasal utterances. Let us consider for instance how the updates due to the 
observation of “einem”  (micro conversational event u1.10 in 3.3.5) and “Schlitz” (mce u1.11) 
result in the  hypothesis that an utterance of the NP “einem Schlitz” was observed, and in the 
assignment of an interpretation to that  phrasal utterance. The hypothesis that the utterance of  
u1.10 and u1.11  in (3.3.5) is part of the utterance of  an  NP leads to a substitution inference: the 
hypothesis  that u1.11’  (expected after observing an utterance of einem)  is the same as u1.11. 
The formulation of this hypothesis  results in the following update of the discourse situation:  
[ | u1.11’ is u1.11] 
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Applying BSC to the discourse situation thus updated results in the assignment of the 
conventional meaning λ P.[y2| ];[| slit(y2)]; P(y2) to up1.10’, which results  in the following 
update: 
[ | sem(up1.10’) is λ P.[y2| ];[| slit(y2)]; P(y2)] 
A similar process leads to hypothesizing the rest of the structure; the only difference is that 
attaching orangene and mit einem Schlitz requires adjoining the PP resulting from processing mit 
einem Schlitz into the NBar resulting from eine orangene: the result can be seen in Figure 3.3.3.  
 
At the end of this process of unification of the phrasal utterances, we obtain the structure 
shown in Figure 3.3.4, from which meanings have been omitted (but see Appendix B and Section 
5). 
 
 u u uspec u ucompl  
                                  
   u :NP                                        
 
 
 uspec :NP                                        u:NBar 
 
 
                               u:NBar                                ucompl: PP 
                           “ orangene”                        “mit einem Schlitz” 
                      sem(u)= λ P λz ([|orange(z)];P(z)    λx([y|];[|slit(y)];[|with(x,y)] 
Figure 3.3.3. The update resulting from the adjunction of ”mit einem Schlitz” to “orangene” 
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We will reiterate at this point one of the central claims of this paper, which is that many of 
the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of completions can be accounted for relying on 
independently motivated formal devices incorporated in PTT. In this Subsection we have shown, 
specifically, that explaining semantic composition in these constructions does not require 
developing novel syntactic or semantic formalisms, but only establishing a link between 
utterances in the discourse situation and syntactic phrases—a link already explicitly proposed  in 
Situation Semantics, HPSG, and in Ginzburg’s KoS, for independent reasons—and translating 
lexical composition and parsing in terms of inferences on the discourse situation. We will next 
see that we do not need a novel treatment of grounding, before discussing two ways of explaining 
the reasons for making a completion in Sections 4 and 5 (intentional analysis) and 6 (alignment 
analyses). 
To conclude, another bit of notation. In PTT, like in other dynamic theories of meaning, 
semantic interpretation and other inference processes generally result in adding to a DRS new 
material, which in general can also include new discourse referents. For instance, the PTT 
equivalent  of existential instantiation of predicate p in the context of DRS K results in K being 
augmented with the DRS [x | p(x)]. We will use the notation K+= K’ for indicating this operation 
of updating DRS K with K’ when K is a propositional discourse referent and K’ is either a 
proposition or a proposition valued discourse referent. The effect of this operation is to change 
the value of K by adding K’. For instance, suppose the value of K is [y | q(y)]. Then existential 
instantiation of p within K as above results in the update: 
K += [x | p(x)] 
Figure 3.3.4.  Simplified representation of the complete syntactic structure assumed for  the first 
contribution 
up1.1:S 
u1.2:”jetzt”:Advp up1.4:VP 
up1.3:NP 
u1.3:”nimmst”:V up1.5:NPi up1.6:NP 
u1.4:”Du”:Pro 
εi 
up1.2:S 
u1.5:”eine”:Det ub1.6:N’ 
ub1.6’:N’ u1.8:”orangene”:AdjP 
up1.10:NP 
ub1.6’’:N’ up1.9:PP 
u1.6:”Schraube”:N u1.9:”mit”:P 
u1.10:”einem”:Det 
ub1.10: N’ 
u1.11:”Schlitz”:N 
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After which the value of K becomes [y,x | p(x), q(y)]. DRS update is defined as follows.8 
K += K’ Let  K be  a proposition-valued discourse referent, and K’ be a proposition 
(DRS) or a proposition-valued discourse referent. Then    
                                 K += K’ =def [ TmpK| TmpK is  K];[ K| K is TmpK;K’]   
 (where TmpK is an unused proposition-valued discourse referent). 
By the definition of DRS and ; in CDRT (see Appendix B.1) this is equivalent to: 
 K += K’ =def λiλj ∃l i[TmpK] l ∧ l[K]j  ∧ v(TmpK)(l) = v(K)(l) ∧ 
                                         v(K)(j) = v([λi’λj’ ∃l’ TmpK(i')(l’) ∧  K’(l’)(j’)])(j)    
3.4 Grounding and Discourse Units  
Unlike other dynamic theories of interpretation, PTT does not rely on the assumption that 
every utterance automatically becomes part of the common ground; instead, it includes an explicit 
formalization of the GROUNDING process discussed in Section 2 (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; 
Brennan, 1991; Traum and Hinkelman, 1992; Traum, 1994; Clark, 1996). Many of the utterances 
in the example dialogue were most likely intended to play a role in this process; and completions 
themselves can be viewed as a particularly explicit form of acknowledgment, as discussed in 
Section 2.  
The formalization of grounding developed in PTT is based on Clark and Schaefer’s (1989) 
proposal discussed in Section 2, as modified by Traum (1994). According to Clark and Schaefer,  
a conversation consists of a series of CONTRIBUTIONS which have to be ACKNOWLEDGED, 
possibly implicitly (thus becoming part of the common ground) or may need further 
CLARIFICATIONS and REPAIRS.  
Traum (1994) and Matheson, Poesio and Traum (2000) developed this proposal by providing 
an account based on the assumption that grounding is achieved through a particular type of 
dialogue control acts called GROUNDING ACTS.  Following (Traum, 1994),  we use the term 
DISCOURSE UNIT (DU) to refer to a  contribution. And again as in (Traum, 1994), it is assumed in 
PTT  that every utterance in a conversation either initiates a new DU, continues a DU, 
acknowledges a DU, performs a repair, or requests the other participant to perform one of the 
grounding acts above. At any point in a conversation a conversational participant may begin a 
new contribution, i.e., initiate a new DU; this new DU gets added to the semi-public part of the 
information state.  This is the case for example with 1.1 or 2.1 in the example dialogue. As we 
will discuss in detail in Section 5, in 1.2 Cnst simultaneously acknowledges the part of the new 
contribution which has already been introduced, grounding it—possibly in response to a 
perceived request from Inst—and adds new material to the contribution. In 1.3, Inst performs 
what Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs called a refashioning of the contribution—adding new material 
which may also lead to a revision (e.g., to the choice of a new screw). (In PTT, this type of 
operation is viewed as a type of repair, as proposed by Levelt (1989) and Clark (1996). In fact, 
the introduction of new material in 1.2 is seen as a repair as well, as discussed in Section 5.)   
Finally, Cnst acknowledges the remaining part of the contribution, which then is fully grounded, 
and accepts the directive specified by the full contribution.9 The accept itself is viewed in PTT as 
a second contribution.  In 2.1, Inst (implicitly) grounds the accept by initiating a new contribution 
(a new directive). 
As in (Poesio and Traum, 1997; Matheson, Poesio, and Traum, 2000), we assume that 
discourse units are dynamic propositions  about the discourse situation, i.e.,  DRSs containing the 
                                                     
8
 A different definition of += was given in (Poesio & Traum, 1998).  
9
 Notice that in PTT acknowledgments—a type of grounding act—and accepts—a backward act resulting in the 
speaker’s assuming the obligation to perform a certain action—are distinct. 
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type of information about conversational events (whether micro conversational events, core 
speech acts, and other types of dialogue acts) that we have discussed in the rest of this section.   
In fact, in recent work we adopted the position that each of the micro-conversational update to a 
discourse situation we discussed earlier in this section constitutes a discourse unit,  but here we 
will stick with the position adopted in (Poesio and Traum, 1997; Poesio and Traum, 1998), in 
which all the updates of the discourse situation related to the process of grounding a particular 
contribution are part of the same discourse unit.  
In (Poesio and Traum, 1997, 1998) the agent’s information state itself was formalized as a 
DRS. This DRS includes, in addition to information about the private attitudes of the agent, a 
record of the contributions (DUs) so far, as well as a special DRS G containing the material which 
has already been grounded. For example,  the information state after interpreting and grounding 
the first contribution  in (3.1.1), and after  interpreting the second sentence (i.e., creating a DU 
DU2 for it) but before grounding it, would be as follows (ignoring micro-conversational events): 
(3.4.1) [DU1,DU2| 
DU1 is  [ce1, K1| 
u1: utter(A,”there is an engine at Avon”), 
K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], 
sem(u1) is K1, 
ce1: assert(A,B,K1), 
generate(u1,ce1)], 
G is [ce1, K1| 
u1: utter(A,”there is an engine at Avon”), 
K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], 
sem(u1) is K1, 
ce1: assert(A,B,K1), 
generate(u1,ce1)], 
DU2 is [ce2,K2| 
u2: utter(B,”it is hooked to a boxcar”), 
K2 is [y,u,s’| boxcar(y), s’:hooked-to(u,y), u is x], 
sem(u2) is K2, 
ce2: assert(B,A,K2), 
generate(u2,ce2)]] 
There are two main reasons for viewing the information state as a DRS. First of all, all 
grounding acts are implicitly anaphoric, in that they refer to particular DUs, as we will see below. 
Secondly, in Compositional DRT the modifications to G and the DUs resulting from grounding 
acts can be modeled quite simply as updates to the values of discourse markers. For example, the  
effect of an acknowledgment on the information state was formalized by Poesio and Traum  
(1998) as replacing the previous value of G with a new DRS which is the  merge of G and DU1 
using the += operator just introduced: 
(3.4.2)     G+= DU1 
In this paper, however, we will use a modal operator G  to assert that a particular DU is 
grounded. The main reason for the change is that this formulation is closer to that adopted in 
more recent work by Traum (1999) in which grounding is not viewed as an all-or-nothing affair, 
but as a matter of degree. This type of theory is more easily modeled using one or more modal 
operators to specify grounding.  The modal operator G expresses a stronger form of mutual 
knowledge than standard MK, in that everything that is grounded (acknowledged) is mutually 
known, but not vice versa.  We will not provide a full axiomatization of G here, but we will 
require that everything that is grounded is mutually known: 
[AX-G-1]  ∀ DU G(DU) → MK(DU) 
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According to this new view, the information state resulting from the first contribution  in 
(3.1.1) being grounded, while the  second one still isn’t, is as in (3.4.3), instead of as in (3.4.1): 
(3.4.3)[DU1,DU2| 
DU1 is  [ce1, K1| 
u1: utter(A,”there is an engine at Avon”), 
K1 is [x,w,s| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w)], 
sem(u1) is K1, 
ce1: assert(A,B,K1), 
generate(u1,ce1)], 
G(DU1), 
DU2 is [ce2,K2| 
u2: utter(B,”it is hooked to a boxcar”), 
K2 is [y,u,s’| boxcar(y), s’:hooked-to(u,y), u is x], 
sem(u2) is K2, 
ce2: assert(B,A,K2), 
     generate(u2,ce2)]] 
According to this version of the theory, in the case of the example dialogue we obtain the 
following information state after the first contribution (the directive jointly produced by Inst and 
Cnst in 1.1 – 1.3)  and the second (the acceptance produced by Cnst in 1.4) are grounded, but  
before the second directive is grounded, again ignoring micro-conversational events and phrasal 
utterances (compare with (3.1.6)): 
(3.4.4) [DU1.1, ce1.6, DU1.4, ce2.2, DU2.1 | 
DU1 is  [K1.1, up1.1, ce1.1,  | 
          K1.1 is [e,x,x3|screw(x), orange(x), slit(x3), has(x,x3), e:grasp(Cnst, x)], 
                              utterance(up1.1), sem(up1.1) is K1.1, 
                 ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1), 
       generate(up1.1, ce1.1)]      
ce1.6 :ack(Cnst,DU1.1), 
G(DU1.1), 
DU1.4 is  [ce1.7, s1.1 | ce1.7: accept(Cnst,ce1.1), s1.1 : obl(Cnst,K1.1) ], 
ce2.2 :ack(Inst,DU1.4), 
G(DU1.4),  
DU2.1 is [K2.1, up2.1, ce2.1   |  
      K2.1 is  [x6,e’,s,w,y|  x6 is x, e’:put-through(Cnst,x6,hole1),  
                                           w is wing1, y is fuselage1, 
       s: fastened(w,y), purpose(e’,s)],   
                       utterance(up2.1), sem(up2.1) is K2.1, 
             ce2.1:directive(Inst,Cnst, K2.1 ) , 
              generate(up2.1, ce2.1)]] 
Notice that grounding acts ce1.6 and ce2.2 are not included in the discourse units. This is the 
solution proposed by Traum (1994) to the ‘bottoming out’ problem present in Clark and 
Schaeffer’s work—explaining how information about the occurrence of grounding acts  is unlike 
other information in the discourse situation in that it  doesn’t seem to require grounding (else we 
would have an infinite regress).  
Notice also that in all accounts of grounding derived from Clark and Schaeffer’s work, 
planning a core speech act really amounts to planning a contribution, i.e., opening a new DU. 
Hence such theories need to stipulate an additional step of intentional reasoning: that to intend to 
perform a core dialogue act ce it is to intend to make a contribution DU with that act as content. 
This is expressed by the following schema. 
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[CE-TO-DU-SCHEMA]:  
       Intcp1([ce | ce:core-act(cp1,cp2,Φ)])  Intcp1([DU | DU is [ce | ce:core-act(cp1,cp2,Φ)]]) 
We will see examples of application of the CE-TO-DU schema in Section 5. 
Grounding acts can be formalized in terms of operations on the information state.  In the 
version of PTT adopted here,  
i. Performing an  Init(DU) simply means introducing a new DU in the information 
state. We assume an Init(DU) every time a new contribution is initiated; such 
grounding acts are not explicitly recorded in the information state.  
ii. Performing a Cont(DU) means adding to an existing DU; again, we do not 
explicitly represent this grounding act in the information state. 
iii. Acknowledging a DU has the effect of grounding the DU, i.e., adding G(DU) to 
the information state; 
iv. Repairing DU1 with DU2 means updating the discourse referent DU1 by 
assigning to it DU2 as value.  
v. Requesting a grounding act means adding to the information state an obligation  
to address that request.  
This formulation does not specify preconditions for such acts—e.g., what it means for a 
contribution to be understood, and therefore when are acknowledgments warranted (Clark’s 
grounding criterion). Clark points out that a contribution may fail to be understood at several 
levels: e.g., the addressee may have not heard what the speaker said, or may have heard it but not 
know its meaning. In this paper we assume that an utterance has been understood when values for 
all the functions that specify its linguistic classifications –phonetic, syntactic, and semantic 
(sem)—can be recovered either from the lexicon or from the context; but we will not provide 
update rules for grounding acts including such preconditions. (Ginzburg’s (2009) proposals for 
information state update rules for grounding acts specifying such information and covering 
clarification requests as well are discussed in Section 7.) 
Matheson, Poesio and Traum (2000) discuss accepting in PTT for the case of core speech 
acts. Update rules for core speech acts are conditional upon acceptance—meaning that for each 
core speech act there is a conditional update rule specifying the part of the update caused by that 
speech act that depends upon acceptance. For instance, for the case of directives, the conditional 
update rule specifies that in case ce is a directive by A to B with content K, then if B accepts ce, 
B assumes the obligation to bring it about that K: schematically, 
          [UP.DIRECTIVE] ce:directive(A,B,K)  (accept(B,ce)  [o | o:obl(B,K)]) 
(Notice that an update rule is not a material implication, but a rule to update the information state 
by concatenating new information.) We assume here that update of the information state as the 
result of grounding acts works in the same way, except that in the case of grounding acts, 
accepting leads to updates of the information state that affect DUs. We use two such rules in this 
paper, UP.REPAIR for repairs, and UP.ACK for acknowledgments. To specify the update 
resulting from UP.REPAIR we use the following abbreviation: 
DU1 ⇐ DU2 Let DU1 be a propositional variable specifying a discourse unit, and DU2 be 
a DRS. Then  
   DU1 ⇐ DU2  =def λiλj i[DU1]j ⇐ v(DU1)(j) = v(DU2)(i) 
The two update rules specifying the behavior of grounding acts, then,  are as follows: 
                           [UP.REPAIR] ce:repair(A,DU1,DU2)  (accept(B,ce)  DU1 ⇐DU2) 
    (with DU1 a propositional discourse referent) 
   [UP.ACK]       ce:ack(A,DU)  (accept(B,ce)  [ | G(DU)]) 
    (with DU a propositional discourse referent) 
POESIO AND RIESER 
 24 
So, for instance, the result of the Ja in 1.4 is to add to the information state G(DU1.1) when 
the acknowledgment is accepted (see (3.3.4)), whereas the result of accepting the repairs in 1.2 
and 1.3 is to add to DU1.1 the new material, as discussed in Section 5. 
3.5 The Information State  
As already mentioned, PTT is an information-state based theory in the sense of  (Cooper et al 
1999, Larsson & Traum 2000, Stone 2004, Ginzburg 2009). Ginzburg (2009, Chapter 4) 
discusses different views concerning what information states such a theory may model; PTT aims 
at modeling the information state of a single agent,  assumed to  consist of three main parts: 
- A private part, with information available to the participant, but not introduced in the 
dialogue. This part includes private beliefs and intentions of that participant, as well as 
hypotheses about beliefs and intentions of other agents. 
- A public part consisting of the DUs that are assumed by that agent to have become part of 
the common ground. 
- A semi-public part, consisting of the information introduced with  contributions that 
haven’t yet been acknowledged. This information is not yet grounded, but it is accessible. 
So far, we have discussed the information about actions in the discourse situation. To 
conclude we briefly discuss information about private attitudes and social attitudes (obligations). 
In PTT, dialogue acts are performed to achieve intentions or to satisfy certain obligations. 
Both the fact that one or more agents have a certain (possibly collective) intention, and that they 
are under certain obligations, may become part of the private, semi-private and public parts of the 
discourse situation, e.g., as a result of planning or of intention recognition  (Matheson, Poesio, 
and Traum, 2000). 
In previous work, only a partial formalization of obligations and intentions was given. In this 
earlier work, both obligations and intentions were viewed as relations between agents and action 
types: for example, the fact that agent A has the intention to perform a particular core speech act 
is captured by  the presence in the discourse situation of intention (3.5.1). 
(3.5.1) i: intend(A,λce.ce: assert(A,B,K1)) 
We adopt here a more standard view of intentions and obligations as predicates indexed by 
the agent(s) holding their intention. We will also simplify matters concerning the dynamics of 
conversational events by assuming that intentions and obligations have as their contents 
propositions describing the state of affairs to be achieved –i.e., DRSs—rather than action types, as 
in (3.5.2), showing the intention by agent A to perform an assertion with content K1. 
(3.5.2) i: IntA([ce|ce: assert(A,B,K1)]) 
A partial formalization of obligations was provided in (Matheson, Poesio and Traum, 2000). 
As far as intentions are concerned, previous work on PTT only discussed the assumption, inherited  
from Grosz and Sidner (1986), that intentions may be related to each other in two ways: 
- by a relation of  dominance when satisfying a certain intention is  part of the satisfaction 
of another, more complex, intention (more formally: intention  i dominates intention i' if 
achieving i' is part of achieving i); and 
- by a relation called  satisfaction-precedes when satisfying an intention is a  prerequisite 
for satisfying the second (intention  i satisfaction-precedes intention i' if achieving i is a 
necessary prerequisite of achieving i’).   
As each intention is (directly) dominated by only one other intention, Poesio and Traum 
(1997) formalized dominance with a (partial)  function dom mapping  intention i2  to the 
intention to which it is subordinated, if any. More controversially, satisfaction-precedence was 
also formalized as a partial function sp(i2) = i1 mapping  intention i2 to the intention i1 that must 
be achieved for i2 to be achievable. 
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Poesio and Traum also used dom and sp to provide an account of discourse entity 
accessibility in PTT, but otherwise proposed no axioms for intentions. One of the goals of this 
paper is to use completions and continuations as a source of additional evidence on the properties 
of intentions, and how they affect interpretation; we discuss a few possibilities and our 
assumptions in Sections 4 and 5. Our views on the relation between intentionality and 
accessibility have changed in the meantime, but we will assume the definitions from Poesio and 
Traum (1997) here; a paper discussing these new ideas is in preparation (Poesio and Rieser, in 
preparation). 
4 Completions: an Account Based on Shared Plans  
In this paper we will propose two analyses of the example dialogue. We begin by presenting in 
this section and the next a mainstream, ‘intentional’ analysis based on hypotheses about the role 
of intentions and cooperation in communication developed in Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, 
Philosophy, and Psychology over the past thirty years.  In Section 6 we will then discuss a second 
analysis, based on the recent proposals by Garrod and Pickering on the basis of recent 
psychological results about interpretation, production and alignment in dialogue (Pickering and 
Garrod, 2004).  
4.1 Coordination, shared intentions, partial shared plans: a look at existing paradigms  
4.1.1 Assumptions:  intention, cooperation, coordination, discourse plans  
Most work on dialogue in Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Psychology in the last thirty or 
so years has been based on three main assumptions.  
The first assumption is that communication involves a great deal of intention recognition: 
the production of utterances is motivated by (implicit and explicit) intentions, and in order to 
communicate felicitously agents must recognize other agents’ intentions even when they do not 
intend to help these agents to achieve them. This hypothesis, generally associated with Grice 
(Grice 1969, Grice 1975, later  revised in Grice 1991), has been the foundation of most theories 
of  dialogue in Artificial Intelligence and Computational Linguistics, such as the work of  Allen 
and Perrault (1980), Cohen and  Levesque (1990a, 1990b),  Grosz and colleagues (Grosz and 
Sidner, 1986; Grosz and Kraus, 1996)  Sadek (Sadek et al, 1994) Asher and Lascarides (2003) 
and Stone (2004) among others;  in Philosophy—e.g., in work by Bratman (1992) or Tuomela 
(2000); and in Psychology (Clark, 1992, 1996; Bara & Tirassa, 2000) –and was thoroughly 
examined in  the seminal book Intentions in Communication (Cohen, Morgan and Pollack, 1990). 
10
 The theories of intentions developed in AI are typically also concerned with how such 
intentions can be achieved: hence many such theories, and particularly those of intention 
recognition, are formulated in terms of plans to achieve a particular goal.  The intentional 
account we propose will be formulated in this way, as well. 
This hypothesis that intention recognition is central to communication is usually 
supplemented  by two further hypotheses.  Much work on dialogue in Artificial Intelligence relies 
on the further assumption that at least in some contexts, communicating agents do not simply 
recognize other agents’ intentions; they are also cooperative, in the sense that  they attempt to 
help  other agents’ achieve their intentions even when they are not explicitly expressed. E.g., a 
genuinely helpful clerk at a ticket counter in a train station will not simply answer the question 
“From which platform does the train to Montreal leave” by indicating the platform, if he / she 
knows that the train has been cancelled.  This view is  central both to Clark’s theory  of dialogue  
discussed in Section 2 and to, e.g.,  Allen’s and  Sadek’s theories of intention recognition in 
                                                     
10
 In recent years, the role of intentions in communication has become of interest to developmental psychologists 
(Homer & Tamis-Le Monda, 2005) and neural scientists (Bara & Tirassa, 2000), as well. 
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dialogue systems (Allen and Perrault, 1980; Sadek, 1992). Completions and continuations are 
viewed by, e.g., Clark as some of the best evidence for cooperative behavior in dialogue (Clark, 
1996, p. 238). 
As discussed in Section 2, the theory of dialogue developed by Clark and summarized in 
(Clark, 1992, 1996) is based in addition on a third hypothesis:  that conversation is a form of joint 
activity just like  playing football or playing in an orchestra,  i.e., driven by joint intentions and 
in which it is necessary for agents to coordinate.  Clark uses “joint activities” as a foundational 
stratum on which coordination on content or process, on setting up common ground, on 
signalling, establishing (complex) joint projects, on communication using parallel tracks etc. is 
then based.  Clark defines joint project quite simply as “… a joint action, projected by one of its 
participants and taken up by the others” (Clark (1996), p. 191). The notion of joint project or 
shared plan has been further developed in the Artificial Intelligence, especially by Grosz and 
Sidner (1990) and by Grosz and Kraus (1996). 
Taken together, these three assumptions lead to the view on which our first analysis is  based: 
that what happens in dialogue, particularly task-oriented dialogue, can  be explained in terms of 
the joint intentions of dialogue participants and the shared plans developed to achieve them. In 
the case of the construction dialogues in the BTPC, this view can be summarized as follows. Inst 
and Cnst have both shared and private domain plans.  Inst and Cnst’s private domain plans 
overlap to a degree with the shared plan; the difference between the shared plan and the private 
plans may lead to discrepancies and negotiations (e.g., as when Inst adds more details to Cnst’s 
proposal in 1.3). Simplifying things drastically, we will assume here that Inst’s private domain 
plan  is  a fully specified plan for building the toy airplane (either instructions or a model).  The 
shared domain plan is a partial plan to build a toy airplane, which at the beginning of a dialogue is 
virtually empty, but gets progressively refined through the construction dialogue.  (More on this 
below.)  Cnst’s private plan is a refinement of the shared domain plan, likely to include at least 
local further specifications based on expectations. 
Crucially, dialogue involves shared plans both at the domain level (how to build a toy 
airplane) and at the discourse level (how to convey a particular intention or plan) (Litman and 
Allen, 1990). For example, Inst and Cnst also share a discourse plan: that the conversation will 
consist of a series of instructions by Inst to Cnst aiming at building a toy airplane according to 
Inst’s model. This view is clearly formulated, e.g., in the following quote from (Grosz and Sidner, 
1990, p. 418): 
Discourses may exhibit two types of collaborative behaviour: 
collaboration in the domain of discourse [...] and collaboration with 
respect to the discourse itself. Although we cannot yet define [...] 
“collaboration with respect to a discourse”, it includes not only surface 
collaboration (such as coordinating turns in a dialogue) or use of 
appropriate referring expressions  ([...]) but also collaborations related 
to the discourse purpose. For example, the participants collaborate to 
ensure that the utterances of the discourse itself provide sufficient 
information to make possible the satisfaction of the discourse purpose. 
In terms of shared plans, Cnst’s completion in 1.2 can be interpreted as indicating that Cnst 
has recognized  Inst’s intentions both at the domain level and at the discourse level,   and one 
possible explanation (although not the only one, as we will see below) for her  decision to 
complete  is that she is being cooperative. Our  first, `intentional’ account of completions is based 
on this Shared Plans hypothesis. We follow here what is perhaps the best-known development of 
this idea, due to Bratman in his work on SHARED COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY (SCA)  (Bratman, 
1992)  and  further refined by Tuomela (2000).  These two theories  are briefly reviewed next. 
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4.1.2 Bratman  
Arguably the most influential modern account of intentions (private and shared) is that of  
Bratman (1992). Bratman’s theory  aims at providing a formalization of  the notion of “shared 
cooperative activity” (SCA, p. 327) that underlies  actions characterised as “being done together” 
like singing a duet, painting a house or starting an attack in a basketball game—i.e., joint actions 
in Clark’s sense, i.e., most actions performed in dialogue, including completions. 
Bratman identifies three main characteristics of SCAs: mutual responsiveness, commitment to 
the joint activity and commitment to mutual support. The conditions that according to Bratman 
must hold in order for us to be said to perform a shared cooperative activity (SCA) J are listed in 
(4.1.1).  First  of all,  we need  individual intentions to J together: (1)(a)(i) and (1)(b)(i). Secondly, 
it must be the case that you and I develop these intentions because of the other’s intentions 
((1)(a)(ii), (1)(b)(ii)). (1)(c) is intended to exclude forced cooperation, e.g. the “Mafia sense” 
(1992, p. 333) of doing something together. Fourth, the intentions must hold for the matching 
subplans involved and they must be stable. (An intention is minimally cooperatively stable if 
“there are cooperatively relevant circumstances in which the agent would retain that intention” (p. 
338). This notion is similar to Cohen and Levesque’s (1990) notion of ‘commitment’.) Finally, 
we must mutually know (1). Mutual knowledge is used in the fixed point sense (Fagin et al., 
1995, p. 402;  Tuomela 2000, p. 78). 
(4.1.1)     Our J-ing is a SCA only if 
(1) (a) (i)  I intend that we J.  
                        (ii) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of meshing subplans 
  of  (1)(a)(i) and (1)(b)(i). 
      (b) (i)  You intend that we J.  
 (ii) You intend that we J in accordance with and because of meshing 
  subplans of  (1)(a)(i) and (1)(b)(i). 
 (c) The intentions in (1)(a) and in (1)(b) are not coerced by the other participant. 
 (d) The intentions in (1)(a) and (1)(b) are minimally cooperatively stable. 
(2)       It is common knowledge between us that (1). 
This first version of Bratman’s characterization of an SCA already captures some key 
elements of the `dialogue as a joint action’ view discussed in Sections 2 and 4.1.1:  commitment 
to joint activity,  meshing subplans,   interdependent intentions,   mutual support, and connecting 
attitudes. Parts (ii) of (4.1.1)(1)(a) and (4.1.1)(1)(b) mean that it is not sufficient for an action to 
be  independently intended to be a joint action by me and you for it to be a SCA; these intentions 
have to be causally connected. Parts (ii) also make explicit reference to the shared plans required 
to achieve a joint intention, via the notion of meshing subplans, described by Bratman as follows: 
“[...] our individual sub-plans concerning J-ing mesh just in case there is some way we could J 
that would not violate either of our subplans” (p. 332).  (As we will see, Inst and Cnst’s private 
plans are meshing in this sense.) 
According to Bratman, however, one ingredient is still missing from (4.1.1): mutual 
responsiveness. Mutual responsiveness amounts to the following: “In an SCA each participating 
agent attempts to be responsive to the intentions and actions of the other, knowing that the other 
is attempting to be similarly responsive” (p. 328).  (As we will see below, mutual responsiveness, 
or more precisely, its development by Tuomela into the hypothesis  that participants in a SCA 
may perform ‘unrequited contributory actions,’   provides us with one explanation for the 
performance of completions.) The full definition of SCA is therefore as  in (4.1.2).  
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(4.1.2)   For cooperatively neutral J, our J-ing is a SCA if and only if 
(a) we J 
(b) we have the attitudes specified in (4.1.1) (1) and (2), and 
(c) (b) leads to (a) by way of mutual responsiveness (in the pursuit of our J-ing) of  
intention and in action.  
Given Bratman’s notion of SCA, an intentional account of completions in the example 
dialogue would go as follows. The relevant J-ing at the stage of example dialogue (1.1) just 
preceding the completion in 1.2 is that Inst and Cnst we-intend  that Cnst fix the ‘wing’ to the 
‘fuselage’ according to Inst’s directives. The intended and mutually known meshing subplans are 
the domain plan for building the toy plane in front of Inst, and the discourse plan that Inst give the 
directives and Cnst carry out the actions. (Both plans are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.)  
In order then for the joining of wing and fuselage to count as a SCA, the following must hold: 
(4.1.3)   Inst and Cnst joining wing and fuselage  is a SCA only if:  
(1)(a)          (i)  Inst intend that Inst and Cnst join wing and fuselage.  
         (ii) Inst intend that Inst and Cnst join  wing and fuselage  in accordance with 
and because of meshing subplans of  (1)(a)(i) and (1)(b)(i). 
    (b)           (i) Cnst intend that Inst and Cnst join wing and fuselage .  
(ii) Cnst intend that Inst and Cnst join  wing and fuselage  in accordance with 
and because of meshing subplans of  (1)(a)(i) and (1)(b)(i). 
    (c) The intentions in (1)(a) and in (1)(b) are not coerced by the other participant. 
    (d) The intentions in (1)(a) and (1)(b) are minimally cooperatively stable. 
(2) It is common knowledge between Inst and Cnst that (1). 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the action to be an SCA are specified by adding the 
mutual responsiveness requirement from (4.1.3), obtaining (4.1.4): 
(4.1.4)    For cooperatively neutral joining of wing and fuselage, Inst and Cnst joining wing and     
  fuselage is a SCA if and only if: 
(a) Inst and Cnst join wing and fuselage 
(b) Inst and Cnst have the attitudes specified in (4.1.3) (1) and (2), and  
(c) (b) leads to (a) by way of mutual responsiveness (in the pursuit of Inst and Cnst’s 
joining of  wing and fuselage) of intention and in action. 
We will discuss  the meshing subplans at stake in some detail in Section 4.2. 
4.1.3 Tuomela  
Bratman’s (1992) concept of shared cooperative activity  is  not formalized in terms of a logic, 
but several such formalizations have appeared, most famously by Cohen and Levesque (1990a, 
1990b). Our own use of we-intention (IntInst&Cnst) in the rest of the paper will be based on the 
logical reconstruction of Bratman’s theory by Tuomela (2000).  Tuomela also proposes several 
revisions of Bratman’s theory, that we briefly review here. 
One problem with  Bratman’s  account of  plan-based joint action identified by Tuomela is 
that the meshing requirement should not be part of the definition of we-intention. Rather, we 
should take it as an entailed conceptual presupposition along the lines of ‘If we have a joint 
intention to see to it that p, then as a rule we also have meshing subplans concerning p’. In 
addition, according to Tuomela, condition (4.1.1)(1)(c) is too strong: coercion should be admitted 
as long as a subject’s intentional agency is not completely by-passed. Tuomela proposes, 
therefore, a  stripped-down characterization  of the we-intention going into the construction of 
the joint of wing and fuselage at the point in which the first completion takes place that can be  
characterized in first approximation as follows. 
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(4.1.5)  Inst and Cnst we-intend that Cnst join wing and fuselage is equivalent to: 
It is Inst’s and Cnst’s mutual knowledge11 that  
 Inst intends that Cnst join wing and fuselage  because 
  Cnst intends that Cnst  join  wing and fuselage;  
 and 
 Cnst intends that Cnst join wing and fuselage  because 
  Inst intends that Cnst join wing and fuselage  
The two clauses in the scope of the mutual knowledge operator in (4.1.5) cover much of clauses 
(1a) and (1b) in (4.1.3), the ‘because’ connective providing the ‘meshing’ required by Bratman, 
but without explicit mention of plans and of coercion.  In Tuomela’s notation (4.1.5)  is expressed 
as follows, where ‘because’ gets translated by the reason relation /r, which is factual in the sense 
that X/rY → X ∧ Y: 
(4.1.6)   IntInst&Cnst(join(Cnst, W, F)) 
↔ 
 MK((IntInst (join(Cnst, W, F)) /r IntCnst(join(Cnst, W, F)))  
          ∧ 
         (IntCnst(join(Cnst, W, F)) /r IntInst(join(Cnst, W, F)))) 
According to (4.1.6) the we-intention IntInst&Cnst that Cnst join W and F  amounts to mutual 
knowledge that each agent’s intention that Cnst join W and F is caused by the other agent’s 
intention that this be done. 
We said above that agents’ disposition to helping, of which at least some forms of 
cooperative completions are an illustration, is meant to be covered in Bratman’s proposal by the 
notion  of mutual responsiveness which, however, is not fully developed, as pointed out by 
Bratman himself. Tuomela (2000, p. 107) provides a more explicit explanation  of the fact  that 
Inst gets extra help by Cnst in formulating a directive for which there can’t be a SCA yet. To do 
this, Tuomela developed an alternative to Bratman’s definition of IntInst&Cnst. This new definition 
cannot be fully discussed here. We will simply highlight the following condition from the 
definition (2000, p. 95): 
“[...] the participants are also assumed to be disposed willingly to perform 
unrequired contributory actions [our italics],  thus being disposed to incur 
extra costs (this being rational as long as the costs of performing them are 
less than the gross gains accruing from their performance)”.  
Tuomela’s notion of unrequired contributory action underlies the ‘intentional’ account of 
completions given here.  Briefly, the idea is that if Cnst and Inst have we-intentions and the 
associated shared plans,  Cnst can infer that a screw is needed at the point of the dialogue we are 
analyzing.  She is therefore able to produce  an unrequired contributory action by producing a 
completion, if circumstances demand it. (We will return on this shortly.) Tuomela’s formalization 
of helping is of course related to the traditional notion of cooperativeness, as formalized, e.g., in 
Cohen and Levesque’s ‘Cooperative’ axiom (Cohen and Levesque, 1990b) or in Sadek’s theory  
(Sadek, 1992). The distinctive aspect of Tuomela’s notion of help is that it is embedded into joint 
intentions and actions. Tuomela  argues that participants acting on the basis of a cooperative 
attitude must be disposed to “strong” helping (p. 249).12 Helping in the “full” sense means 
                                                     
11
 In many contexts mutual knowledge will be too strong. We will however stick to mutual knowledge for the purposes 
of this paper.   
12
 Tuomela distinguishes between `helping in the weak sense’ and `helping in the strong sense’. Help in the weak sense 
means  that  agent A is responsive to agent B’s performance of her part of the SCA, in order to successfully complete 
her own part; it is therefore a form of alignment. Helping in the strong sense is supporting the other agent by 
performing part of their performance of an SCA in an essential way. 1.2 and 2.2 in our example are examples of strong 
helping,  whereas Cnst’s acceptances are examples of helping in the weak sense.  
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‘helping in all circumstances in which help is contributive to the others’ part-performances’. It is 
exactly reliance on part-performances (making up a SCA eventually) which distinguishes 
Tuomela’s notion of help from Cohen and Levesque’s (1990b) and Sadek’s (1992),  which 
capture taking over of some agent’s intention. 
In the rest of the paper, we will use Tuomela’s IntInst&Cnst  predicate to express we-intentions, 
adopting the formalization in (4.1.6).    
4.2 An intentional analysis of the example dialogue: first pass  
In order to maintain the complexity of the presentation manageable, we divided the presentation 
of our intentional analysis of the example dialogue between this section and the next. In this 
section we concentrate on we-intentions and shared plans, showing how the Bratman / Tuomela 
framework just introduced can explain how completions are produced, without however 
discussing how completions can be incrementally produced and interpreted, and how the common 
ground gets updated as a result. In fact, we abstract away from the details of the DRT notation and 
of PTT and adopt a vanilla logical form. In the next Section we present a more complete account 
in which these issues are considered as well, using the tools from PTT.  
As said above, our intentional analysis is based on the assumption that at the beginning of the 
conversation Instructor and Constructor have a we-intention –i.e., an SCA in the sense of 
Bratman and Tuomela—that  Constructor assemble a toy airplane identical to the one that the 
Instructor has. (As discussed in Section 3, the argument of the we-intention is a DRS, i.e., a 
proposition, but we adopt a simplified representation in this subsection.) 
(4.2.1) IntInst&Cnst( toy-airplane(x) ∧ assemble(Cnst, x)) 
The Instructor (henceforth, Inst) has a complete13 plan for assembling the toy airplane in 
Figure 2.1 (a) shown in Figure 4.2.1. The dialogue is driven by the goal of making this a shared 
plan by discussing it with the Constructor (henceforth: Cnst), so that Cnst can then execute the 
relevant actions.  (For the purposes of this paper, we’ll assume that the case in which Inst receives  
no instructions, just a completed model of the airplane, can be subsumed under this case as well.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Arguably, a more plausible view is that Inst doesn’t start with  a complete plan for the construction of the model—
instead, he/she develops her private plan incrementally as well. We do not think however that this more plausible, but 
also greatly more complex,  view would have any implications for our account of completions.  
 Assemble toy airplane  
 
 Assemble fuselage 
 
 Assemble wing 
 
Join wing and fuselage 
Figure 4.2.1. Inst’s private plan before the conversation. 
grasp-5h-bar grasp 3h bar 
grasp(screw1) 
join(5h-bar,3h-bar, 
screw1) 
…………………
…. 
grasp(orange-slit-screw 
align wing and fuselage 
insert-screw-
through-hole 
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According to the intentional view, Inst and Cnst develop a shared plan to achieve this we-
intention of assembling the toy airplane. This shared plan is initially highly underspecified and 
simply specifies that Inst and Cnst are going to assemble a toy airplane; but as the conversation 
progresses, the  shared plan gets progressively more refined as each subplan becomes an SCA as 
well.  (Note that the agreed upon actions in the shared plan are immediately executed,  mixing 
planning and execution, unlike in the TRAINS conversations (Gross et al, 1993; Heeman and 
Allen, 1995), for example.) 
At the point at which Inst begins utterance 1.1 in (1.1),  “So jetzt nimmst Du eine …,” the 
goal of Inst is to get Cnst to produce the Baufix plane in Figure 2.1 (a), and the state  of Cnst’s  
assembly  is as shown in Figure 2.1 (b); we repeat Figure 2.1  here for convenience as Figure 
4.2.2. Cnst  has built the tail and the rear part of the fuselage. She has already picked up a 7-hole 
bar which is to become the `wing’ (henceforth, W), has laid it across the `fuselage’ (henceforth, 
F), and has aligned the wing’s and the fuselage’s holes, which will make it possible for a fixing 
mechanism such as a screw to join  wing and fuselage. Each of these steps has been 
acknowledged by Inst and Cnst. (A full listing of the dialogue prior to the fragment being 
analyzed is in Appendix A.) 
 
                                                          
(a) The Baufix model Inst intends Cnst to assemble. 
 
(b) Constructor's state of assembly at the beginning of (1.1) 
 
     Figure 4.2.2. Instructor's and Constructor's respective situations at the beginning of (1.1). 
Given this state of assembly,  the partial shared plan at this point is presumably similar to the one  
shown in sketchy form in Figure 4.2.3. The parts of Inst’s private plan devoted to the assembly of  
fuselage and wing are now shared (in fact, they have already been executed).  Now  Inst and Cnst 
have a we-intention that Cnst join wing and fuselage; this we-intention is indicated in italics as it 
is currently at the top of the agenda. (More details on the shared plan in a moment.) 
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At this point in the conversation Cnst has a private plan as well, a refinement  of the partial 
shared plan in Figure 4.2.3. This private plan probably already contains the information that she 
will need to get a screw in order to join wing and fuselage, as sketchily shown in Figure 4.2.4.  
However, Cnst has lots of spare parts left, above all nine screws which she can in principle use 
for the join as shown in Figure 4.2.5; hence, she cannot refine her own private plan any further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
Figure 4.2.5. Screws available to Cnst at the point when 1.1 is uttered. The intended screw is the orange 
screw with a slit. 
 Assemble toy airplane  
 
 Assemble fuselage 
 
 Assemble wing 
 
Join wing and fuselage 
Figure 4.2.3. The shared  plan at the point the completion takes place. 
grasp(5h-bar) grasp( 3h bar) 
grasp(screw1) 
join(5h-bar,3h-bar, 
screw1) 
…………………
…. 
align wing and fuselage 
… 
 Assemble toy airplane  
 
 Assemble fuselage 
 
 Assemble wing 
 
Join wing and fuselage 
Figure 4.2.4. Cnst’s private  plan at the point the completion takes place. 
grasp(5h-bar) grasp( 3h bar) 
grasp(screw1) 
join(5h-bar,3h-bar,screw1) 
…………………
…. 
grasp(screw) 
align wing and fuselage 
….. 
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As said above, in the Tuomela-derived logical notation just introduced, the currently active 
we-intention to join W and F can be expressed as follows: 
(4.2.2 )   IntInst&Cnst(join(Cnst,W,F)) 
As shown in (4.1.6), repeated below for convenience, Inst and Cnst having  a we-intention to 
join wing and fuselage, in Tuomela’s framework, is equivalent to them mutually knowing that 
each of them has an intention to do this action because of the other agent’s intention to do it: 
(4.1.6)   IntInst&Cnst(join(Cnst, W,F)) 
↔ 
  MK((IntInst (join(Cnst, W,F)) /r IntCnst(join(Cnst, W,F)))  
            ∧  
                     (IntCnst(join(Cnst, W,F)) /r IntInst(join(Cnst, W,F)))) 
 
In order to  join  two objects Cnst  needs, first  of all, to find a screw and a nut.  She must 
then stick the screw through the holes and screw it into the nut in order to produce a stable join of 
three bars (that we will call here the Wing&Fuselage-join).  This partial domain plan, that we 
assume to be shared, can be summarized as follows:14 
(4.2.3)  join(Agent, Bar1,Bar2)     
Step 1:  align(Agent, Bar1, Bar2, Hole1,Hole2), 
Step 2:   grasp(Agent, Screw), 
Step 3:   grasp(Agent, Nut), 
Step 4:  put-through(Agent, Screw, Hole1,Hole2), 
Step 5:  screw-into(Agent, Screw,  Nut),  
As in (Asher and Lascarides, 2003),  we assume that the relation between intentions and 
actions (here formalized in terms of plans) is non-monotonic: i.e., that a plan such as (4.2.3) is  a 
default way of executing a particular action. (Asher and Lascarides formalization of intentions 
and actions does not involve the notion of plans.)  This can be formalized as follows, where we 
use a generic normally involves  operator to state that the conclusions are non-monotonic:15 
(4.2.4)  join(Agent, Bar1, Bar2) normally  involves  b & c & d & e & f 
 where 
 (b) align(Agent, Bar1,Bar2, Hole1,Hole2) 
 (c) grasp(Agent,Screw), 
(d) grasp(Agent, Nut)  
 (e) put-through(Agent, Screw, Hole1,Hole2), 
 (f) screw-into(Agent, Screw,  Nut) 
In the conversations of the Bielefeld corpus,  things are a bit more complex, in two respects: 
(i) actions are performed by Cnst under Inst’s instruction; and (ii) actions are immediately 
executed. As it is not our goal here to provide an account either of the interleaving of planning 
                                                     
14
 We are using a very simplified view of plans here, ignoring the distinction between preconditions –conditions that 
have to hold in order for the plan to be executable—and steps of the plan proper. Normally, having the Nut and the 
Screw would be considered to be a precondition. (This difference is not unlike that between presupposition and 
assertion.)  
15
 (4.2.4) is meant to be a neutral notation which could be reconstructed in different nonmonotonic formalisms.  In 
SDRT, the relation between intentions and plans would be expressed by a conditional, and  normally involves  would 
be Asher and Morreau’s >Asher&Morreau  operator. In PTT defaults are inference rules, formulated using Brewka’s (1990) 
prioritized version of Reiter’s (1980) Default Logic). 
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and execution, or of the interleaving of discourse plans and domain plans (see e.g., (Litman and 
Allen, 1990)), we simplify matters by assuming that in this domain, shared plans / meshing 
subplans combine discourse actions, domain actions, and execution. For the particular example 
under discussion, the resulting plan is assumed to be as shown in (4.2.5). According to this plan 
for Cnst to join wing and fuselage,  in order to jointly perform the action currently we-intended,  
Inst  has to produce the directives triggering these actions; each of these results in actions by 
Cnst; and at the end, Cnst must communicate that she  completed the actions demanded. 
(4.2.5) join(Cnst, W, F) 
 
normally involves  b & c & d & e & f & g, where  
(b)  1. directive(Inst, Cnst, align(Cnst, W, F, Hole1, Hole2)), 
 2. align(Cnst, wing, fuselage, Hole1, Hole2), 
 3. assert(Cnst, Inst, aligned(Cnst, W, F, Hole1, Hole2)) 
(c) 1. directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Screw)), 
 2. grasp(Cnst, Screw), 
 3. assert(Cnst, Inst, grasped(Cnst, Screw )) 
(d) 1. directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Nut)), 
 2. grasp(Cnst, Nut), 
 3. assert(Cnst, Inst, grasped(Cnst, Nut)) 
(e)  1. directive(Inst, Cnst, put-through(Cnst, Screw, Hole1,Hole2)), 
 2. put-through(Cnst, Screw, Hole1,Hole2), 
 3. tell(Cnst, Inst, put-through(Cnst, Screw, Hole1,Hole2)) 
(f) 1. directive(Inst, Cnst, screw-into(Cnst, Screw, Nut)), 
 2. screw-into(Cnst, Screw, Nut), 
 3. assert(Cnst, Inst, screwed-into(Cnst, Screw, Nut)) 
(g) assert(Cnst, Inst, joined(Cnst, W,F). 
We will assume throughout this Section and the next that intention recognition for Cnst amounts 
to  recognizing  the directives and performing the required actions.16 
Bratman’s and Tuomela’s  theories of intention make the stronger assumption that  a we-
intention to bring-about a W&F join distributes over the conjuncts: i.e.,  having a we-intention to 
bring about an action entails we-intentions for all parts of the plan. With this assumption, we 
would then also derive from (4.2.1) and (4.2.5) (c) the following: 
(h) IntInst&Cnst (directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Screw))) 
(i) IntInst&Cnst  (grasp(Cnst, Screw)) 
(j) IntInst&Cnst  ( assert (Cnst, Inst, grasped(Cnst, Screw))). 
Notice that even with this assumption, Inst and Cnst would still have different private plans 
and different private intentions: Inst, seeing the fully built up airplane model on his side, 
subscribes to 
(4.2.6)  IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, orange-slit-screw)))17 
whereas for Cnst we have 
(4.2.7) IntCnst(grasp(Cnst, Screw)). 
(The difference between (4.2.6) and (4.2.7)  is due to the fact that grasp(Cnst, Screw) can be 
satisfied by Cnst in various ways due to the nine screws she has.) The point is that if we make the 
further assumption that IntInst&Cnst  is distributive, we get (4.2.7)  irrespective  of any inferences 
                                                     
16
 Intention recognition could also be formalized in such a way as to bypass the directive recognition stage, and 
assuming simply that Cnst recognizes Inst’s intention of Cnst performing a particular action. An account along these 
lines would not, however, differ from the one we are adopting  for our purposes. 
17
 We are not being very precise concerning notation here. Quantificational formulae are sometimes represented as 
constants for convenience’s sake. 
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due to the verbal exchange: in other words, with this assumption, Cnst already wants to grasp a 
screw before Inst starts his directive. (Cnst’s  intention can be satisfied because there are screws  
on his side of the screen.) The only difference between the two plans would then be that Cnst 
doesn’t know which particular elements have to be used. However, we will remain non-committal 
on whether Cnst  derives  (4.2.7) from distributivity of we-intentions or from the directive and 
cooperativity. 
We now consider how an intentional account explains what may have caused  Cnst to 
produce a completion in 1.2.  Given that IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Screw))) is the 
next step in the interleaved discourse / domain plan in (4.2.5)  to achieve SCA (4.2.2),  we may 
ceteris paribus assume that by uttering Well, now you grasp  Inst has started the production of the 
next directive in this shared plan. What about Cnst’s contribution? According to the mutually 
intended  step (d) of (4.2.5), Cnst should by  default wait until  Inst has fully produced his 
directive,  and only then she  should do the grasping. But she intervenes. So we must explain: 
a. the cause for the completion, including the information used for the intervention; 
b. how the old shared plan changes, and what the new shared plan looks like;  
c. the relation between old and new shared plan.  
Let us start with the cause for the completion and the information used for the intervention. 
The step in the plan which is we-intended at this point in the conversation is: 
join(Inst and Cnst,W, F). 
Inst begins to perform the next step, (c): 
directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, orange-slit-screw)). 
However,  Cnst ‘jumps in’ before the directive is completed, and possibly without being 
prompted by some sort of request for help (as we saw in Section 2, there is some  evidence that in 
this particular example a request for completion may have been made using prosody, but the 
matter  is not entirely clear, and these signals are not encountered with all completions). Clearly,  
Cnst has been  trying to compare her expectations (based on the plan she assumes to be shared) 
with the actions she observes (as proposed, e.g., in the MOSAIC model (Wolpert et al, 2003))  
and she has been doing this incrementally. As a result, even before Inst’s  utterance of the 
directive  is completed, Cnst has already related the incomplete utterance she  is observing  to the 
next step in the shared plan,  directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Screw)). We will discuss in more 
detail how this can happen in the next section, in which PTT is used to provide a detailed account 
of incremental semantic interpretation in this example. 
As we said above, in a theory in which we-intentions are assumed to distribute over the 
subactions of plans, recognizing this directive is  predicted to be fairly straightforward, as 
intention  (4.2.6) would already be near the top of Cnst’s agenda. Otherwise, some sort of search 
through the space of possible plans to achieve (4.2.2) must be assumed. 
By comparing the part of the directive that has already been produced by Inst with the 
directive she expects, Cnst can hypothesize that what’s missing so far is an utterance of the fact 
that the object to be grasped is a screw. (There is no more information about this in the shared 
plan, and as there are nine screws, there are nine ways  to make the plan more specific, so there is 
no way for Cnst to make the recognition more precise, except by guessing. ) 
We  see at least four  ways of explaining why Cnst follows up this  recognition with a 
decision to utter “a screw”: 
a. Responding to a Request: Cnst may have interpreted 1.1 (more precisely, its 
prosodic lengthening) either as a Request to perform a Continue (DU), or as a 
Request to Acknowledge the DU. In either case, in PTT it is assumed that the 
result is an obligation:  
obl(Cnst,cont(DU)) or obl(Cnst, ack(DU)). 
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 Notice how an account of this type presupposes a theory of obligations and their 
discharge such as the theory in (Matheson, Poesio and Traum, 2000).   
b. Voluntary coordination-level control: Even without having interpreted Inst’s 
utterance as a request, Cnst may nevertheless intend  to signal her understanding 
of the directive: i.e., to acknowledge Inst’s directive. Acknowledging a directive 
cannot be done simply by repeating the part already uttered: this might be 
interpreted simply as a partial acknowledgment of only the part of the directive 
already performed. Hence, Cnst acquires the (private) intention to perform the 
missing part of the directive (as above). However, the directive is still considered 
by Cnst as  performed by Inst only. Such an account presupposes a theory of 
grounding acts like the one discussed in Section 3. 
c. Cooperativeness: Cnst intends to help Inst to perform the directive:  
    directive(Inst,Cnst,grasp(Cnst,Screw)).  
We formalize this as Cnst making  performing the directive into a  shared plan:18  
 IntCnst&Inst (directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,grasp(Cnst,Screw))).  
This leads to Cnst performing an   “unrequired contributory action”: performing 
the part of the directive that is missing. As a result, Cnst assumes the private 
intention:  
 IntCnst (utter(“a screw”)) 
d. Blurting out: Cnst feels that Inst is taking too long to perform a simple directive. 
As soon as Cnst  recognizes the directive that Inst is trying to perform, the plan 
(in terms of utterance actions) Inst is using to do so,  and what is still missing for 
the completion of this plan, Cnst  acquires the intention to utter the missing part, 
without necessarily making the directive into a joint action, and without 
necessarily intending to acknowledge Inst’s contribution.  (Although both 
intentions could be there.)  
All these are valid explanations of what may have happened, but we won’t have enough 
space to pursue  all of them in detail. In a way, explanation d. is the most interesting, but also the 
most difficult to formalize. Explanations a.-c. all involve reasoning about information states—i.e., 
the type of explanation that is most in contrast with the alignment model proposed by Pickering 
and Garrod—so we will concentrate on them. Further, explanations a. and b. are examples of the 
type of interaction most closely studied in previous work on PTT, particularly in (Matheson, 
Poesio and Traum, 2000), so we will primarily concentrate on providing a detailed account of the 
Cooperativeness explanation, c., providing however the bare bones of an account according to a. 
and b.—and in particular, of the interaction between such account and the grounding process. 
After the completion,  as a  result of Inst and Cnst’s coordinated action we get  a complete 
directive: Well, now you take a screw. However, there is a difference between this directive and 
the version in Inst’s private plan: 
IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, orange-slit-screw))) 
Inst may  react to  Cnst’s contribution by either  
a. Accepting the completion (either because the complete speech act reflects Inst’s 
initial intention, or because Inst considers the new directive a valid alternative);  
b. Rejecting it, 
c. Performing a literal resumption, 
d. Paraphrasing it, or 
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 This notion of cooperativeness is different from Cohen and Levesque’s in two respects. First of all, Cnst is deriving a 
joint intention from a shared plan, instead of deriving a private intention from Inst’s plan. Secondly, as we will see in 
Section 5, Cnst is adopting an intention to perform part of a plan whose execution would satisfy an obligation of Inst, 
instead of performing an action from scratch.  
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e. Refashioning it, by modifying some aspects of it..  
In this particular case, Inst appears to be performing a refashioning, as discussed in Sections 2 
and 3  (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). Inst knows that orange-slit-screw ⊂ screw; this can be 
captured by the following meaning postulate: 
orange-slit-screw(x) := screw(x) ∧ orange(x) ∧ ∃y(slit(y) ∧ with(y,x)). 
So he accepts some aspects of the contribution, but adds more material to ensure the right 
screw is identified.  Inst’s intention is of refashioning the directive currently under elaboration 
into the  more specific directive: 
IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, screw(x) ∧ orange(x) ∧ ∃y(slit(y) ∧ with(y,x))))). 
Again, Inst compares the directive already produced with his intended directive. A screw has  
already been produced; the difference between  Cnst’s ∃x(screw(x)) and Inst’s ∃x(screw(x) ∧ 
orange(x) ∧ ∃y(slit(y) ∧ with(y,x)), is 
∃x(orange(x) ∧ ∃y(slit(y) ∧ with(y,x)). 
We get the more economical 
IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, orange(x) ∧ ∃y(slit(y) ∧ with(y,x))))) 
yielding an orange one with a slit. 
Notice how performing the type of reasoning discussed here requires the ability to talk about 
incomplete speech acts,  i.e., a theory such as PTT. We next show how PTT allows us to make the 
account just presented more precise. 
5 An Intentional Analysis of the Example Dialogue: Second Pass  
In this section we analyze the example dialogue,  utterance unit by utterance unit,19  
supplementing the intentional analysis just provided with a discussion of how the utterance units 
are  incrementally interpreted and produced according to the PTT view of  interpretation, 
generation and the grounding process, on the basis of the grammar given in the CDRT fragment in 
Appendix B. The analysis of these aspects we will provide is very detailed. On the other hand, 
PTT, unlike SDRT,   does not provide (yet) a complete set of default rules specifying the inferential 
connection between utterances and their interpretation, so we will only discuss these inferences in 
an informal way.  (See (Poesio, 1994; Poesio, 1996; Poesio, To Appear) for a discussion of the 
use of Prioritized Default Logic in PTT and a formalization of other types of inferences within it.) 
5.1 Discourse situation updates up to the point just before 1.1   
We discussed  in Section 4 how according  to the intentional analysis, a conversation like the one 
from which fragment (1.1) is extracted is driven by Inst and Cnst’s we-intention to build a toy 
plane according to the model given to Inst, which in the simplified view adopted here becomes 
the  private plan in Figure 4.2.1. By way of his instructions, Inst turns the private plan into a 
progressively more specified shared plan interleaving discourse and domain actions as in the 
example in (4.2.5).  As a result of Cnst’s performing the domain actions in this shared plan, Inst 
and Cnst reach the situation whose relevant aspects are depicted in Figure 4.2.1 (state of 
assembly) and Figure 4.2.4 (leftover screws). 
In PTT, performing a directive amounts to performing a contribution which, ultimately, 
amounts to a series of micro-updates as in (3.3.5), each of which has to be properly grounded. 
The  discourse situation just before  (1.1) is a record of both core speech acts and micro 
conversational events performed up to that point.  
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 Following (Traum, 1994, Traum & Nakatani, 1999, Poesio and Traum, 1997, Poesio and Traum, 1998)  we use the 
term UTTERANCE UNIT to refer to basic units of dialogue processing, corresponding roughly  to prosodic units. 
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5.2 Production of 1.1: So, jetzt nimmst Du …   
We saw in section 4.2 that at this point in the dialogue, Inst and Const we-intend to join two 
specific objects,  that we will call here wing1 and fuselage1.20 In PTT notation, and using DRSs as 
intentional contents,  the fact that  we-intention (4.2.2) is part of  the common ground is captured  
by including (5.2.1) among the conditions characterizing the discourse situation.21 
(5.2.1)  i1.1a:IntInst&Cnst ([e1| e1:join(Cnst,wing1,fuselage1)]) 
We also saw that in the BTPC conversations such goals are achieved by following plans 
along the lines of (4.2.5), whose next step (step (c))  is a  directive by Inst to  Cnst to grasp a  
screw.  In PTT terms, performing such a directive amounts to planning (i.e. intending) a 
conversational event ce1.1 of  type directive and with content proposition K1.1: the occurrence 
of an event e of Cnst grasping orange-slit-screw. (The event should take place in the future, but 
we will omit tense here for brevity).   
(5.2.2) i1.1b:IntInst([ce1.1,K1.1| K1.1 is  [x,e| x is orange-slit-screw, e:grasp(Cnst, x)],  
                                     ce1.1:directive(Inst,Cnst,K1.1)]) 
A couple of remarks about (5.2.2). Notice, first, that embedded DRSs are essential to 
formulate this intention. Secondly, Inst’s intention  is about a  specific screw (represented here as 
the constant orange-slit-screw), instead of the more general intention to grasp an x which is a 
screw (in (5.2.2’)) which can be expected to be in the shared plan. (That Inst’s intention is about a 
specific screw is suggested, e.g., by the subsequent repair.) 
(5.2.2’)  i1.1b’:IntInst([ce1.1,K1.1 |K1.1 is [x,e|screw(x),e:grasp(Cnst,x)], 
                                                           ce1.1:directive(Inst, Cnst, K1.1)]) 
(In passing, note also that if we assume that we-intentions distribute over the plan in (4.2.5), 
Cnst could  derive (5.2.2’) from the non-specific joint intention in the shared plan shown in 
(5.2.2’’).) 
(5.2.2’’)   i1.1b'’:IntInst&Cnst([ce1.1,K1.1| K1.1=[x,e|screw(x), e:grasp(Cnst, x)] ,  
                                                           ce1.1:directive(Inst, Cnst, K1.1)]) 
Assuming that  intentions to perform domain actions lead to the adoption of domain plans to 
achieve such intentions via von Wright’s (1963) Practical Syllogism,22 (5.2.2)  leads to Inst’s  
plan of performing an utterance generating the directive in the sense discussed in Section 3.1, 
example (3.1.5). To simplify matters, we assume here, as in (Poesio and Traum, 1997), that this 
plan amounts to intending to perform an utterance up1.123 whose conventional meaning (the 
value of sem(up1.1)) is the same as the content of the directive. This intention is dominated by 
the intention i1.1b of performing a directive, ensuring that this intention is about the same ce1.1 
and K1.1 as intention i1.1b (Poesio and Traum, 1997).    
(5.2.3) i1.1c:IntInst([up1.1 | utterance(up1.1),  sem(up1.1) = K1.1,  generate(up1.1,ce1.1)]) 
(5.2.3) is the starting point for the generation process. And at this point, the hypothesis that 
the participants’ record of the discourse situation includes information about the occurrence of 
micro conversational events – events of uttering sub-sentential constituents—does begin to do 
                                                     
20
 We remind the reader that in CDRT, unlike standard DRT, there are regular constants; wing1 and fuselage1 are  such 
constants, and so is  orange-slit-screw. 
21
 We will generally assume de dicto (wide scope) intentions. 
22
 Intending ϕ and believing that performing action χ has as a consequence ϕ leads to performing χ: Intend (ϕ) ∧ 
Bel(χ→ϕ) → Do χ (from Wright, Georg Henryk von. 1963. "Practical Inference." Philosophical Review, 72:159-179. 
_______. 1972. "On the So-Called Practical Inference." Acta Sociologica, 15:39-53.)  
23
 Terminological note: we use discourse referents named upi.j to indicate phrasal utterances, where i is the number of 
the turn. We use discourse referents named ui.j to indicate lexical utterances. 
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some work. Specifically, the MCE hypothesis (i) connects intentions such as (5.2.3) with their 
syntactic realization, and (ii) provides us with an account of the information that is available to 
Cnst when she starts planning her completion. 
In PTT, performing an utterance with the conventional meaning represented by K1.1 is   
viewed as an action (of type utter). We can then view the results of surface realization, the 
process of determining the surface structure to be used to realize an utterance up1.1 with content 
K1.1 (Reiter and Dale,  1995), as a plan just like those produced in other types of planning. (The 
assumption being of course that specialized planners, called SURFACE REALIZERS in natural 
language generation, are responsible for this task.) As shown in (3.3.5),  the plan chosen by Inst 
for producing  conventional meaning K1.1  in this particular occasion  involves  choosing up1.1 
to be an utterance of type S. This action is decomposed in the performance of an utterance u1.2 of 
the temporal adverbial “Jetzt” and an utterance of a second phrasal utterance of type S, here 
called up1.2. Performing up1.2 involves performing a (phonetically silent) utterance up1.3 of type 
NP24 and an utterance up1.4 of type VP, which in turn involves three subactions: an utterance 
u1.3 of type V (“nimmst”), a subject utterance up1.5 of type NP (“Du”), and a complement 
utterance up1.6 of type NP  (“eine orangene Schraube mit einem Schlitz”).  
Another advantage of the micro-conversational events hypothesis is that we do not need to 
assume that every utterance that gets produced is  a constituent of a single syntactic tree—a big 
`sign’ in the HPSG sense.  In the case of 1.1, for example, it is plausible to view at least the first 
“So” (indicated here as u1.0),  and possibly even “jetzt”, as separately planned utterances 
intended to achieve quite distinct goals from the other utterances which generate the directive. In 
this case, “So” would seem to realize a turn-taking action, whose goal is to take the turn and keep 
it  (Traum and Hinkelman, 1992; Traum, 1994; Poesio and Traum, 1997).25  The hesitation that 
may or may not have occurred at the end of 1.1 would play a turn-taking oriented goal, as well, 
and possibly a role in the grounding process. To show what such an analysis would be, we 
assume here this interpretation for  “So,”  whereas we interpret the utterance of “jetzt” as an 
utterance of type Advp with a  sentence-adjunct interpretation.  Omitting many of the details 
already shown in (3.3.5), including lexical interpretations and many sub-utterances, and using the 
notation u:“word“:Cat to stand for:  
u:utter(A,“word“), Cat(u) 
Inst’s  plan to satisfy i1.1c in (5.2.3) becomes a plan of performing the actions shown in tree 
format in Figure 5.2.1 and in linear format in (5.2.4).26 Intention i1.1d is dominated by i1.1c. 
(5.2.4) i1.1d:IntInst([u1.0,ce1.0,up1.1,u1.2,u1.3,up1.2,up1.3,up1.4,u1.4,up1.5,up1.6|  
u1.0: utter(Inst, “so”), ce1.0: take-turn(Inst), 
generate(u1.0,ce1.0), 
S(up1.1) , sem(up1.1)= K1.1,  
u1.2:“jetzt“:Advp,  S(up1.2), u1.2 ↑ up1.1,  up1.2 ↑ up1.1,   
NP(up1.3), VP(up1.4), up1.3 ↑ up1.2,    up1.4 ↑ up1.2,     
u1.3:“nimmst“:V,  u1.3 ↑ up1.4, NP(up1.5), up1.5 ↑ up1.4, 
u1.4:“Du“:Pro, u1.4 ↑ up1.5,  
up1.6:“eine orangene Schraube mit einem Schlitz“:NP, 
up1.6 ↑ up1.4]) 
                                                     
24
 According to LTAG syntax, directives have a phonetically empty NP in subject position. 
25
 “So” could also be interpreted as a READY signal as in the MapTask scheme (Carletta et al, 1997).  
26
 We have assumed for simplicity that the entire utterance is planned at once. However, in a more plausible theory, the 
generation process would be incremental, as well. 
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The overall mental state of Inst after acquiring intentions i1.1b, i1.1c, and i1.1d is portrayed 
in ‘box’ format in Figure 5.2.1, where constituency relations are also displayed in a graphical 
format. 
 
As said in Section 3,  in the PTT model of contributions—derived from Clark and Schaefer’s 
proposals as modified by Traum—the intention to perform a core dialogue act  leads to an 
intention to make a new contribution, i.e., to open a new DU, according to the CE-TO-DU-
SCHEMA here repeated: 
[CE-TO-DU-SCHEMA]  
Intcp1([ce | ce:core-act(cp1,cp2,Φ)]) Intcp1([DU | DU is [ce | ce:core-act(cp1,cp2,Φ)]]) 
Because of this schema, (5.2.2), (5.2.3) and (5.2.4) lead to (5.2.5): 
(5.2.5) i1.1e:IntInst([DU1.1Inst |  
 DU1.1Inst is  
  [ce1.1,K1.1,up1.1,u1.0,ce1.0,u1.2,u1.3,up1.2,up1.3,up1.4,  
  u1.4, up1.5,up1.6| 
                                                  K1.1 is [x,e| x is orange-slit-screw,  e:grasp(Cnst, x)],  
  ce1.1:directive(Inst, Cnst,K1.1), 
  utterance(up1.1), sem(up1.1) is K1.1,  
  generate(up1.1,ce1.1), 
  ..... remaining conditions from (5.2.4) ...  
                                                               ]]) 
Figure 5.2.1.   Inst’s mental state after sentence planning. 
…. 
i1.1b:IntInst  ([K1.1,ce1.1| 
                              K1.1 is [e, x|  x is orange-slit-screw,e:grasp(Cnst,x)] 
                              ce1.1:directive(Inst, Cnst, K1.1)]) 
i1.1c:IntInst  ([up1.1| utterance(up1.1), sem(up1.1) = K1.1, generate(up1.1,ce1.1)]) 
 
i1.1d:IntInst 
u1.0 ce1.0 u1.1 u1.2 u1.3 up1.2 up1.3 up1.4 u1.4 up1.5 up1.6 
u1.0:utter(Inst,“so"), 
ce1.0:take-turn(Inst),  
generate(u1.0,ce1.0), 
”eine orangene Schraube mit 
einem Schlitz” 
up1.1:S 
u1.2:”jetzt”:Advp 
up1.4:VP 
up1.3:NP 
u1.3:”nimmst”:V up1.5:NPi up1.6:NP 
u1.4:”Du”:Pro 
εi 
up1.2:S 
… i1.1b i1.1c i1.1d 
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Intentions such as i1.1e in (5.2.5) lead to Inst performing the planned action, i.e., beginning a new 
contribution.  Inst starts executing this intention, succeeding to perform u1.2, u1.3, and u1.4. It’s 
not clear to us whether the lengthening observed at this point is meant to indicate a problem – 
e.g., that Inst has forgotten which screws are unused, and therefore does not know what 
description would be adequate (Dale and Reiter, 1995; Stone, 2004)— a request for 
acknowledgment, or whether it is just accidental. 
5.3 The completion: 1.2, “eine Schraube” 
The process that leads Cnst to produce the completion begins when she observes  Inst 
performing the first four micro-conversational actions of his planned contribution. As discussed 
in Section 3,  according to PTT observing these utterances  leads Cnst to create a number of new 
Discourse Units, each of which represents “material to be grounded”; one ‘micro-DU’ per 
utterance event is assumed. For simplicity, however, we represent here Cnst’s  interpretation of  
the utterance events in 1.1 as a single new Discourse Unit, that we will call DU1.1Cnst (to 
emphasize that it need not be the same as the DU from Inst’s perspective). The update to the 
discourse situation resulting from the observation of DU1.1Cnst  is shown in linear format in 
(5.3.1) and in graphical format in Figure 5.3.1. This new contribution minimally contains a record 
of the occurrence of each utterance, together with the results of lexical access and  (incremental) 
parsing (see (Poesio, 1995; Poesio and Muskens, 1997; Poesio, To Appear) for details). 
Assuming that there are no interpretation problems, DU1.1Cnst  would be a partial representation 
of the DU planned by Inst, as shown in (5.2.5). The difference between the two is that in the 
contribution observed by Cnst, NP up1.6  hasn’t yet been observed, but it is already expected.27 
(In addition, a new dialogue act ce1.1  is presumably hypothesized, but at this point there is no 
evidence that it has already been classified as a directive, although that is likely as well given the 
information from word order and the pending we-intention.) 
(5.3.1) [ DU1.1Cnst | 
    DU1.1
 Cnst is [u1.0,ce1.1,u1.2,up1.1,u1.3,up1.2,up1.3,up1.4,up1.5,up1.6,u1.4 |  
u1.0: “so“:take-turn,     
S(up1.1),  u1.2:“jetzt“:Advp,  S(up1.2),  
u1.2 ↑ up1.1,  up1.2 ↑ up1.1,   
u1.3:“nimmst“:V, NP(up1.3), VP(up1.4),   
up1.3 ↑ up1.2, up1.4 ↑ up1.2, 
u1.3 ↑ up1.4,   NP(up1.5),  up1.5 ↑ up1.4, NP(up1.6),   
up1.6 ↑up1.4, 
u1.4:“Du“:NP,  u1.4 ↑ up1.5 ]] 
(5.3.1) is the starting point for Cnst’s semantic interpretation process. The extent to which 
semantic construction and speech act interpretation take  place immediately is still an open 
question (our views are discussed in more detail in (Poesio, To Appear)).  The interpretation in 
(5.3.1) simply  encodes the results of lexical access and preliminary syntactic interpretation, both 
of which are known to at least begin very early (Swinney 1979, Simpson 1994, Frazier 1987, 
Tanenhaus et al 1995).  There is also evidence that the observation of the occurrence of an event 
of uttering an anaphoric NP such as a pronoun is sufficient to start the processes by which such 
expressions are interpreted, as discussed in (Poesio, 2001; Poesio, To Appear). How much more 
interpretation takes place? As discussed  in Section 4, under the intentional account  the fact that a 
completion takes place is an indication  that Cnst somehow manages to recognize Inst’s intention 
to perform a directive. (We represented this intention there using  the simplified form 
IntInst(directive(Inst, Cnst, grasp(Cnst, Screw))). )  This recognition is what prompts Cnst to 
utter “eine Schraube.” A more explicit PTT representation of the result of the first of these 
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 We assume here that Inst and Cnst have the same mental grammar. 
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inferential processes is shown in (A), whereas the intention to utter a screw would be represented 
as in (B).  
(A) IntInst([ce1.1, K1.1 | 
                 K1.1=[x,e|screw(x), e:grasp(Cnst, x)]  
                 ce1.1:directive(Inst,Cnst,K1.1)]) 
(B) IntCnst([u|u:utter(Cnst,”eine Schraube”)]) 
 
 
 (Note that it’s hard to tell from the dialogue whether Cnst has already identified a particular 
screw, so we will not assume anything in this respect here.) 
We consider two hypotheses concerning the way Cnst reaches conclusion (A).  As for the 
way recognition of (A) leads to the adoption of intention (B), we already saw in Section 4 that 
this can be explained in a number of ways, and a number of these alternative hypotheses seem 
equally plausible, so that choosing among them would amount to mind reading.  We will 
nevertheless attempt to show that several such hypotheses could be expressed in terms of PTT. 
5.3.1 Identifying intention (A)  
Existential Closure One hypothesis concerning the process through which Cnst reaches 
conclusion (A) is based on the operation of EXISTENTIAL CLOSURE proposed by Chater, Pickering 
and Milward (1995). According to Chater et al, existential closure takes place every time a new 
input is perceived; its purpose is to produce propositions out of partial syntactic interpretations,  
up1.1:S 
u1.2:”jetzt”:Advp 
up1.4:VP 
Figure 5.3.1. Cnst’s interpretation after perceiving 1.1. 
DU1.1 is 
up1.2:S 
up1.3:NP 
εi 
u1.3:”nimmst”:V up1.5:NPi up1.6:NP 
u1.4:”Du”:Pro 
u1.0 ce1.0 ce1.1 up1.1 u1.2 u1.3 up1.2 up1.3 up1.4 u1.4 up1.5 up1.6  
…   DU1.1 
u1.0:utter(Inst,“so"), 
ce1.0:take-turn(Inst),  
generate(u1.0,ce1.0), 
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so that the new input can be immediately evaluated against the current situation.  In PTT terms, 
the existential closure hypothesis amounts to hypothesizing that Cnst attempts to derive a 
proposition as the conventional meaning of up1.1 by existentially closing the  missing argument, 
even when the only information at her disposal is what is presented in (5.3.1). More explicitly,  
the hypothesis is that as a result of observing the contribution represented in (5.3.1) as DU1.1
 Cnst, 
Cnst hypothesizes a new DRS  K1.1 as the  argument of an intention attributed to Inst: K1.1 is the 
proposition that an event of the Constructor taking an object x yet to be determined will have to 
take place.28 (In PTT, the result of all inferences performed by Cnst on the basis of (5.3.1), such as 
existential closure,  is viewed as material to be grounded separately,  i.e., as a separate DU; for 
simplicity here we will however assume that all such inferences are added to the same DU, DU1.1
 
Cnst.) We remind the reader that we specify DRS updates using the notation K+= K’, defined as 
follows:  (see Section 3.2): 
K += K’: Let  K be  a proposition-valued discourse referent, and K’ be a proposition 
(DRS) or a proposition-valued discourse referent. Then    
K += K’ =def [ TmpK| TmpK is  K];[ K| K is TmpK;K’]   
(where TmpK is a new proposition-valued discourse referent) 
Using this notation, the result of existential closure is the update of Cnst’s view of the discourse 
situation in (5.3.2). 
(5.3.2) DU1.1
 Cnst += [K1.1| K1.1 is [x,e|e:grasp(Cnst,x)]]. 
This update of the information state changes the value of DU1.1Cnst  by adding to it the existence 
of a new proposition K1.1 whose content is the existence of an event of grasping an unspecified 
object x. 
The recognition by Cnst that an action of grasping something is being discussed is the basis 
for her inferring that the grasping action in DU1.1Cnst  is the first step in performing the action 
currently we-intended. We recall that under the intentional account, Inst and Cnst are operating 
under the shared plan for bringing about the required join of the three pieces in (4.2.5), involving 
both domain and discourse actions. The next step in the ‘existential closure hypothesis’ is that 
inferring (5.3.2) leads Cnst to infer that Inst is performing the second directive (c.1) in the shared 
plan in (4.2.5). (The acceptance by Cnst of that directive will result in Cnst’s adopting the 
intention of performing the action indicated by the directive, (c.2) in (4.2.5).) 29 This inference 
leads  to Cnst updating her view of the content K1.1 of the directive with the information 
[|screw(x)]: 
(5.3.2’)  DU1.1
 Cnst += (K1.1 += [|screw(x)]) 
(which, by virtue of the definition of +=, is equivalent to updating the information state twice as 
follows: 
[TmpK| TmpK is DU1.1
 Cnst]; 
[DU1.1
 Cnst| DU1.1 Cnst is TmpK;[TmpK’| TmpK’ is K1.1][K1.1| K1.1 is TmpK’; [|screw(x)]]], 
i.e., update the value of DU1.1
 Cnst  within the information state by adding the condition that x is a 
screw to the value of K1.1 within DU1.1
 Cnst). Then Cnst updates DU1.1 Cnst with  (A),  i.e., she 
attributes to Inst a directive  whose content is the updated K1.1 . This is shown in (5.3.3). Notice 
that this intention is the intention discussed above in (5.2.2’). (As above, we assume Cnst ascribes 
                                                     
28
 As pointed out to us by Jonathan Ginzburg (p.c.), existential closure as specified by Chater et al, and as implemented 
here, is a significant simplification in that in a dialogue not all core dialogue acts have a proposition as a content: the 
content of interrogatives are questions, and the content of directives presumably would be some form of action type. 
(For an ontology of the type of objects required in a theory of dialogue, see (Ginzburg, 2009).) 
29
 In  the ‘standard’ version of PTT, as presented, e.g., in (Matheson, Poesio, and Traum, 2000), adopting  this intention 
would be  a way of addressing the obligation raised by the directive. As already said above, we are not concerned with  
obligations here. 
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to Inst a de dicto intention. Also, as discussed in Section 4, we leave it undetermined here 
whether this  private intention attributed to Inst is directly derived from we-intention (h) derived 
from (4.2.5) via distributivity of we-intention.) 
(5.3.3) DU1.1
 Cnst +=       [i1.1b’|i1.1b’:IntInst([ce1.1, K1.1|  
                                                                              sem(up1.1) is K1.1, 
K1.1 is [x,e|screw(x),e:grasp(Cnst,x)], 
                      generate(up1.1,ce1.1), 
                                   ce1.1:directive(Inst,Cnst,K1.1)])] 
Direct inference  from the lexicon to the plan  An alternative analysis of the inference process 
leading Cnst to conclude (5.3.3)  is that Cnst recognized that Inst is performing directive (c.1) in 
(4.2.5)  directly from the lexical meaning of u1.3 in  (5.3.1), which is a mention of a grasping 
action. In other words,  mentioning a grasping action is sufficient by itself to activate step (c.1) of 
the shared plan in (4.2.5), without the  step of existential closure resulting in (5.3.2).  Although 
the end result would again be (5.3.3), this second hypothesis has the advantage of avoiding the 
need to stipulate that existential closure takes place after each and every utterance; and there is 
increasing  evidence for this type of ‘surface’ semantic reasoning (see, e.g., the work by Ferreira 
et al on ‘good enough’ representations, (Ferreira, Ferraro, and Bailey 2002)). 
5.3.2 Acquiring intention (B) to perform a completion  
As discussed in Section 4, we can think of at least four possible explanations for the fact that Cnst 
acquires intention (B) to perform a completion:  responding to a request, voluntary coordination 
control (Clark’s ‘collaborative completions’), cooperativeness, and ‘blurting out’. All these four 
explanations assume that Cnst recognizes (5.3.1) as a partial plan for performing the contribution 
in (5.3.3).  We discuss each in turn. 
Cooperativity What we called the ‘cooperativity explanation’ in Section 4 is that Cnst decides 
to change the current contribution by modifying  the directive into a joint action (and adding 
some details).  Revising a contribution in this way is a sort of refashioning (Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1990, p. 481-486) of the DU that represented the contribution. As discussed in Section 3, 
refashioning is formalized in terms of the system of grounding actions proposed by Traum (1994) 
and adopted in PTT as a repair grounding act: Cnst proposes to replace DU1.1Cnst, according to 
which it is Inst alone who performs the directive, with the concatenation of DU1.1Cnst and DU1.2, 
DU1.1Cnst;DU1.2  (shown in (5.3.4)), in which the directive is a joint action of Inst and Cnst. 
DU1.1Cnst;DU1.2 still contains all the information in Figure 5.3.1, including the information about 
utterances and the fact that sem(up1.1) = K1.1.    
(5.3.4) [i1.2a| i1.2a:IntCnst([DU1.2,ce1.2| 
DU1.2 is [ce1.1, K1.1| 
     K1.1 is[x,e|screw(x),e:grasp(Cnst,x)], 
                               ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1)] 
                        ce1.2:repair(Cnst,DU1.1
 Cnst,DU1.1 Cnst;DU1.2)])] 
If the repair is accepted, (each participant’s view of contribution) DU1.1 gets replaced by 
DU1.2, as seen in Section 3 and discussed below.  (Arguably, Cnst is also acknowledging the 
partial contribution represented by DU1.2; we will discuss this additional function of the 
completion shortly.) 
After deciding to turn the directive into a joint action, Cnst has to decide how best to 
complete it—i.e., which additional utterance actions to perform in order to generate ce1.1 as in 
(5.3.4).  Again, Cnst may have determined which utterances are missing from (5.2.4) in a number 
of ways. The simplest explanation is that a sort of structural alignment took place: Cnst develops 
her own plan for performing the directive in (5.3.4), and then compares this plan with the actions 
she observed. Cnst’s plan to perform ce1.1 is  a series of utterances very much like those in 
(5.2.4), except that it includes the generic “eine Schraube”  instead of the more specific NP “eine 
COMPLETIONS, COORDINATION AND ALIGNMENT IN  DIALOGUE 
 45 
orangene Schraube mit einem Schlitz”, so the conventional meaning she associates to up1.1 is the 
generic proposition to grasp a screw. Cnst’s utterance plan is shown in (5.3.5).30 
(5.3.5) [ce1.1, u1.2, up1.1, u1.3, up1.2, up1.3, up1.4, up1.5, up1.6, u1.4 |  
S(up1.1) ,  sem(up1.1) is K1.1,31  
u1.2:“jetzt“:Advp,  S(up1.2), u1.2 ↑ up1.1,  up1.2 ↑ up1.1,   
u1.3:“nimmst“:V, NP(up1.3), VP(up1.4),   
up1.3 ↑ up1.2, up1.4 ↑ up1.2, u1.3 ↑ up1.4,   NP(up1.5), 
up1.5 ↑ up1.4, NP(up1.6), up1.6 ↑up1.4, 
u1.4:“Du“:NP,  u1.4 ↑ up1.5, u1.5:“eine“:Det, 
u1.6:“Schraube“:N, u1.5↑ up1.6, u1.6 ↑ up1.6]  
Having produced this utterance plan / syntactic structure, Cnst compares it with the utterances 
she has observed Inst performing.32  Cnst then decides to include in the new contribution she is 
planning, DU1.2 (shown in (5.3.4)), the missing information about NP up1.6. The update to the 
information state with this intention, which is satisfaction-preceded by i1.2a, is shown in 
reduced form in (5.3.6). 
(5.3.6) [i1.2b| i1.2b:IntCnst(DU1.2 += [ | up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP]), sp(i1.2b) = i1.2a] 
(by the definition of +=,  (5.3.6) is equivalent to: 
[i1.2b| i1.2b:IntCnst([TmpK| TmpK is DU1.2];  
                                            [DU1.2| DU1.2 is TmpK; [ | up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP]]), 
                        sp(i1.2b) = i1.2a]. 
(Notice that the fact that i1.2a satisfaction-precedes intention i1.2b ensures that i1.2b refers to 
the same DU1.2 as i1.2a, according to the Grosz and Sidner view of discourse accessibility as 
formalized in (Poesio  and  Traum, 1997). See Section 3.5. Accessibility in PTT is discussed more 
extensively in (Poesio  and  Rieser, in preparation).)) 
The fact that Cnst decides to utter an NP instead of producing a complete utterance such as, 
say, “Ich nehme eine Schraube” might also be explained in terms of cooperativity:  reusing as 
much as possible of Inst’s  output would make ce1.1 a genuinely joint action. 
In case existential closure were assumed, alignment at the domain level (rather than at the 
syntactic one) could also be used to explain how Cnst plans her contribution to the joint directive 
(see (4.2.5)(c)). That is, Cnst might have decided to utter an NP  by comparing  the content of the 
jointly intended directive in (5.3.4) –the proposition to grasp a generic screw—with the  
proposition of grasping some object in (5.3.2), derived from the partial directive that Inst has 
                                                     
30
 As correctly pointed out to us by a reviewer, assuming that Cnst’s expectations about the utterance plan for the 
directive are so detailed as to include the intention to generate every single word is a big assumption, and could reveal 
problematic in the case of indexicals, for although in this case it seems correct to assume that the utterance plan 
contains 2nd  person Du and nimmst as they were uttered by Inst, in case Inst hesitated earlier, only producing So jetzt, it 
would seem more plausible to expect that Cnst would produce 1st  person Nehme Ich eine Schraube rather than 2nd  
person Nimmst Du .... With respect to the first issue we will simply reiterate the point already made in Sections 4 and 
5.1—that the view of utterance planning adopted here is an extreme simplification—adding that in addition a much 
more complex theory of matching one’s expectations with the other participant’s production will also be required. Such 
a theory will have to allow matching one participant’s first person verb with the other participant’s second person. With 
such a theory in place, the second issue will become unproblematic as well.   
31
 We are forcing the notation a bit here and use the is notation to indicate the condition   λ i. sem(v(up1.1)(i)) = 
v(K1.1)(i).  
32
 This assumption that participants in a conversation always compare their expectations with what they observe is well 
accepted in Cognitive Science: for instance, it is at the basis of Wolpert, Doya and Kazato’s (2003) ‘MOSAIC’ model 
of language comprehension, and also appears to be broadly consistent with Pickering and Garrod’s  (2004)  `alignment’ 
model (which will be discussed at greater length in a following section). 
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performed by means of existential closure. Cnst would then conclude that this latter proposition 
should be augmented with  K1.1d: 
(5.3.7) K1.1d=[x|screw(x)] 
Cnst could  then decide to produce  an utterance with K1.1d as content – i.e., an indefinite NP, 
very much as in (5.3.6). (Cfr. Pickering and Garrod’s “I/O constraint”.) 
Acknowledgment Completions are often produced in order to acknowledge an (as yet 
incomplete) DU (see Clark’s ‘collaborative completions’, Clark 1996, p. 238).  In other words, 
Cnst’s intention in uttering “eine Schraube”  may have been to acknowledge (the complete 
version of) Inst’s directive, instead of, or in addition to,  repairing it, as proposed  in (5.3.4). This 
possible interpretation of Cnst’s intention is shown in (5.3.8). The content of intention i1.2a in 
(5.3.8) is an acknowledgment of the completed  DU1.1
 Cnst in (5.3.3) –i.e., not simply the 
utterance, but the utterance together with the results of inferences: 
(5.3.8) [i1.2a| i1.2a:IntCnst([ce1.3| ce1.3:ack(Cnst,DU1.1 Cnst)])]  
The effect of this acknowledgment is to make DU1.1Cnst  grounded: i.e., to update the discourse 
situation with G(DU1.1Cnst) (see below). 
A few aspects of this interpretation of what happened in the sample dialogue are worth 
discussing. First of all, one might argue that what gets acknowledged by Cnst is not just 
DU1.1Cnst, but the proposition resulting from the concatenation of DU1.1Cnst  with the record of 
the completion taking place: 
DU1.1
 Cnst +=  [ | up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP] 
I.e., that what Cnst actually intends  is the following: 
(5.3.8’)    [i1.2a| i1.2a:IntCnst( (DU1.1 Cnst += [ | up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP]); 
                                                [ce1.3| ce1.3:ack(Cnst,DU1.1
 Cnst)])] 
which is equivalent to: 
   [i1.2a| i1.2a:IntCnst( [TmpK | TMpK is DU1.1 Cnst]; 
        [DU1.1
 Cnst| DU1.1 Cnst is TmpK; [ | up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP]]; 
                     [ce1.3| ce1.3:ack(Cnst,DU1.1
 Cnst)]) 
(Note that acknowledgments are not parts of discourse units (Traum, 1994; Matheson Poesio and 
Traum, 2000), so (5.3.8’) is a well-formed proposition as ce1.3 is not part of DU1.1
 Cnst.  ) 
Secondly, it might be argued that an intention to acknowledge is part of Cnst’s intentions 
even under the ‘cooperativity’ interpretation discussed above; i.e., that intention i1.2a in (5.3.4) 
should actually incorporate parts of (5.3.8), as follows: 
(5.3.4’) [i1.2a| i1.2a:IntCnst([DU1.2,ce1.2, ce1.3| 
                                                     DU1.2 is [ce1.1, K1.1,up1.6| 
      K1.1 is [x,e|screw(x),e:grasp(Cnst,x)], 
                           ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1), 
                                       up1.6:“eine Schraube“:NP ], 
                                                     ce1.2:repair(Cnst,DU1.1
 Cnst, DU1.1 Cnst;DU1.2), 
                                                     ce1.3:ack(Cnst,DU1.2)])] 
The distinction is subtle, which is as it should be as interpretation seems to proceed in the 
same way irrespective of the ‘true’ intention. The  main remaining difference between the 
acknowledgment interpretation in (5.3.8’) and this new  repair + acknowledgment interpretation 
in  (5.3.4’)  is that in the case of (5.3.8’),  the directive would be still considered  Inst’s action. 
Just as in the case of the cooperativity interpretation, in the case of acknowledgment 
interpretation in (5.3.8) Cnst would have a number of ways to realize her intention. Notice that a 
repetition of the partial directive would be appropriate as an acknowledgment of that part only 
(i.e., without making a completion). As in the case of the cooperativity explanation, to decide 
how to execute the Acknowledgment Cnst would have to determine what’s missing from Inst’s 
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directive - either by a structural or by a domain-level match. Either way, the result of this decision 
process is that Cnst acquires an intention along the lines of (5.3.6) or (5.3.8’). 
Responding to a Request As pointed out before, another possible reason for the completion is 
that Cnst interpreted the pause in 1.1 as a request. The system of grounding acts developed by 
Traum (1994)  and adopted in PTT (see section 3.6) includes three types of Requests that Inst may 
have intended  to perform: Request for Acknowledgment, Request for Continuation, and Request 
for Repair. In all three cases, if Cnst adopts this interpretation she will update her information 
state by adding  an obligation to address the request (the mechanics of obligations in PTT is 
discussed in some detail in (Matheson Poesio and Traum, 2000). After that,  it will be this 
obligation (rather than cooperativity, or a voluntary desire to acknowledge) that will lead Cnst to 
acquire  intentions such as (5.3.4) or (5.3.8).  Once these intentions are acquired, however, the 
result will not be any different from that discussed above. 
Blurting Out Finally, it is possible that Cnst’s action is not motivated either by a decision to 
be cooperative at the domain level (i.e., by acquiring intention (5.3.4)) or   by an intention to 
acknowledge (as in (5.3.8)), but by impatience – i.e.,  by a view that Inst is taking too long to 
perform the action. According to this explanation, Cnst  quickly recognizes that Inst has intention 
i1.1b’ in (5.3.3), and realizes what is missing by a structural or domain level match, just as 
explained above. However, Cnst  is also moved by other goals, such as completing the task 
quickly, and it is as a result of these goals that she  acquires intentions (5.3.4) or (5.3.8). We do 
not have a full account of what these other goals might be and how they lead to the acquisition of  
one of these intentions, but we do expect these intentions to be expressible in terms of the 
formalism assumed here. 
5.4 The repair: 1.3, “eine orangene mit einem Schlitz” 
Upon hearing the completion, Inst’s view of the discourse situation is predicted by the analyses 
above to be as depicted  in Figure 5.4.1 (next page). 
Inst’s behavior upon hearing the completion is consistent with him, first of all, recognizing 
that the NP uttered by Cnst is intended as a completion of the utterance Inst himself previously 
performed: i.e.,  that he is meant to update DU1.2 with the information in (5.4.1)—that the NP 
uttered by Cnst is meant to fill the position of the missing NP in the tree in (5.2.4): 
(5.4.1) DU1.2 += [ | up1.7 is up1.6] 
He then appears to ascribe to Cnst, one the basis of the information in Figure 5.4.1, one of the 
intentions in (5.3.4), (5.3.8), or (5.3.4’). In all of these cases Cnst intends to perform a grounding 
act having as one of its arguments discourse unit DU1.1 from (5.3.1) augmented with the 
information that a screw is needed (as well as, possibly, with changes to the directive, and/or 
information about the utterance). In the case of (5.3.4), the intention is of repairing DU1.1; in the 
case of (5.3.8), the intention is to acknowledge it; in the case of (5.3.4’), to do both. (We might 
call this DU the  DU ‘under discussion’, to borrow a term from Ginzburg.) 
We will proceed here under the assumption that Inst attributes to Cnst the most complex 
intention, that in (5.3.4’)—i.e., the intention both to be cooperative and to acknowledge the 
contribution in DU1.1 augmented with the information that the object that Inst wants Cnst to pick 
up is a screw. (In this way, we will cover most of the ideas that would be needed to analyze what 
happens in the dialogue under the other interpretations.)   As a result, Inst’s view of the discourse 
situation is updated as intended by Cnst, as shown in (5.4.2). 
(5.4.2)       DU1.2 += [ce1.1, K1.1| 
                                            K1.1 is [e,x|screw(x),e:grasp(Cnst,x)], 
                                            ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1)]; 
                     [ce1.2, ce1.3| 
                                     ce1.2:repair(Cnst,DU1.1
 Inst, DU1.1 Inst;DU1.2), 
                                     ce1.3:ack(Cnst,DU1.1
 Inst)] 
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At this point, Inst appears to ‘accept’ the repair proposed by Cnst, but also to have decided 
that Cnst’s description of the screw may not ensure that Cnst chooses the correct screw (the one 
which we have called orange-slit-screw) and so decides to perform a continuation: an expansion 
of the description of the object to be grasped. Also, Inst may or may not ground DU1.1, 
depending on whether he recognizes an Acknowledgment. 
As said in Section 3, we need two conditional update rules for grounding acts here: 
UP.REPAIR ce:repair(A,DU1,DU2)  (accept(B,ce)   DU1 ⇐ DU2) 
UP.ACK       ce:ack(A,DU)  (accept(B,ce)  [ | G(DU)]) 
(We remind readers that an update rule is not material implication, but a rule specifying how 
an information state is updated by concatenating new information (Larsson and Traum, 2000).) 
The result of inferring the intentions in (5.4.2), then, is that in case Inst accepts the repair he will 
proceed to update his information state by replacing DU1.1 with the DU consisting of the 
concatenated contents of DU1.1 and DU1.2, as follows: 
(5.4.3) DU1.1 ⇐ DU1.1;DU1.2 
which, as seen in Section 3.5, is equivalent to the update: 
λiλj i[DU1.1]j ∧ v(DU1.1)(j) = v(DU1.1;DU1.2)(i). 
If Inst also recognizes and accepts an acknowledgment, he will perform the further update: 
(5.4.4) [ | G(DU1.1) ] 
Inst then proceeds to plan his continuation. Such expansions of an object’s description are 
also viewed in PTT as a type of refashioning; this time, of the DU which is the result of the repair 
Figure 5.4.1.  Inst’s view of the discourse situation after perceiving Cnst’s completion in 1.2. 
DU1.2 is 
… i1.1b i1.1c i1.1d DU1.1 DU1.2 
up1.1:S 
u1.2:”jetzt”:Advp 
up1.4:VP 
up1.3:NP 
u1.3:”nimmst”:V up1.5:NPi up1.6:NP 
u1.4:”Du”:Pro 
up1.7 u1.5 u1.6 ub1.1 
up1.7:NP 
u1.5:”eine”:Det 
u1.6:”Schraube”:N 
ub1.1:N’ 
… 
i1.1d … 
… 
 
 
 
DU1.1 is 
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performed by Cnst in 1.2, the just updated DU1.1
 Inst. With his continuation, Inst intends to repair 
DU1.1
 Inst with a new DU (called here DU1.3) in which the argument of the directive, K1.1,  is 
updated by adding to its previous content (in 5.4.2) the additional information about the screw x 
which Inst believes it will be necessary in order for Cnst to identify the appropriate screw. This 
intention is represented in (5.4.5) as intention i1.3a of performing a repair ce1.5, replacing 
DU1.1
 Inst  with the new DU1.3, in which K1.1 is updated with the information in K1.3.  
(5.4.5) [i1.3a| i1.3a:IntInst([DU1.3, ce1.4, ce1.5 |  
                                                    DU1.3 is  DU1.1
 Inst ; 
                                                                    [K1.3 | K1.3 is [ | orange(x)];[ x3|slit(x3), has(x,x3)]]; 
                                                                    (K1.1 += K1.3), 
                                                    ce1.4:ack(Inst,DU1.1
 Inst), 
                                                    ce1.5:repair(Inst,DU1.1
 Inst, DU1.3)] 
(Notice, incidentally, that at this point the content of directive ce1.1 (proposition K1.1) is no 
longer the content that Inst had originally planned, shown in (5.2.5). I.e., the PTT account of this 
episode of collaboration in dialogue makes this core speech act a genuine case of  ‘joint 
production’ in the sense of Clark (1996).) Furthermore, Inst reaches the decision to realize the 
planned refashioning in (5.4.5) as an apposition, as it is often the case in dialogue. This makes a 
treatment of appositions essential for a theory of incremental dialogue processing, which has to 
be one based on a syntactic theory like LTAG in which such incremental construction can be 
modeled. We return to appositions shortly. 
In the PTT framework there are at least two ways to explain how Inst reaches intention i1.3a 
in (5.4.5). One explanation is that this intention is the result of plan matching: matching Cnst’s 
version of the  directive in (5.4.2) with Inst’s originally planned directive in (5.2.5). According to 
this view, Inst compared the  content K1.1 of directive ce1.1 that would follow from Cnst’s 
repair, with the content of ce1.1 according to his own original  intention, shown in (5.2.5).  As a  
result, Inst identifies the need to produce the additional information in K1.3. A second 
explanation is that Inst acquires the intention as  the result of situation matching:  Inst considers 
the situations that may result  from the execution of the content K1.1 of the directive as proposed 
by Cnst, and realizes that there are 9 such situations, one for each of the screws in Figure 4.2.4. 
This appears to be what Pickering and Garrod (2004) have in mind.  (Such simple planning can 
be done quite efficiently, as shown, e.g., by the work on planning in the TRAINS project (Allen 
and Ferguson, 1994, Ferguson et al, 1996).) 
As an aside,  the fact that utterance unit 1.3 was actually produced in two prosodic units  
suggests that Inst identifies the  properties that have to be added to the description of the screw 
produced by Cnst in order to uniquely identify the required screw incrementally, in two steps 
(Levelt, 1989). First of all, Inst realizes that the property  [ | orange(x)] is required; then, that the 
property of having a slit, 
                                             [ x3 | slit(x3), has(x,x3)] 
is also needed. Each of these two properties is going to be independently realized using an 
apposition, further argument for the need for a theory of appositions.   
In PTT, this two-stage process would be modeled by attributing to Inst two distinct intentions: 
an intention to enrich K1.1 with the information that screw x is orange (shown in (5.4.6)) and an 
intention to enrich this new description with the additional information that x has a slit, shown in 
(5.4.7). 
(5.4.6) [i1.3a’| i1.3a’:IntInst([DU1.3,ce1.4| 
                                                          DU1.3 is  DU1.1Inst ; 
                                                                           [K1.3| K1.3 is [ | orange(x)]] ; 
                                                                           (K1.1 += K1.3) , 
      ce1.4:repair(Inst, DU1.1
 Inst, DU1.3)])] 
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(5.4.7) [i1.3a’’| i1.3a’’:IntInst([DU1.3’, ce1.4’|  
                                                          DU1.3’ is  DU1.3 ; 
                                                                           [ K1.3’| K1.3’ is [ x3 | slit(x3), has(x,x3)]; 
  [ | orange(x)]] ; 
                                                                           (K1.1 += K1.3’) , 
                                                          ce1.4’:repair(Inst, DU1.1
 Inst, DU1.3’)]) 
We will however simplify matters  in what follows and treat the whole of 1.3 as a single 
apposition. 
Our treatment of appositions, and the derivation of the meaning of utterance 1.3, are 
discussed in Appendix B.4; we just give a brief summary in this section.  One assumption one is 
forced to make, given  the properties of LTAG, is that eine is ambiguous between the  ‘normal’ 
interpretation and the form used in appositions, henceforth  eineapp, to which   is associated the 
auxiliary tree and lexical meaning in (5.4.8), which yields a type [[pi],[pi]] (<<e,t>, <e,t>> ) for  
the appositional NP: 
(5.4.8)                    N+ 
                                     
 
                 N-                                                  NPapp 
                                                                    
 
                                          Detapp                                                      NAdj+ 
                                                                
 
                                  
                        eineapp: λP’λPλx([v| ]; P(x); P’(x); [ | v is  x] ) 
We further assume that the appositional NP  is syntactically adjoined to the previous utterance, 
resulting in the LTAG analysis for eine Schraube, eine orangene mit einem Schlitz shown in 
(5.4.9). 
(5.4.9)                   NP 
 
                                                                   N’               NPapp 
                                                                                                               NAdj 
                                                        N’  
                                                                                                                   PPDat           
           
 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                     NPDat 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
       Det                           N                     Detapp                     NAdj              PDat           Det          N 
                               
 
eine                     Schraube                eineapp             orangene             mit          einem    Schlitz 
whose interpretation is shown in (5.4.10) (for the full derivation, see Appendix B.3). 
(5.4.10) λP([x| ]; [v| ]; [ |screw(x)]; [ |orange(v)]; [ | v is  x]; [y| ]; [ | slit(y)]; [ | has(x,y)]; P(x)) 
Apart from the syntactic and semantic issues, the planning of (5.4.9) –or, more precisely, of 
its appositional part)—proceeds just as the planning of the completion discussed in Section 5.2. 
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5.5 Acknowledging and accepting: 1.4, “Ja” 
The next utterance in the example dialogue, 1.4 ,”Ja”,  illustrates both the fact that utterances can 
be used to achieve multiple communicative intentions at different levels—in this case, to perform 
both an Acknowledgment act at the grounding level and a backward-looking core Accept act –
and the differences between these two types of backward-looking  acts. 
At the grounding level, utterance 1.4 signals an acknowledgment of the refashioned discourse 
unit resulting from the repair that Inst  performed with utterance 1.3. I.e., utterance 1.4 appears to 
perform at the grounding level the same function as utterances 1.2 (in interpretations (5.3.4’) and 
(5.3.8)) and 1.3 (in interpretation (5.4.5)). As a result, both agents’ information state will be 
updated with the equivalent of (5.4.4), i.e., G(DU1.1). 
At the task level, the function of 1.4  is to accept the (joint) directive resulting from the 
previous three utterances in this first contribution after the initial production by Inst was 
refashioned first by Cnst and then  by Inst,  i.e., with the version of K1.1 in (5.4.5). 
The process leading to the planning of these two actions in response to the directive 
elaborated in the previous turns, and their effect on the discourse situation,  have  been the focus 
of several  previous PTT papers (e.g., (Matheson et al, 2000)) so we only discuss it briefly here. 
As discussed in Section 3, in PTT every conversational action induces an obligation on the other 
participant  to address that action. At this point in the conversation Cnst has two obligations: 
(i) to address the directive:  
                             obl(Cnst,address(Cnst,ce1.1)) 
(ii) to perform a grounding action with respect to its content—informally,  
   obl(Cnst,grounding-act(ce1.1))  
There are several ways to address a directive, two of which are accepting it and rejecting it. 
This is modeled in PTT by assuming that (part of) the formalization of actions such as directives 
consists of update rules leading to the conclusion that a participant has addressed a conversation 
action if  certain types of responses have been produced. This in turn leads to the removal of the 
obligation. These conditional update rules take the following form: 
ce:directive(A,B,K)  (accept(B,ce)  address(B,ce)) 
 ce:directive(A,B,K)  (reject(B,ce)  address(B,ce)). 
I.e., if A performs a directive to B, and B accepts that directive, then that counts as having 
addressed the obligation of addressing the directive. This removes the obligation to address the 
conversational action, but of course, accepting a directive then leads to a new obligation, to 
perform the action directed. This is formalized using another update rule which, in a schematic 
fashion, can be formalized as follows: 
ce:directive(A,B,K)  (accept(B,ce)  obl(B,K)) 
The same happens with obligation (ii), the obligation to perform a grounding act. The 
performance of any of the grounding acts in (Traum, 1994) will discharge the obligation; the 
performance of any of the grounding acts will also lead to further updates – e.g., acknowledging a 
DU results in that contribution being grounded, as discussed in Section 3: 
ack(A,DU)  G(DU) 
In summary, as a result of the performance of 1.4, the discourse situation gets updated as in 
(5.5.1): 
(5.5.1) [ce1.6, DU1.4|    
                        ce1.6:ack(Cnst, DU1.1
 Cnst),  
                        G(DU1.1
 Cnst), 
                        DU1.4 is [ce1.7, s1.1| ce1.7 : accept(Cnst,ce1.1), s1.1 : obl(Cnst,K1.1)]] 
Where DU1.1
 Cnst is the DU resulting from the two repairs in 1.2 and 1.3: 
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                         [ce1.1, K1.1 | 
                                             K1.1 is [e,x,x3| screw(x), orange(x), slit(x3), has(x,x3),  
                                                                     e:grasp(Cnst, x)] 
                                              ce1.1:directive(Inst&Cnst,Cnst,K1.1)] 
This completes the first contribution in (1.1).   
5.6 The rest of the conversation 
An analysis of the second contribution in the sample dialogue –utterances 2.1-2.4—at the level of 
detail just given for the first one would require a discussion of numerous additional aspects of 
PTT,  including the treatment of anaphoric accessibility,  and of a number of additional 
grammatical issues, such as  our treatment of connectives and  the German `Satzklammer’. As it 
is just not possible to present all this material in a single journal paper, we will only provide a 
sketchy discussion of the main issues from the point of view of coordination, and defer the 
additional discussion to a second paper in preparation (Poesio and Rieser, In Preparation). 
2.1: “Und steckst Sie dadurch, also” 
With utterance 2.1 Inst moves on to the next step in the shared plan in Figure 4.2.3  and in 
(4.2.4), which turns into  step (e) in (4.2.5). Inst wants Cnst to put the screw through the aligned 
holes of the longer bar serving as ‘fuselage’ and the shorter bar serving as ‘wings’ of the toy 
airplane. From a production / sentence planning  perspective (Levelt, 1989; Dale and Reiter, 
2000),  there are very few  differences between the steps that Inst goes through in planning 
utterance 2.1 and those that were involved in planning utterance 1.1. Again, Inst has the intention 
to perform a directive (let’s call it ce2.1);  and again, Inst  decides to plan an utterance up2.1 
generating directive ce2.1. (As said above,  a full analysis of  the particular realization of ce2.1  
chosen by Inst for  the example dialogue would require a discussion of  three linguistic  
phenomena:  rhetorical relations (und, also), the so-called `Satzklammer’ (steckst … dadurch ) 
and the pronoun Sie, that raises the issue of anaphoric accessibility within micro conversational 
events. We defer this discussion to a second paper.)  And again, Cnst interrupts Inst before the 
plan for up2.1  is completely executed. 
2.2: “von oben” 
What happens at this point  is very similar to what happened during the first contribution 
when Cnst performed the completion in 1.2, and we believe our analysis of that completion 
applies  with relatively few modifications to this case as well, except that there is very little 
evidence in this case that anything in  Inst’s performance could be interpreted by Cnst as a  
request, so the other explanations (Cooperativity, Voluntary coordination control, and blurting 
out) look more plausible in this case than the Request for Acknowledgment. In fact, in this case 
our intuition tells us that there is a stronger sense that Cnst is simultaneously acknowledging 
Inst’s contribution and refashioning it. The main issue raised by this utterance is one of 
compositional semantics: how the meaning of the modifier von oben is integrated with the 
meaning of Inst’s contribution. In the later paper we discuss two options: maintaining the simple 
treatment of VPs as having type <e,t> used so far, and  going to the  higher <s, <e, t>> type 
common in work on tense based on a Parsonian semantics (Parsons, 1990). 
2.3: “von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden”  
With this utterance, Inst achieves two objectives. First of all, he acknowledges Cnst’s 
participation to the current DU—this time by explicitly repeating Cnst’s utterance. He then returns 
to the utterance plan which had been interrupted by 2.2, and continues the production of the 
purpose clause. The purpose clause also contains a second example of (in this case,  deictic) 
reference: the reference to the three constituents of the airplane previously aligned. 
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2.4: “Ja”  
Finally, the Ja in 2.4 is produced (and interpreted) more or less like 1.4. We will just briefly 
remark that Cnst seems not to have had any problems interpreting the definite description die 
drei. 
5.7 Recap 
This concludes our intentional analysis of the completion under discussion. In summary, we 
argued that it is possible to provide a fairly explicit analysis of four possible reasons for the 
completion by making the following assumptions: (i) that utterances are actions, and that 
planning an utterance is akin to planning any other action  (which is not to say that the same 
planner is used!!) (ii) that Inst and Cnst have shared plans interleaving domain and discourse 
actions, as in (4.2.5); (iii)  that the participants to a conversation—or at least, to a fairly structured 
task-oriented conversation like those in the Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus—continuously generate  
expectations about what’s to come next in the dialogue on the basis of these interleaved and 
shared plans, and that they monitor each other’s utterances comparing them with these 
expectations so as to be able to recognize where they stand in the conversation; (iv) that they are 
able to do this comparison before an utterance is completed, perhaps via some form of Existential 
Closure; and finally (v) that as a result of that they can plan appropriate grounding acts;  in 
particular, we have proposed that completions can be viewed as a form of repair.  We would 
argue that none of these assumptions is ad-hoc, and that  at least (i), (iv) and (v) are necessary to 
any account of the phenomenon at hand. In the following Section we discuss an alternative 
account which does not make assumption (ii) and that adopts a different view of the monitoring 
process. 
6 A non-intentional analysis  
Pickering and Garrod (2004) while encouraging psycholinguists  to take up dialogue as a valid 
area of research, argued that many aspects of dialogue interpretation—particularly priming at the 
lexical, syntactic, and referential level (Morton, 1969; Branigan et al, 2000)—can  be explained  
without resorting to an intentional analysis, and sketched instead a model of interaction centered 
around  the notion of ALIGNMENT  between the dialogue participants’ models. Although Pickering 
and Garrod’s alignment model is more of a programmatic proposal than a fully worked out 
theory, it has proven very influential (Purver et al,  2006; Rickheit  and  Wachsmuth, 2008).  As a 
contribution to the ongoing discussion concerning this model, in this section we briefly discuss 
which aspects of  cooperations could be accounted by an alignment model, and how. 
6.1 The Pickering and Garrod alignment model 
The starting point of Pickering and Garrod’s analysis is the consideration that successful 
communication between dialogue participants A and B requires them to go through the same 
stages of interpretation and production, illustrated in Figure 6.1 (next page). 
Pickering and Garrod (henceforth: P&G) also note that priming effects can be observed at 
each of these levels of interpretation, from the phonetic (Bard et al, 2000) to the lexical (Garrod 
and Anderson, 1987) to the syntactic (Bock, 1986; Branigan et al, 2000). Finally, P&G discuss 
experiments suggesting that in order for dialogue to be felicitous,  the participants need to 
produce aligned  ‘situation models’.  The term ‘situation model’ is widely  used in the 
psycholinguistic literature on reading and text processing to indicate a variety of representations 
expressing information about the events and entities described in a narrative (theories of situation 
models have been proposed in, e.g.,  (Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Garnham, 
2000). But what P&G have in mind is a much more general notion of situation model—and one 
which may change from task to task, often being developed on the spot by the participants to the 
task. For example, in one of the studies they discuss, by  Garrod and Anderson (1987), the 
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participants in a `cooperative maze game’ have to develop ways of describing each other’s 
position in a maze in order to follow a route. The subjects were found to develop `aligned’  views 
of the maze in the sense that they would jointly develop a protocol for referring to maze positions, 
and particular positions, confirming the results of work of Clark and colleagues (Clark and 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark, 1996).  
 
Figure 6.1. The levels of representation involved in (spoken) language comprehension. (From (Pickering and 
Garrod, 2004); reprinted with permission.)  
The conclusion that Pickering and Garrod draw from these observations is, first,  that 
`aligning representations’ at all levels is a central aspect of dialogue processing; and that this 
alignment is the result of fairly simple comprehension mechanisms, rather than of intention-based 
mental state reasoning. (Such `more complex’ types of processing are considered as an option, 
but not the basic form of processing available to dialogue participants.) 
A phenomenon that, according to P&G, can be predicted from the Interactive Alignment 
Models is  the creation of  ROUTINES. P&G point out  that  dialogue is highly repetitious: e.g., 
Aijmer (1996) suggests that up to 70% of words in the London-Lund corpus occur as part of 
recurrent sequences of words. According to P&G, this follows from the alignment assumption: 
during production, participants in the dialogue will tend to choose expressions or syntactic 
structures  which have already been produced as part of the present (or, perhaps, earlier) 
dialogues.  
6.2 An alignment-based analysis of the example dialogue 
What would an account of sentence cooperations according to the Interactive Alignment model 
look like?  We find it useful to divide this question in two parts: explaining  how Cnst reaches her 
conclusion about what Inst is trying to achieve; and explaining how she decides to produce a 
completion. (We concentrate on the completion.) 
6.2.1 Interpreting  Inst’s actions  
The first question that has to be addressed is: what would the situation model be  in a task in 
which the participants are not simply describing reality, but modifying it via actions? We think at 
least two answers are possible: 
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(i) the situation model is a representation of  the state that Cnst has reached  in 
assembling the toy plane: i.e., what has already been assembled, and which parts 
are still available. 
(ii) the situation model is the shared plan itself: i.e., which of the required actions have 
already been performed, and which still have to be. Most, if not all, theories of 
planning view plans such as those discussed in the previous sections as 
representations –typically, tree structures—which can be manipulated by, e.g., 
decomposing an action in its subactions.  (In fact, the idea that plans can be viewed 
as mental constructs is fairly recent, dating back to Pollack’s dissertation (1986).) 
If we assume for this task a situation model of the second type,  the process by which  Cnst 
would recognize Inst’s actions under the IAM would not be so very different from the process  
discussed  above for the intentional model—it would simply require Cnst to find a matching 
action in the plan, as done, e.g., by Kautz (1987). We concentrate therefore on explaining how 
Cnst could reach such a conclusion if the situation model was of type (i). 
One obvious difficulty is that Inst and Cnst’s situation models in this sense are not really 
`globally aligned’ in the sense of being identical until the  very end of the conversation, as  both 
Inst and Cnst are perfectly aware. It is however possible to argue that achieving  the desired 
alignment is  the entire point of instruction-giving  conversations, which are not therefore an 
exception to the IA model. 
Coming to what could be a `priming’ alternative to recognizing Inst’s intentions by looking at 
a shared plan, we believe that a candidate can be found by generalizing the notion of `routine’ to 
non-linguistic actions. Namely, it could be argued that during a typical conversation of the BTPC, 
an AGGREGATE FORMATION ROUTINE is established: a repeated pattern of actions which together 
lead to the same result (namely, two parts of the toy airplane get joined). In the dialogue from 
which (1.1) is excerpted, Inst first instructs Cnst to join the `side rudder’ to the `fuselage’; then to 
join the tail to the fuselage; etc. After a while, Cnst may be able to abstract over these repeated 
actions and produce the routine in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Routine created during a toy plane assemble dialogue 
 
Once this routine becomes part of the common ground, an instance can be recognized through 
simple structural match, without need for explicitly reasoning with intentions.  In the case under 
consideration, for example, Cnst may be able to recognize that nimmst is an instance of the 
second step of the routine, and hence, that the missing argument must be a screw. She may also 
be able to identify the syntactic structure to use for the completion by looking at the realization of 
previous mentions of this type of object. 
AGGREGATE FORMATION 
 
PARAMETERS:  
C1, C2: constituents to be joined 
P1, P2: ports 
S: screw, with bolt B  
 
SUBACTIONS: 
1. align P1 of  C1, with P2 of C2 
2. get S 
3. pass S through P1 and P2 
4. fasten B 
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6.2.2 Deciding to produce a completion 
As the sketchy discussion above makes clear, in our opinion it would be possible to develop an 
alignment account of interpretation. What is not at all clear to us is how such a model could 
explain what happens next: i.e., why it is that Cnst decides to produce a completion, instead of 
waiting for Inst to finish his contribution.  In other words, the alignment model as currently stated 
does not provide an account of dialogue management, an important  aspect of what dialogue 
participants have to do (and one which had a significant influence in the design of PTT as 
currently conceived). 
6.3 Summary 
`Traditional’—i.e., Grice-inspired—models of dialogue processing tend to formalize all aspects 
of an agent’s behavior when involved in a dialogue in terms of intentions (see, e.g., Cohen’s 
account of reference (Cohen, 1979) or Grosz and Sidner’s theory of discourse structure (Grosz 
and Sidner, 1986)). We feel that the alignment model offers a very reasonable alternative to these 
Gricean models as far as interpretation and production are concerned.  However, intentions also 
play an important role in formalizations of dialogue management—how an agent decides what to 
do next—and  we can’t find anything in the alignment model as currently stated which would 
explain how Cnst reaches her decision to produce a completion, nor to explain what is it that Inst 
is trying to do (a non-intentional alternative to speech acts, that is). 
7 Related Work  
To our knowledge the only other proposal in the literature  on dialogue explicitly concerned with  
completions is the paper by Purver et al (2006), developed in the Dynamic Syntax framework 
(Kempson et al. 2001, Cann et al. 2005). We discuss Dynamic Syntax and Purver et al’s  
proposal in this section, after however discussing the two other main theoretical frameworks for 
the semantics of dialogue, Ginzburg’s KoS  (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Ginzburg, 2009) and Asher 
and Lascarides’ SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), both of which provide  theoretical insights 
that have been  incorporated in our framework and that could perhaps be extended to provide a 
treatment of the phenomenon under consideration. 
7.1 Ginzburg’s theory of the Dialogue Game Board 
Arguably, the most developed modern theory of semantic interpretation in dialogue is Ginzburg’s 
KoS framework (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Ginzburg, 2009). The theory was conceived from the 
start to deal with dialogue, and provides the widest coverage of dialogue-specific phenomena, 
including in particular grounding, clarification requests and non-sentential utterances; therefore it 
could probably be extended to provide an account of completions, at least for what concerns their 
interpretation.  
7.1.1 General features of the model 
Like PTT, KoS is inspired by Situation Semantics (Barwise and  Perry, 1983) and is founded on 
the assumption that many aspects of interpretation in dialogue can only be properly explained by 
providing an account of the discourse situation in  its entirety. Another similarity  with PTT is that 
KoS is based on an information state view of dialogue interpretation—and  as in PTT, it is 
assumed that each participant’s information state – their dialogue gameboard (DGB)—contains 
both public and private information. In its basic form, a participant’s information state according 
to KoS contains a record of Speaker, Addressee,  the Moves so far –whose first element is called 
the LatestMove-- the (shared) Facts about the discourse situation, and a record of the Questions 
Under Discussion, or QUD. The information state is a record in Type Theory with Records 
(Cooper 2005). 
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The QUD field is one of the most distinctive features of this framework. Its value is a stack  
(and in the general case a partial order) of the issues raised in a conversation. QUD was 
hypothesized to account for the pragmatics of  queries – and especially to explain how the 
propositional interpretation of  short non-sentential answers is recovered—but , as we will see, it 
also plays a central role in KoS’s  treatment of grounding.  Simplifying matters considerably, 
when A asks B  a query such as “Who came?”, the DGB of both participants gets updated with 
the information that the latest move was a query: Ask(A,B, λ x. come(x)). As a result, the issue 
raised by the query—in the case of a wh-query, an abstract: λ x. come(x)—gets added to the 
QUD, as shown in Figure 7.1.1. 
 
According to KoS, the presence of this issue in QUD is what enables B to provide a short 
answer to the question:  say, “John”. The content j of this short answer can be combined with the 
content of the question that is maximal in QUD to get a proposition, “John left”. When grounded, 
this proposition is added to Facts. 
The effect of dialogue acts on the DGB—i.e., how the information state is updated as a result 
of, e.g., questions and answers-- is modeled by  conversational rules. A conversational rule 
specifies how information states that met certain preconditions , such as the presence in 
LatestMove of an Ask dialogue act, are updated as a result. For instance, the incrementation of 
QUD with the issue resulting from a question is specified by a conversational rule called Ask 
QUD-incrementation (Ginzburg 2009, p. 117).33 The overall series of updates to the information 
states of all conversational participants resulting from a change in the discourse situation is called 
a protocol; an example of protocol is the protocol for Cooperative query exchange specified 
below (Ginzburg 2009, p. 116). 
Cooperative query exchange  
1. LatestMove.Cont = Ask(A,q) 
2. A: push q onto QUD; release turn 
3. B: push q onto QUD; take turn; make q-specific utterance. 
As this example shows, the updates specified by a protocol generally differ depending on the 
role of the conversational participant. After asking the question A will (normally) release the turn, 
whereas B will take it and perform a relevant utterance. 
As well as the most extensive treatment of dialogue phenomena, KoS also comes with the 
most  detailed fragment of any theory of dialogue, the HPSG grammar from Ginzburg and Sag 
(2000), subsequently modified in substantial ways in (Purver, 2004; Fernandez, 2006; Ginzburg, 
2009), inter alia. 
7.1.2 Grounding and clarifications 
(Ginzburg, 2009) also includes a full treatment of  the grounding process.  The crucial advance of 
this proposal is that it provides a detailed account not just of successful communication, but also 
of  failure in communication and how it is handled via clarification requests. Ginzburg’s  book 
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 Here and elsewhere page numbers refer to the last draft of the book available online. 
Spkr: A 
Addr: B 
Moves:  〈….〉  
LatestMove: Ask(A,B, λ x. come(x)) 
Facts: 〈….〉 
QUD: 〈λ x. come(x)〉  
Figure 7.1.1. Update of the DGB after asking a question. 
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also contains an interesting theory regarding what is means to understand an utterance, and 
provides a formalization of the grounding criterion based on this theory. 
In its simplest form, the KoS account of the process by which the DGB is updated as a result 
of utterance u is as follows: 
1. If the utterance is understood, LatestMove is updated with u (and the process of update 
continues as discussed above); 
2. If the utterance is not completely understood, so-called CRification ensues. 
Note how utterances are not immediately added to LatestMove upon being perceived. 
Instead, they go to an information state field called PENDING, that contains ungrounded 
utterances (PENDING is very similar to the field called UDUs by Matheson, Poesio  and  Traum 
(2000).) From there, utterances go to LatestMove if  grounded—but may also be revised as a 
result of the CRification process. 
The content of PENDING are what Ginzburg calls locutionary propositions (p. 148--149). 
A proposition in TTR is a type of record with the two fields 
[SIT   = S, SIT-TYPE = ST] 
for which truth conditions are defined: the proposition above is true iff S is of type ST, written S 
: ST (Ginzburg 2009, section 2.5.4). In locutionary propositions, SIT-TYPE is  the utterance type 
resulting from    parsing, whereas SIT is the utterance. The situation type, in turn, is a record of 
type SIGN  that encodes the same information encoded by signs in the earlier (Ginzburg and Sag, 
2000): phonetic information in the PHON field, syntactic category in the field  CAT, constituency 
information in the field  CONSTITS, and semantic information. As in HPSG, the meaning of an 
utterance in KoS is viewed as a function from contexts to contents, where contexts are a 
generalization of the notion of context due to Kaplan (1989): whereas Kaplan’s contexts were 
limited to a few values for indexicals like I, you, here, now , in the theory of contexts developed 
in Situation Semantics, particularly in the work of Robin Cooper  (Gawron and Peters, 1990; 
Cooper, 1992; Cooper and Poesio, 1994; Cooper, 1996) a great deal of aspects of the  
interpretation are sought in contexts, including referents for proper names. Hence, semantic 
information is encoded in two fields: the field C-PARAMS specifies the contextual parameters 
of a semantic object that have to be supplied by  the context for the object to be interpretable, 
whereas the field CONT specifies content proper—how these values and those supplied by 
lexical semantics are combined.  For instance, the locutionary proposition corresponding to 
discourse unit DU1 in (3.4.3) would be as follows: 
(7.1.1) [SIT-TYPE =  
                     [ PHON = ”there is an engine at Avon”, 
                        CAT    = S : syncat,  
                        CONSTITS = { there, is, an, engine, at, Avon, an engine, at Avon } : set (sign),  
                        C-PARAMS = [ spkr: IND, addr: IND, s0: SIT, l: LOC, 
                                                    a: IND, c1: named(a, “Avon”)],  
                        CONT = assert(spkr, addr, [SIT = s0, 
                                                                     SIT-TYPE = [x : Ind, c1 = engine(x),  c2 = at(x,a)]]) 
   SIT = [PHON = “derisanenginatevn”, 
            CAT = S: syncat, 
            CONSTITS = { u1(der), u2(is), u3(an), u4(engin),u5(at), u6(evn), u7(anengin),  
                                      u8(atevn) },  
            C-PARAMS = [ spkr = A, addr = B, s0 = sit1, l = l1, a = avon, c1 = prop1] 
            CONT = ] 
Comparing these propositions with the PTT encoding of the same contribution, it is clear that 
leaving aside the semantic  differences between records and DRSs –potentially significant, but not 
entirely clear to us--  the first main difference is that whereas in PTT the representation of the 
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information state is more akin to what in Situation Semantics would be called a  situation type, 
just as in DRT and SDRT, the information state in KoS consists of propositions specifying that 
indexical situational objects are of a certain situation type. It might be argued that the KoS view is 
more natural, and a similar view of ‘anchored DRT’ has also been advocated for DRT by Kamp 
e.g., in (Kamp, 1990)—but the semantic differences become less clear with Compositional DRT, 
in which, unlike in vanilla DRT,  proper names and indexicals are treated as directly referential 
(i.e., are encoded as constants),  not as existentially quantified. 
The one distinction which clearly seems to make a difference is the explicit encoding of 
situational parameters in KoS. This explicitness is the basis for the formulation of the grounding 
criterion proposed by Ginzburg and colleagues: that understanding an utterance means finding 
values for the contextually dependent parameters in C-PARAMS within the DGB (Ginzburg, 
2009, p. 153).  In case of failure to ground—for instance, in case the referent of Avon is 
unknown, or in case the addressee does not understand what is the relevant meaning of  engine 
for this context—crification ensures.  By contrast, in PTT we have failure  of understanding in 
case  an utterance can’t be assigned a meaning. The KoS treatment is more general, offering for 
instance the potential to identify failure of understanding also in the case of failure of intention 
recognition, i.e., when no dialogue act can be assigned to an utterance. Encoding contextual 
parameters in CDRT would not be particularly problematic, as they could be viewed as 
distinguished discourse referents (as indeed they were in (Cooper and Poesio, 1994)) but no 
attempt to compare the two types of grounding criterion and / or develop a version of PTT with 
contextual parameters  has been made so far. 
The treatment of clarification requests in KoS is based on the extensive empirical analysis of 
clarifications in the British National Corpus carried out by Purver (2004). Purver classified 
clarification requests with respect to their form (identifying eight distinct types: wot, explicit, 
literal reprise, wh-substituted reprise, reprise sluice, reprise fragment, gap, and filler - fillers 
corresponding to what we are calling here completions)  and their content (identifying four 
distinct categories: repetition, clausal confirmation, intended content, and correction); many  of 
these are treated  in (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2004; Ginzburg, 2009). 
According to KoS, the process by which contextual parameters are instantiated begins by 
applying a Contextual Instantiation update rule (p. 153, 154) which updates the information 
state by  ‘filling in’ parameters as soon as suitable instantiations are found. In case the 
instantiation of the parameters is only partial,  Clarification Context Update Rules apply,  of 
which two are discussed: Parameter Identification and Parameter Focussing.  Parameter 
identification applies whenever the value of one of the contextual parameters is missing and 
results in questions that can be paraphrased as “ what is the intended content of ui?” (e.g., “what 
do you mean by Avon” or “Who is Bill?”.  In KoS terms, asking such a a question amounts to 
putting as maximal in QUD a question of the form λ x Mean(sprk, ui, x). Parameter focusing 
produces confirmation requests on the basis of the value of the CONT field. In both cases, the 
process simply involves putting an appropriate question on QUD—in other words,  clarification 
requests are supposed to work just like any other request. 
With these refinements, the process by which the information state is updated can be 
specified by the more complex protocol that follows (Ginzburg, 2009, p. 180 – (96)): 
Utterance Processing Protocol For agent A with IS I: if a locutionary proposition  
lp = [ sit = u, sit-type = T] 
is maximal in PENDING: 
(a) if p is true, try to integrate p in A.DGB using a Moves update rule 
(b) Otherwise: try to accommodate p as a CR to LatestMove 
(c) Else: seek a witness for T by asking a Clarification Request. 
 
 
POESIO AND RIESER 
 60 
7.1.3 Non-sentential utterances, self-initiated repair and incremental pending 
In Chapters 6 and 7 of (Ginzburg, 2009), two ingredients are added that make the KoS 
framework appropriate for providing a treatment of completions. In Chapter 6 an extensive 
treatment of Non-Sentential Utterances is provided, based on the work of Fernandez (2006), 
covering in particular short answers ( yes, no, John) and sluices of various types (as in, e.g., A: 
John left  B: Who?). That chapter discusses in detail how utterances providing a complete 
dialogue act can update and be interpreted with respect to the DGB even when syntactically they 
are  not sentential. In Chapter 7, and in particular in Section 7.3,  the possibility that PENDING 
can be incrementally updated (after every micro conversational event) is considered, which would 
provide a unified treatment of  self-repair. Such moves would make KoS and PTT even more 
similar, making it virtually certain that solutions developed within  one framework could be 
readily imported in the other.34   
7.1.4 Summary of the discussion 
To our knowledge no explicit treatment of the phenomenon of completions in its full 
generality has been  provided in KoS so far, but we don’t see any reason why the analysis 
provided in this paper could not be recast in the KoS framework, once the differences between a 
treatment based on TTR and one based on DRT are better understood. The main difference 
between the two frameworks is that PTT attempts to stay closer to mainstream formal semantics in 
terms of syntactic and logical underpinnings, whereas KoS is closer to the unification-based 
world using HPSG as syntactic framework and TTR as semantic representation (hence, arguably, 
closer to treatments of dialogue in computational linguistics). It’s not clear to us however that 
such differences matter much in terms of the proposed treatment of completions; on the other end,  
the two frameworks share the basic assumptions about information state, common ground, and 
their update that we argued are crucial to the treatment provided here. 
Arguably, the most interesting difference between the frameworks  is in the grounding 
criterion, formulated in terms of lack of meaning for utterances in PTT, and of contextual 
parameters in KoS. This is one area where the treatment proposed in KoS could be adopted in 
PTT. 
7.2 Asher and Lascarides’ Logic of Conversation 
7.2.1 A general comparison between the design philosophies of LOC and PTT 
Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) monograph contains a wealth of insights concerning the 
structure of dialogue and its systematic description. It is based on interesting ideas concerning the 
division of labour of, inter alia, information content, lexicon, cognitive states, and world 
knowledge. The formal apparatus is developed in great detail,  integrating  much current research 
in logics, linguistics, philosophy and AI, in a way echoing the “Zeitgeist” in an attractive manner. 
An obvious similarity between LOC and PTT concerns the underlying logic: both frameworks 
are derived from DRT, of which they share the general logic assumptions about the dynamic 
nature of the common ground. PTT is more conservative, being based on Compositional DRT and 
hence, ultimately, on type theory in the sense of Montague.  LOC is less traditional, both because 
meaning is characterized in terms of a logic more closely related to DRT as formulated, say, in 
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993), and, above all, because  a substantial effort has been made in LOC to 
‘modularize’ the process  of interpretation and to identify distinct logical frameworks to 
characterize, for instance, semantic interpretation as opposed to meaning proper. No such effort 
has been made in PTT. 
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 And indeed, Purver (2004) provides an analysis of certain types of filler CRs that might be considered cases of 
completions, as in A: Is Bill ... B: coming? 
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Another big difference, already pointed out in (Asher and Lascarides 2003, p. 304),  is that 
PTT is speech-act and intention based, whereas LOC’s theory of coherence rests on the concept of 
discourse relations such as Elaboration, Narration and the like and on various axioms like 
Contrast guaranteeing/explaining local coherence. In PTT  discourse relations and the like have 
played a very minor role so far, although argumentation acts are included among the dialogue acts  
covered in (Poesio and Traum, 1997).  This is partly due to different preferences concerning the 
data used for setting up dialogue theory:  LOC sticks to the philosophy of language principle of 
using prototypical examples and pays less attention to the mapping from NL to logical forms, i.e. 
SDRSs, which is more or less taken for granted, whereas PTT proceeds from natural data, 
especially from task-oriented dialogue, and tries to preserve NL surface using CDRT-style 
translations. So there are different guiding methodological principles here. Discourse relations are 
a  heavy machinery resting on rich intuitions concerning discourse structure and PTT is 
minimalistic in this respect. In the long run, PTT needs of course a theory of rhetorical structure--
indeed, this is already required for the example transcript; this will be discussed in the follow-up 
paper. By contrast, in LOC the idea of plan-basedness is boiled down to speech-act related goals 
(SARGs), there are no large shared partial plan structures used;  large structures emerge solely via 
discourse relations encapsulating recursively built up material. 
7.2.2 Completions in LOC 
Asher and Lascarides state quite clearly that coordination of the sort discussed  in this paper 
is beyond the scope of their book—e.g., when discussing their example (4), attributed to Sacks, 
on p. 297, Asher and Lascarides say (footnote 3): ‘Note that Henry’s and Mels’s utterances 
contribute a single proposition. We gloss over this here, however’. 
(4) a. Joe: We were having an automobile discussion .... 
 b. Henry: discussing the psychological motives for 
 c. Mel: drag racing in the streets. 
Nevertheless, LOC has a lot to offer concerning the description of our example, repeated  
below, and appropriate   extensions are not difficult to envisage. We will investigate this in  some 
detail in this section. 
Coordination in the production of single speech acts. 
Two ingredients seem missing from LOC in order to provide an account of such examples. In 
example (1.1), repeated here as (7.2.1), we have two cooperative dialogue moves, Cnst’s 
production of  a screw and Inst’s other repair an <-> orange one with a slit, which is 
acknowledged by Cnst. 
(7.2.1)   Inst:  So, jetzt nimmst du  
 Well, now you grasp  
Cnst: eine Schraube 
 a screw, 
Inst: eine <-> orangene mit einem Schlitz. 
 an <-> orange one with a slit 
Cnst: Ja.  
 Yes. 
To handle cooperative productions one needs some sort of representational underpinning, 
such as joint intentions, or at least joint plan structures. In the analyses proposed in this paper  
shared plans, common intentions and common situations help to explain why alignment wrt 
completions occurs. Misalignment arises simply as a consequence of the difference between 
shared plans and individual plans. In LOC there is no real basis for the explanation of alignment, 
due to the lack of  a principled treatment of fine grained coordination, despite the use of a 
cooperativity principle and claims to the contrary (p. 417).    If one does not handle aligned 
structures, one misses a central feature of NL dialogue and neglects established insights, e.g. 
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Clark’s track-theory or his presentation-acceptance cycle for common productions.  Asher and 
Lascarides’ notion of correction, which might be considered of relevance here at first sight (LOC, 
pp. 345-354), solely rests on intuitions concerning denial and consistency, which is clearly not 
what one needs for the repair in (7.2.1), because there is no inconsistency there. 
Furthermore, the decision to abstract away from explicit representation of utterances and 
speech acts means that some other mechanism will have to be introduced in order to account for 
non-sentential information state updates. 
Indirect Speech  Acts  and Acknowledgement in LOC 
Nevertheless, if we abstract from completion and coordination and take an idealised version 
of Ex. 1, 1’, we can profitably ask what LOC has to offer for that. As seen in Sections 3 and 5, 
PTT has incorporated several general insights from SDRT concerning the representation of the 
content of dialogue acts, and more have been included in PTT’s treatment of anaphoric 
accessibility, discussed in the follow-up paper. In this section we discuss whether specific 
proposals about indirect speech acts and acknowledgments  in SDRT apply to such examples. 
(1’) Inst  and  Cnst: Well, now you grasp a screw, an <-> orange one with a slit. 
                       Cnst: Yes. 
The intuitions concerning an idealized (1’) which does not observe completion and 
coordination as phenomena sui generis are that Inst and Const’s turn is a request and Const’s Yes 
functions either as an acknowledgement, an acceptance act or an indication of the action carried 
out. We concentrate on the issues of request and acknowledgement here. Before we can start that, 
a rough picture about the global theory levels going into LOC might be of help (see Figure 7.2.1): 
 
Figure 7.2.1. Interaction of logical modules in LOC (from Asher and Lascarides (2003), p. 431, simplified) 
Assuming that the first turn represents an unconventionalised indirect speech act, ISA (LOC, 
pp. 307-311), Gricean style reasoning leads to the inference of an implicit speech act. According 
to LOC we then get a complex type assertion• request for the first turn. Complex types can be 
expanded either way, here we assume an expansion of request. Where are we in the complex 
modularised structure in Figure 7.2.1 after having applied Gricean style resoning? Presumably 
Information Lexicon 
(Partial) Description of 
Content  
Glue Logic 
Cognitive Modelling Cognitive States 
World Knowledge 
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within Cognitive Modelling. Grammar alone will give us of course only an SDRS for the 
declarative sentence, which in linear notation would be as follows: 
[x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]. 
What we want to have is, however, a request,  i.e. it is the grasping that should be done. In 
LOC-style notation this is (δ for do and the DRS for the proposition which is requested): 
δ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]). 
How one can proceed from grammatical information to cognitive modelling with respect to 
non-conventionalised indirect speech acts is not explained in detail in LOC. 
We shall now see what we can do with δ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), 
with(y,x)]), i.e. which axioms of LOC apply. 
The default Request Related Goals (RRG) (LOC, p. 394) states that if a request α is made, 
then the speaker’s goal is typically that the action aα it denotes be performed. This is indicated by 
the intention operator IS(α).  We obtain therefore: 
[x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)] ! >  
IS ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)] ) 
                             (a[x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]). 
We then need Cooperativity, condition (a) (LOC, p. 391), in order to model agents’ take-
over of intentions: 
(a) IA(δ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)])  > 
 IB(δ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)])   
(where A = Inst and B =  Cnst). Following LOC, p. 394, we can then replace 
IS([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]) 
with 
SARGInst([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)], 
Done(a[x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]))). 
In addition, we can assume that Cnst’s Yes entails that he has accepted or achieved 
Inst([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)])’s SARG of ([x, y| grasp (you, x), orange (x), 
screw(x), slit(y), with(y,x)]). 
This being the case, the two turns, Inst and Cnst’s Well, now you grasp a screw, an orange 
one with a slit and Cnst’s Yes, satisfy the semantic conditions of Acknowledgement(α,β) (LOC, 
p. 466). 
7.2.3 Summary of the argument 
LOC does not treat agents’ coordination in the production of single speech acts and is therefore 
not directly applicable. However, if one fuses Inst’s and Cnst’s contributions as in (1’), one can 
apply LOC’s indirect speech act analysis and derive the speech-act related goal of Inst’s, namely 
that he wants Cnst to grasp a yellow slit bolt. In addition, one gets Cnst’s take over of Inst’s 
intention due to cooperativity as well as his  acknowledgement. 
7.3 Dynamic Syntax 
7.3.1 The Dynamic Syntax framework 
The paradigms from psycholinguistics, linguistics and philosophy we have discussed so far all 
started from the assumption that agents’ joint verbal contributions have to be treated within a 
theory of dialogue. The DS framework, first summarized in Kempson et al. (2001) started with 
the aim to ‘characterize structural properties of language in terms of the incremental process of 
building up interpretation from the sequence of words’ (Kempson et al. (2001), p. ix). Still, the 
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empirical boundary of this endeavour was the sentence and, as far as we can see from the 
published work, at least in the beginning no extension toward dialogues such as e.g. the 
modelling of turn-constructional units or sequences of turns had been considered. However, in the 
course of the development of the paradigm since 2001 it turned out that DS modelling techniques 
for intra-sentential regularities such as anaphora, ellipses, relative clause construction or 
appositions generalize naturally to similar phenomena in dialogue. Incrementality is, of course, 
the main methodological assumption DS shares with PTT (see Section 3 and Appendix B.2 in this 
paper).  Meanwhile (see Gargett et al. (2008)) the state in DS theorizing appears to be as follows. 
There is a deep foundational debate among DS scholars whether some phenomena like, say, 
corrections or completions presuppose for their treatment a special paradigm, i.e. a dialogical one 
or whether these can be treated in a theory which is neutral vis à vis the sentence, monologue or 
dialogue distinction. The data of interest in this context are non-repetitive fragment forms of 
acknowledgements, clarifications and corrections. Their example (7.3.1) below is very near the 
corpus data concerning completions which we discuss in this paper: 
(7.3.1) A: Are you left or 
 B: Right-handed. 
There is a deep methodological issue here, namely which phenomena should be treated in 
which theoretical layer and how far sentence bound theories should be stretched. DS theoreticians 
maintain a twofold perspective: on the one hand they talk about a DS model of dialogue, and on 
the other hand they treat dialogue features within the frame of a proposition. We briefly look at 
these two aspects starting off with some of the basic assumptions and tools of DS, leaving, 
however, the wealth of technical details aside (concerning these, see Cann, Kempson, and Marten 
(2005), Purver, Cann, and Kempson, (2006) or Gargett et al. (2008) for a short synopsis). 
Basic assumptions and tools of DS (in the version of Gargett et al. (2008)) 
DS is a parsing based approach using a strictly left-to-right interpretation of linguistic input. It 
works with growing tree structures and their decorations which are encoded using a special modal 
logic called LOFT—Logic Of Finite Trees (Blackburn and Meyer-Viol, 1994). LOFT handles the 
usual relations on finite trees. Underspecification and update are essential ingredients of DS. 
Growth of information for tree structures and their decorations is conceived of as a monotonic 
process. The building up of tree structures is steered by the requirements of nodes: for example, 
an underspecified subject node in a tree would have to be equipped with the information that an 
expression of the type of individual is needed. Requirements say which information must be got 
in order to yield a (more) complete structure. Structures are built up by lexical or computational 
actions. Computational actions include the introduction and the updating of structure. Lexical 
actions introduce individual lexical items inducing nodes and decorations. Partial trees grow 
incrementally, driven by the requirements of the words encountered. A pointer ◊ marks the state 
of the parsing process. Complete individual trees correspond to predicate-argument structures. A 
tree adjunction operation is used for generating more complex structures via the fitting together of 
trees sharing one term. ‘Importantly, adjunction as other forms of construction and update, can be 
employed to model how subsequent speakers may dynamically provide fragmentary extensions in 
response to the previous utterance’. (Gargett et al. (2008), p. 45). DS uses structural and content 
under-specification, e.g. meta-variables for pronouns and subscripted placeholders for names both 
of which inform tree construction. Meta-variables can be updated if the context yields an 
appropriate term for substitution. Essential for the matters of this paper is the DS notion of 
context. A context in DS involves the storage of parse states, i.e. of the partial tree arrived at, the 
word sequence identified and the actions used. As a consequence, the context provides a tool for 
switching from parsing to generation. The switch from parsing to generation is needed in turn to 
model coordination of speakers in dialogue. 
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Central assumptions of DS concerning dialogue  
(i.e., what is called ‘the DS dialogue model’ in the some of the papers). Parsing is the prime 
mechanism of DS, generation being defined upon it. Generation and parsing are both seen as 
incremental processes. How is the parsing-generation relation modelled? Whereas a hearer by 
needs builds up a succession of partial parse trees, a speaker is also equipped with a goal tree 
containing the information he wants to produce. The generation process is determined by the 
parsing process on the goal tree and a subsumption relation existing between the goal tree and the 
partial parse tree guaranteeing felicity of  production, so to speak. The DS dialogue model takes 
account of the hearer’s parse tree as well as of the speaker’s goal and parse trees. As a 
consequence, hearer’s activities such as clarification requests, completions and 
acknowledgements can be handled in an on-line manner. Above all, a hearer can start his 
generation process right from the parsed string resulting from the on-going production of the 
speaker. This technique is essential for completions and repairs as well as for the production of 
feed back indicators. ‘In particular, for split/joint utterances, this enables switch from hearer to 
speaker at any arbitrary point in the dialogue […]’ (Gargett et al. (2008), p. 46). In sum, we see 
that we get the incremental tools to handle completions. In the next chapter we show how 
completions can be modelled in DS, starting with some remarks tying the DS methodology to 
general  dialogue research. 
7.3.2 Completions in Dynamic Syntax: Purver et al (2006) 
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1990)  started from the hypothesis that in dialogue participants produce 
utterances cooperatively. This led to a sort of schema capturing presentation and mutual 
acceptance as a recursive process, described here informally and in an abridged version. Clark 
and Wilkes-Gibbs’ idea was that e.g. in order to initiate a reference to, say, some Tangram figure, 
an agent either presents a referring term x or invites one from the other agent. If a term is invited 
by the first agent, the other agent, being cooperative, presents one. If the presented term x is 
considered inadequate, then a revision x’ of x, an expansion y of x or a replacement z of x is 
provided. Finally, a term x held adequate is accepted by both parties and mutual acceptance is 
inferred. Observe that by the last step x enters the common ground.  Applying this device to 
example 1.2, we have a production So, jetzt nimmst du by Inst, a presentation eine Schraube by 
the other agent, Cnst, most probably invited by Inst’s lengthening. Inst reacts with an expansion 
1.3 eine orangene mit einem Schlitz which gets mutually accepted, see Cnst’s Ja and Inst’s 
continuation. In short, seen from the Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs perspective, syntax production goes 
through three stages: presentation, repair by expansion and acceptance, as we saw in previous 
sections.  
As is clear from the Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs approach, cooperatively produced utterances 
present a problem since they integrate production and parsing processes, normally treated as 
separate paradigms. Recent extensions of Dynamic Syntax (DS, Purver and Kempson  (2004), 
Purver, Cann, and Kempson (2006)) have paved the way for modelling cooperative production of 
utterances by several agents in a theory of grammar framework achieving effects of the original 
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs proposal. Purver et al. developed a tool which can toggle from parsing to 
generation states and vice versa and can this way also serve as a basis for modelling changes of 
speaker’s activity. 
At the heart of this account is the notion of a parser state P. P is a set of triples <T, W, A>, T 
being a semantic tree under construction, W a sequence of words, and A a set of lexical or 
computational actions used for building up trees or singling out words.  The notion of a parser 
state is then used for the definition of a context C of a particular tree T in the set P. C consists of: 
(a) a set of triples P’ = {…, <Ti, Wi, Ai>, …} resulting from the previous sentence(s),  and 
(b) the current triple <T, W, A>. 
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At the start of the parsing process P’ is empty and the context is identical to the current parser 
state P0 = <T0, 0, 0>. Here T0 is the basic axiom <?Ty(t), ◊> with ?Ty(t) a designated goal to be 
proved and ◊ serving as a pointer to the current stage of the parsing procedure. In P0 we have 
empty sequences for words and actions. 
Defined in an analogous fashion, a generator state is a pair (Tg, X). Tg is a goal tree and X a 
set of pairs (S, P) with S standing for a candidate string and P for the associated parser state, a set 
of <T, W, A> triples. At the beginning of the discourse X will consist of an empty candidate 
string and the standard initial parser state (0, P0). The context C  for generation is defined as for 
parsing, as the set of triples P’ = {…, <Ti, Wi, Ai>, …} and the current triple <T, W, A>. 
Purver et al. (2006) provide a model of shared utterances capturing tightly fitting completions 
and the change of roles among speaker and hearer35. The model is given along the following 
lines. The structural description of the first part So36, jetzt nimmst du which is incomplete by 
grammaticality standards can be used as an input for the parsing or the generation of the 
completion eine Schraube. Both productions together add up to a well-formed structure as in our 
example (1.1). Since one can switch from parsing to generation and vice versa, at least a 
necessary condition for role switches is met by means of the respective contributions. 
The normal generation process starts with a generator state (Tg, {0, P0}), where Tg is the goal 
tree, 0 the place holder for the candidate string and P0 the initial parser state <T0, 0, 0>. As 
mentioned above, T0 stands for the basic axiom <?Ty(t), ◊>. On condition that a suitable goal 
tree, basically representing the meaning structure of the candidate string, is available for 
generation, a continuation can be produced using the structure arrived at. This is achieved 
replacing P0 with the parser state (a set of triples <T, W, A>), Pt got from the structure produced, 
called transition state. 
Now, assume speaker role A and the corresponding hearer role B. Hearer B parses up to Pt. If 
he has a suitable goal tree Tg, he can set up a transition generator state Gt = (Tg,{(0, Pt)}) and 
continue. Thus Gt can be directly used for generation. In order that this may happen, a 
monotonicity constraint has to be satisfied: the goal tree Tg must be subsumed by one of the 
partial trees in Pt. 
Considering both sides, A and B, we have the following: At the point of transition A’s 
generator state Gt’ contains the pair (St, Pt’). St is the string produced so far and Pt’ the 
corresponding parser state, the transition state for B. A is assumed to interpret B’s continuation in 
the context of his parser state Pt’, into which the structures extracted from B’s productions will be 
integrated. 
By way of illustration Cnst’s (= B’s) transition from hearer to speaker role is represented in 
Figure 7.3.1. Pt depicts Cnst’s parsing procedure, the ? indicating that an object Ty(e) is expected 
due to the type Ty(e, (e, t)) of nehmen. jetzt is treated as an unfixed sentence adverb. Cnst 
recognized the words [so,] jetzt, nimmst, du using actions a1, a2, and a3. He has a suitable goal tree 
to set up a transition generator state Gt. The goal tree shows that the indexical must be changed. 
Hence we have the logical form Fo(jetzt’((nehmen’(ε, x, Schraube’(x)))(Fo(Cnst)))). The slot for 
the string is empty, and this is what one expects, given the example: the string produced is eine 
Schraube, it is fitted in as an object-NP, two new actions a4, and a5 are needed to achieve that. 
 
 
 
                                                     
35
 In discussing the completion in the DS framework based on (Purver and Kempson ( 2004)) and (Purver et al. 
(2005)) we got help from Matthew Purver and Ruth Kempson, which we gratefully acknowledge. Any remaining 
mistakes are ours, of course.  
36
 For So we assume a functional interpretation along the lines of the discussion in 5.2;  So will hence not turn up in the 
DS trees any more. 
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Figure 7.3.1. Modelling of completion jetzt nimmst du eine Schraube involving role shift from hearer to speaker 
(simplified). 
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Figure 7.3.2. Modelling of completion jetzt nimmst du eine Schraube involving role shift from hearer to speaker 
(simplified). 
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Figures 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 only illustrate the completion part. There is also a suggestion 
concerning the description of appositions in (Cann, Kempson, Marten (2005), ch. 7, p. 328, ch. 8, 
8.4.1 and 8.67, p. 365), which could be used in order to graft the Instructor’s eine orangene mit 
einem Schlitz onto Schraube. The apposition functions as an other-repair to Cnst’s contribution. 
So far, repairs have not been treated in DS in a systematic way. The most explicit reconstruction 
of corrections known to us is in SDRT (Asher and Lascarides (2003), 345-373), which 
presupposes discourse relations but is not tied to incremental surface syntax. 
What is the difference between the DS model of completions and our account? The difference 
can essentially be traced back to the philosophy of Dynamic Syntax. By joining  parsing and 
production DS provides a necessary condition for Cnst’s production of some object NP but this 
will not necessarily be eine Schraube, it could be anything else, say a car, a black hole etc. The 
targeted production of language material is clearly plan-based. So, in order to make DS do that it 
would have to be tied to some theory of dialogue via a suitable interface. 
8 Conclusions 
Theorists from Clark to Ginzburg to Pickering and Garrod all agree that perhaps the key test for a 
theory of dialogue is the extent to which it accounts for what is arguably the key difference 
between dialogue and monologue—the process by which the conversational participants achieve 
their communication goals by coordinating with each other--without assuming that this 
communication is always successful. This requirement on information-state theories  has perhaps 
been best captured by Ginzburg in the following passage (Ginzburg 2009, p. 121): 
… one could argue that the basic criterion of adequacy of a semantic 
theory of dialogue is the ability to characterize for any utterance type 
the update that emerges in the aftermath of successful grounding  … 
this is the early 21st century analogue of truth conditions 
To our knowledge, what was presented in this paper is the first formal account of a crucial 
aspect of this process of coordination in dialogue: the fact that coordination can be achieved at the 
level of the single utterance. Most ideas have been developed elsewhere: our account builds, on 
the one hand, on Clark’s  proposals about coordination, as formalized by Bratman and Tuomela 
for shared plans, and by Traum for grounding; on the other, on ideas about  the dynamics of the 
common ground  developed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Kamp; last but not least, on the view of the 
common ground developed in Situation Semantics by Barwise, Perry, Cooper, and colleagues.  
As far as we know, however, this is the first attempt to put all these ideas together in a single 
account. 
This being the case, it is almost inevitable that our account is not going to be the ultimate 
word on the argument. We mentioned throughout the text a number of limitations of the present 
proposal (e.g., the need to integrate these ideas with the kind of statistical models of interpretation 
that are now becoming prevalent both in Computational Linguistics and in Psycholinguistics) and 
many issues to be addressed in further research, ranging from empirical questions such as the 
proper formulation of the grounding criterion to formal questions concerning the consistency of 
the underlying logic. It’s virtually certain that many aspects of the theory will need to be revisited 
once these issues are studied in detail at the light of more empirical data. However, we believe 
that our approach of relying whenever possible on independently motivated tools and hypotheses  
such as LTAG, Compositional DRT, Prioritized Default Logic, the Clark / Traum view of 
grounding, the Bratman / Tuomela view of intentions, etc—are the best we could do to ensure  
that our proposals will scale up. Some issues left open in this paper will be addressed in a follow-
up paper (Poesio and Rieser, In Preparation) that will extend the analysis to the phenomena 
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observed in the second part of the example dialogue, in particular, providing an incremental 
account of anaphora. 
We remain noncommittal concerning whether an approach based on alignment and in which 
all types of intentional reasoning are avoided could provide an explanation of completions: a 
more detailed formulation of the alignment account will be required before that question can be 
properly addressed.  We believe that some types of completions could be explained in this way: 
for instance, as one of our reviewers pointed out, the production of the second completion in the 
example dialogue, 2.2 (von oben) could be explained without reference to shared plans: Cnst 
could simply have examined the state of her own knowledge, decided that she needed more 
information in order to execute the action, and performed a request.  (There is ample evidence 
that conversational participants often decide how to act next on the basis of their own knowledge 
only–see, e.g., (Bard et al, 2000).) We indicated some ways in which the alignment approach 
would need to be further developed in order to understand whether such explanations could work. 
Conversely, however,  it could be argued that in task-oriented dialogues the only ‘situation 
models’ that participants could attempt to align are their plans, and thus that alignment of 
representations would not eliminate the need for some sort of intentional representation and 
intention recognition. 
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Appendix A: Full Transcript of the Dialogue Up to the Excerpt  
Versuchspersonen-Paar 21 
 
Instrukteur (I) m; Konstrukteur (K) f 
Bedingung: Sicht blockiert, Vorlage Modell, Beschreibung/Konstruktion simultan 
Gesamtdauer 12: 45 
Anmerkung: I erwähnt 'Flugzeug' zunächst nicht; K kommt von selbst drauf. 
Konstruktionsresultat I: 
Aa=10.3Ab=08.1Ba=10.1Bb=08.2C=02.1Da=12.2Db=01.1Dc=08.3Ea=12.1 
Eb=01.2Ec=07 Ed=05 Ee=13 Ha=11.3Hb=02.2Hc=04 Hd=03.1He=11.1 
La=14.1Lb=15.1Lc=09.1Ld=16.1Le=17.1Ra=14.2Rb=15.2Rc=09.2Rd=16.2 
Re=17.2Va=11.2Vb=03.2Vc=06Vd=03.3Ve=03.4Vf=10.2Muttern=VL 
Konstruktionsresultat K: 
Aa=10.3Ab=08.1Ba=10.1Bb=08.2C=02.1Da=12.2Db=01.1Dc=08.3Ea=12.1 
Eb=01.2Ec=07 Ed=05 Ee=13 Ha=11.3Hb=02.2Hc=04 Hd=03.1He=11.1 
La=14.1Lb=15.1Lc=09.2Ld=16.1Le=17.1Ra=14.2Rb=15.2Rc=09.1Rd=16.2 
Re=17.2Va=11.2Vb=03.2Vc=06Vd=03.3Ve=03.4Vf=10.2Muttern=VR 
Montiert Hb parallel zu C bugwärts zeigend. 
21I001 mit den sieben Löchern. 
21K001 ja. <sil: 2> 
21I002 da hast du zwei Stück von <noise: klappern> 
21K002 ja. 
21I003 <noise> die kannst du erstmal zur Seite legen. dann ist eins mit eins, 
zwei, drei, vier, fünf Löchern </noise: klappern> 
21K003 {ja}<noise: klappern> 
21I004 <noise> <hum: atmen> und <sil: 1> eins mit drei Löchern </noise: 
klappern> 
21K004 {ja}<noise: klappern> 
21I005 <noise> so, <--> jetzt nimm das äh mit den fünf Löchern mal in die 
linke Hand </noise: klappern> 
21K005 mhm. 
21I006 das andere in die rechte <noise: klappern> <-> und leg(e) sie so 
übereinander, daß sich zwei Löcher überschneiden. 
21K006 also die zwei mit den fünf Löchern? <sil: 1> 
21I007 ja. 
21K007 das sie sich wo 
21I008 das kleine ist dann untendrunter so 
21K008 hä? also das mit den drei Löchern? 
21I009 ja. 
21K009 untendrunter. 
21I010 ja. <attrib> oh, das ist aber schwierig </attrib: leise> <-> jetzt 
überschneiden sich ja zwei Löcher, ne? <sil: 2> 
21K010 zwei? 
21I011 bei dir auch? 
21K011 wie wann? <-> <hum: lachen> ich soll das in der Mitte zusammenlegen 
<par> überkreuzen </par: 1> 
21I012 <par> nein, nicht in der Mitte so, </par: 1> daß es also wieder quasi 
eine <--> eine <par> (ei)n Teil so </par: 2> 
21K012 <par> ah ja, Verlängerung </par: 2> mit zwei Löcher. 
21I013 mhm. 
21K013 <quest: ?> überschneiden. 
21I014 also wenn du jetzt von oben draufguckst, hast du sechs Löcher. 
21K014 ja. 
21I015 ja? 
21K015 mhm. 
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21I016 zwei zwei überschneiden sich, ist das richtig? 
21K016 ja. 
21I017 so und jetzt nimmst du die beiden <--> m die mit den äh <-> sieben 
{Löchern}<spk: K, mhm> ja? 
21K017 ja. 
21I018 die die legst du so drauf <-> auf diese beiden, die sich überschneiden, 
daß sich das (ei)n Kreu/, daß es sich ein Kreuz ergibt so. <-> weißt 
du? <-> legst du auf den Tisch am besten. 
21K018 <noise> das mit den drei Löchern immer noch unten und dann leg(e) ich 
was? <hum: atmen> </noise: klappern> 
21I019 ja. 
21K019 <hum: stöhnen> (ei)n Kreuz. 
21I020 ja, daß es so <sil: 2> jetzt überschneiden sich quasi so die ähm <hum: 
?> eben haben sich ja nur die <--> beiden überschnitten, ja? 
21K020 ja. 
21I021 und jetzt überschneiden die sich dreimal. <-> verstehst du? <hum: 
lachen> 
21K021 nee. 
21I022 m, dann machen wir das mal anders, warte mal <noise: klappern> <hum: 
lachen> <--> m, leg(e) das mal so auf den Tisch mit den, daß die sich 
die bei, wie wir es eben hatten, daß wir sechs Löcher so haben. 
21K022 ja. 
21I023 legst du so auf den Tisch. 
21K023 hab(e) ich schon. 
21I024 und da ist noch ein anderes mit dr/, nimmst du noch ein anderes mit 
drei Löchern, 
21K024 {mhm}<noise: klappern> 
21I025 und das schiebst du vor <-> von <noise> links <--> drunter, </noise: 
klappern> <par> daß sich auf der anderen Seite </par: 3> <cont> 
21K025 <par> auch nur das zwei überschn/ </par: 3> 
21I026 </cont> zwei überschneiden. 
21K026 ah ja. 
21I027 ja? 
21K027 dann habe ich sieben Löcher. 
21I028 ja, ja, so können wir es liegen lassen. 
21K028 mhm. 
21I029 jetzt nimmst du so einen roten Würfel. 
21K029 <attrib> was war mit dem {sieben}<noise: klappern> Löchern, den wir 
</attrib: leise> ja gut. 
21I030 ja? 
21K030 ja. 
21I031 und den legst du ganz links <--> drauf. 
21K031 ganz links? 
21I032 ja, auf das äußerste Loch. 
21K032 mhm. 
21I033 so <-> jetzt nimmst du <-> eine <-> rote Schraube <sil: 2> 
21K033 mhm. 
21I034 und schraubst es von unten fest. kannst du so, mußt du so hochnehmen 
dafür. 
21K034 (ei)ne kleine rote? 
21I035 ja. 
21K035 eckige? 
21I036 ja, ja. 
21K036 gut. <noise> <-> dann ist jetzt nur der Dreier fest <--> erstmal 
</noise: klappern> 
21I037 ja, genau, mhm. <-> kannst es aber wieder so hinlegen. ja, paß auf und 
dann nimmst du jetzt erstmal noch so(_ei)n Teil mit fünf Löchern. 
21K037 ja. 
21I038 und <-> schraubst es oben auf den Würfel drauf mit einer runden 
Schraube mit (ei)nem Schlitz drin. 
21K038 <noise> mit der roten runden? </noise: klappern> 
21I039 ja. <sil: 7> hast du? 
21K039 ja. 
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21I040 so, jetzt nimmst du <-> (ei)ne gelbe runde 
21K040 mhm. 
21I041 und so(_ei)n <sil: 2> ähm orangenes Teil, so(_ei)n Gewinde, mit 
Gewinde. 
21K041 ja. 
21I042 ja? und schraubst das äh <-> Dreier, die Dreierstange an die Fünfer. 
21K042 also so wie gehabt ne, diese untere? <sil: 2> oder was? 
21I043 ja, ja, also die Dreier wird von unten an die Fünfer geschraubt. 
21K043 mhm. 
21I044 verstehst du? 
21K044 ja. <sil: 2> und wie rum ich das mache ist egal, von unten die gelbe 
rein? 
21I045 nee, von oben die gelbe. 
21K045 und wo <-> wo von den beiden? <sil: 3> ich habe ja zwei Löcher, wo ich 
es reinstecken kann. 
21I046 also die gelbe Schraube ist jetzt <--> <hum: räuspern> rechts von dem 
roten Würfel. 
21K046 direkt <par> dran. </par: 4> 
21I047 <par> oben. </par: 4> <sil: 1> ja, ja. 
21K047 <noise> ja. <sil: 3> </noise: klappern> 
21I048 <noise> und das ist quasi in dem ersten Loch von dem Fünfer, ne 
</noise: klappern> 
21K048 mhm. 
21I049 in dem ganz links äußersten und <par> mittig </par: 5> 
21K049 <par> und dem mittleren vom Dreier </par: 5> 
21I050 mittig von den dreien. genau. und jetzt nimmst du die <-> eine eckige 
gelbe Schraube und machst sie in das rechte <-> Loch daneben. 
21K050 ah ja. 
21I051 und unten wieder so(_ei)ne Mutter vor. <sil: 2> 
21K051 mhm. 
21I052 na. <sil: 4> <hum: atmen> <noise: klappern> jetzt wird es schwieriger. 
<hum: lachen> <noise: klappern> <-> paß auf, jetzt nimmst du <--> jetzt 
legst du den anderen, dies Dreierteil, ne dies andere 
21K052 ja. 
21I053 von rechts, also das ist genau symmetrisch und mit dem <-> mit dem 
linken Dreier, was du schon festgeschraubt hast. 
21K053 ja. 
21I054 so <--> jetzt nimmst du eine lange Stange mit sieben Löchern drin, 
21K054 ja. 
21I055 die legst du jetzt auf <--> die Fünfer. 
21K055 auf die {obere}<spk: I, ja.> auf die untere? auf die obere? 
21I056 quasi <sil: 2> {ja}<attrib: leise> <noise> <sil: 4> wart(e) ähm m 
</noise: klappern> 
21K056 was war denn jetzt mit der unteren Dreier, das habe ich noch nicht. 
21I057 die kommt dadrunter, also legst du einfach, hältst du mal fest so 
<noise: klappern> 
21K057 ja. 
21I058 wenn die jetzt festgeschraubt wär(e), wär(e) die genauso wie die 
andere. 
21K058 ja. 
21I059 ja? 
21K059 <noise: klappern> das ist klar. 
21I060 jetzt nimmst du in die linke Ha/, also das hast du jetzt in der rechten 
Hand, halt das mal so fest, <noise: rascheln> oder legst es auf den 
Tisch oder irgendwie so. 
21K060 ja <noise: klappern> 
21I061 ist <quest: (ei)ne> jetzt ähm, legst du <--> das Teil mit den <--> 
sieben Löchern 
21K061 ja. 
21I062 so <sil: 2> <attrib> mhm so dadrauf, warte mal, wie beschreib(e) ich 
dir das jetzt, mhm </attrib: leise> 
21K062 der obere oder der untere Fünfer, wo soll ich es hintun jetzt? 
21I063 oben auf den <-> auf den Fünfer. 
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21K063 ja. 
21I064 also nicht der auf den roten Würfel ist. <sil: 4> da ist ja auch einer 
mit fünf Löchern auf dem roten Würfel. 
21K064 ja, also auf dem {unteren}<spk: I, ja.> Fünfer. 
21I065 wo links die beiden gelben Schrauben drin sind. 
21K065 ja. 
21I066 dann kommt eine, erst ein Loch, das läßt du frei 
21K066 mhm. 
21I067 und dann kommt <noise> (ei)n Loch, <-> wo du es draufpackst </noise: 
klappern> 
21K067 ach so, <par> also zwei </par: 6> <cont> 
21I068 <par> da legst du es drauf </par: 6> 
21K068 </cont> überschneiden sich wieder. 
21I069 genau, die überschneiden sich, genau wie (ei)n Kreuz legst du es drauf 
und zwar mittig, ne <hum: schmatzen> 
21K069 wie (ei)n Kreuz nicht. 
21I070 doch <-> ja so, was heißt (ei)n Kreuz, eine Kreuzung, wie eine 
Kreuzung. 
21K070 hä, welches überschneidet sich denn dann? 
21I071 unten dieses ähm mit den fünf Löchern, wo die zwei gelben Schrauben 
drin sind. 
21K071 das zweite von rechts bei dem? <sil: 3> 
21I072 ja, genau, zweite von rechts. 
21K072 und dann leg(e) ich das mittlerste von dem Siebener drüber. 
21I073 genau 
21K073 ah ja. 
21I074 so machst du es und 
21K074 ah ja gut 
21I075 dadrunter liegt wiederum dies mit dem <-> drei Löchern. 
21K075 genau, das äußerste linke Loch vom Dreier. 
21I076 {mhm}<spk: K, gut> also die beiden von dem Dreier, der da noch 
drunterliegt äh, da schneiden jetzt zwei <-> ja? 
21K076 ja, das ist klar, das haben wir. 
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Appendix B: A Grammar Fragment for the Example Dialogue  
In this Appendix we introduce the elementary trees associated with the words used in the 
fragment and discuss some of the more complex linguistic phenomena that occur in it,  
abstracting away from micro-conversational events. Our LTAG treatment is based on (Abeillé 
and Rambow, 2000; Joshi 2004) and on Frank’s view that elementary trees represent extended 
projections (Frank, 2002). Our semantics is based on Compositional DRT as presented in 
(Muskens, 1996). Some  ideas from Muskens’ (2001) Logical Description Grammar, an 
integration of  LTAG with CDRT, were also taken into account.  
B.1. A Brief Overview of Compositional DRT 
The aim of Muskens in developing Compositional DRT (Muskens, 1996) was to develop a 
framework in which the dynamics of DRT could be combined with compositional methods of 
meaning specification without developing an entirely new logic as done, e.g., in Heim’s File 
Change Semantics (Heim 1983) or Groenendijk and  Stokhof’s Dynamic Predicate Logic 
(Groenendijk and  Stokhof, 1989). Muskens uses the term grafting to describe his approach: 
extend a type logic like those standardly used in Montagovian approaches with the types 
necessary to provide a reconstruction of the DRT constructs and an (axiomatic) formalization of 
their properties.  
Specifically, the logic proposed by Muskens includes two new types: the type of discourse 
referents pi and the type of states s. Discourse referents are used to model the dynamics of 
context in the same way as they are used in DRT, i.e., in the sense that each noun phrase 
introduces a new discourse referent. States are used to model contexts themselves, and the way 
they are modified by natural language sentences; they are the object-language equivalent of the 
assignments used to formalize the semantics of DRSs in (Kamp and Reyle, 1993). This dynamics 
is mediated by DRSs, viewed as relations between states.  A function v: pi  (s  e) provides the 
mapping from discourse referents and states to entities, in the sense that v(x)(i) specifies the 
`value’ of discourse referent x at state i. 
Muskens specifies a translation for all DRS constructs in terms of this type logic. The most 
important translations are shown in (B.1.1). 
(B.1.1) a. R{x1 … xn} is short for λi. R(v(x1)(i), … v(xn)(i)) 
 b. x1 is x2 is short for λi. v(x1)(i) = v(x2)(i) 
 c. [x1…xn| ϕ1 … ϕm] is defined as λiλj i [x1 ... xn] j ∧ ϕ1(j) … ∧ ϕm(j)  
                              where  i [x1...xn] j is short for i and j differ at most  over [x1 … xn].  
               d. K;K’ is defined as  λiλj ∃ k K(i)(k) ∧ K’(k)(j) 
For example, the type logic translation of the DRS in (3.1.2) (repeated below as (B.1.2)(a)) is 
shown in (B.1.2)(b). 
(B.1.2) a. [x,w,y,z,s,s’| engine(x), Avon(w), s: at(x,w), boxcar(y), s’:hooked-to(z,y), z is x] 
b. λiλj i [x,w,y,z,s,s’] j ∧ [engine(x)](j) ∧ [Avon(w)](j) ∧ [s: at(x,w)](j) ∧ 
[boxcar(y)](j) ∧  [s’:hooked-to(z,y)](j) ∧  v(z)(j) = v(x)(j) 
In Compositional DRT, DRSs are the translations of sentences—the propositions. Hence, type 
<s <s t>> is the type of propositions, and most translations of NL expressions are chains of 
functions whose ultimate value is an object of this type:  e.g., common nouns have translations of 
type <pi, <s,  <s, t>>>.  Muskens introduces an abbreviated notation in which [t1 … tn] stands for 
<t1, <t2, …. <tn, <s, <s, t>>>>>:  in this notation, [] stands for the type <s, <s, t>> of DRSs, [pi] is 
the type <pi, <s, <s, t>>> of common nouns, [[pi][pi]] is the type <<pi, <s, <s, t>>>, <pi, <s, <s, 
t>>>> of determiners, [[pi]] is the type  <<pi, <s, <s, t>>>, <s, <s, t>>> of quantifiers,  etc. We 
will use this abbreviated notation in what follows. 
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The most important change to Muskens’ semantics we make here is having two types of 
discourse referents and two v functions. Although in the main body of the paper we only referred 
to a single v, in fact in addition to Muskens’  referents of type pi, to which a function v assigns 
values of type e, we also use referents of type piK, and a second function vK assigning to these 
referents values of type []. This of course requires a rather different semantics in which 
assignments have a higher type; see (Poesio and Muskens, 1997) for some discussion. 
B.2. LTAG: Basic Trees 
B.2.1 Nominal Phrases 
As standard in LTAG, we assume that nominal phrases  (NPs) are the projection of determiners 
rather than of nouns. The elementary trees for nouns do not therefore include a projection. We 
also assume the standard semantic treatment of nouns in CDRT, where nouns are translated as 
functions of  type [pi] (i.e., <pi, <s, <s, t>>> - see B.1). 
Schraube, Schlitz:            N+ 
                             
 
          
                       Schraube: λx([ |screw(x)]) 
Our treatment of determiners is also derived without modification from the analysis of 
determiners in LTAG and Compositional DRT. Although determiners are not viewed in LTAG  
as heads of separate Determiner Phrases, but as heads of NPs, the elementary trees associated 
with determiners do  introduce  an  expectation of an N’, to which the elementary trees associated 
with nouns can be attached by substitution. Semantically, determiners are given the standard 
CDRT type [[pi],[pi]]. Both indefinite and definite determiners introduce new discourse referents, 
but the latter have a presuppositional component. 
eine:             NP+ 
               
 
            Det
 
        N’- 
      
        eine: λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
einem:           NPDat+ 
               
 
          DetDat           N’Dat- 
      
      einem: λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
We assume a `Loebnerian’ treatment of definites, according to which definites have a uniqueness 
presupposition (see (Poesio and Rieser, In Preparation)): 
die:              NPDat+ 
               
 
         DetDat      N’Dat- 
      
     
         die: λP. λP’.  ([y|y = ι x. P(x)  ];  P ‘ (y); 
Indexical and anaphoric pronouns are also analyzed as heads of NPs.  
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Du:         NP2nd+ 
                             
 
             Du: λP.P (you) 
Syntactically, adjectives in LTAG introduce auxiliary (adjunct) trees, incorporated into NPs 
by adjunction. Semantically, they are treated as functions from predicates to predicates, of type 
[[pi], pi] (<<pi, <s < s t>>>, <pi, <s <s,t>>>>). 
orange          N+ 
               
 
            AdjP
   
   N-             
 
     orange: λP[pi] λv([ |orange (v)]; P(v))       
In German, adjectives can be nominalized, as in the case of orangene in 1.3. We treat these 
nominalized adjectives syntactically and semantically as nouns. 
B.2.2 Prepositional Phrases 
As discussed in Section 3.4, prepositional phrases are treated in LTAG as adjunct trees, 
incorporated into NPs and VPs by adjunction. Semantically, prepositions are assumed to be 
functions from quantifiers to predicate modifiers, i.e., to have  type [[[pi]pi]pi]. 
mit                                   N+ 
                                     
 
 
                        
                    N-                                PPDat                                       
                                                         
                                      PDat                                       NPDat- 
     
 
                            mit: λP [[pi],[pi]] λx(P(λy[ | has (x,y)]))  
B.2.3 Verbal Phrases and Sentences 
In LTAG, sentences are viewed as projections of verbs, just as in HPSG. We’ll discuss the lexical 
interpretation of verbs in the example dialogue later, as they both require some discussion of 
aspects of German grammar.  
Adverbs are interpreted  as VP and S modifiers; we show here the elementary (auxiliary) tree 
involved in the interpretation of jetzt discussed in Section 5.2. 
jetzt                 S+ 
               
 
      AdvPinv             Sinv-             
 
        jetzt: λp. now(p)       
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B.3. Constructions occurring in the first turn: 1.1-1.3 
The first  turn of the example dialogue contains two  linguistic phenomena whose treatment needs 
some discussion: inversion (the fact that the subject of nimmst occurs after the verb)  and 
apposition. We discuss each in turn. 
B.3.1 Inversion 
Our syntactic treatment of subject-verb inversion  is based on the standard treatment of inversions 
in German adopted, e.g., by most papers in (Freidin, 1992), and is specifically modelled after the 
proposal by deMena Travis (1992). The elementary tree for the verb nimmst shown below 
includes an empty element in subject position, coindexed with the postverbal NP. 
nimmst                     Sinv- 
                                          
                                             VPinv+  
                                                           
           NP                                    V’                                        
                                              
                           Vfin2nd                                          NP2ndi+                                           NP+ 
                                  
                                     
           
                      εi          nimmst: λxλQ(Q(λx’[e| e: grasp(x,x’)])) 
B.3.2 Apposition 
The utterance of a noun phrase in 1.3 would generally be classified as an apposition, a form of 
parenthetical expressed with a noun phrase.  Appositives are extremely common in dialogue, 
reflecting the fact that utterance generation is incremental, as well; hence an account of this 
construction is essential for a theory like PTT. Providing a unified account is however quite 
difficult, as nominal parentheticals have a wide range of forms and uses in addition to those 
illustrated by the example dialogue, as shown by the examples in (B.3.1). (See Meyer (1992) for 
an extensive, if purely descriptive, investigation of appositions.) 
(B.3.1) Westinghouse Electric Corp. is wooing Michael H. Jordan,  
a. former head of PepsiCo's international operations / 44 / from Lawrenceville, NJ  
b. the former head of Pepsico’s international operations / a 36-year company veteran   
to be its new chief executive officer. 
As accounting for all these types of nominal parentheticals would be quite a challenge in itself, 
we only concentrate here on the class of appositions  illustrated in the example dialogue, in which 
the apposition plays a restrictive role.  Our  treatment of such  constructions is consistent with the 
central claim of Meyer (1992)  that syntactically and semantically,  such appositions are a type of 
nominal modification; we formalize this claim by proposing that semantically appositions are of 
type [[pi] [pi]], like PPs and other nominal modifiers. (A reminder that nominal predicates, the 
type <e,t> of Montague grammar, in CDRT are functions from discourse referents to DRSs, <pi, <s, 
<s, t>> >, abbreviated [pi].)  Our main objective here is to explain how the apposition is 
incrementally integrated with the interpretation of the previous utterances, both from a syntactic 
perspective and from a compositional semantic point of view. 
This need to explain how appositions are  incorporated from a syntactic perspective  is one of 
our  main reasons for adopting a syntactic formalism like LTAG which allows for adjunction 
operations.  The basic idea of our proposed LTAG derivation for eine Schraube … eine orangene 
is that the final interpretation is obtained by adjoining tree (b) for the apposition to tree (a) for the 
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NP, as  shown schematically in (B.3.2): we assume that the syntactic interpretation for 1.3 (shown 
in (b)—we assume orangene is an adjective nominalization, as discussed below) is adjoined to 
the syntactic interpretation for 1.2 (in (a)), obtaining (c). (The  PP mit einem Schlitz is omitted for 
brevity.) 
(B.3.2)          (a)      NP                        (b)              N’                            (c)         NP 
 
                    eine                 N’              N’                         NPapp              eine                    N’ 
 
                  Schraube                                    eineapp                       N’               N’                 NPapp 
 
                                                                                            
                                                                                               NAdj            Schraube    eineapp     NAdj 
As said above, we follow Meyer in hypothesizing that the class of appositions we are 
concerned with semantically behave as nominal modifiers, of type [[pi], [pi]]. This still leaves 
open the question of how certain types of NPs –particularly indefinites and definite NPs—can 
serve as predicate modifiers. We take these to be cases of NPs whose type has been lowered to 
that of predicates (Farkas & de Swart, 2003), and exploit the properties of  Muskens’ 
Compositional DRT   to explain how the restriction expressed by the apposition is grafted onto the 
appropriate discourse entity. 
However, the implementation of this intuition is subject to a few constraints determined by 
LTAG. LTAG restricts the possible semantic analyses of NPs used predicatively, because only 
lexical categories are allowed, and the only semantic operation which is allowed is application.  
Such restrictions prevent treatments in which the predicative meaning of NPs in appositions can 
be derived syncategorematically –say, by stipulating a structure as in Figure B.4.1, with a 
semantic  operation associated with  NPapp that  `lowers’ the NP-type  interpretation for eine 
orangene, mit einem Schlitz to one of type [[pi], [pi]]. 
 
In LTAG, one  has to stipulate instead that German eine is ambiguous between a normal 
determiner interpretation, shown in (B.3.3a), and the  interpretation used in appositions, of type 
[[pi], [[pi], [pi]]] (the CDRT translation of  <<e,t>, <<e,t>, <e,t>>>) shown in (B.3.3b). 
(B.3.3) a. eine:      λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
 b. eineapp: λP’λPλx([v| ]; P(x); P’(v); [ | v is x]) 
  
 
                                       NP  ([[pi]])                                     
 
                                                        NBar ([pi]) 
 
 
                                NBar ([pi])                   NPapp ([[pi] pi]) 
                                                                    λP λ u P (λ x [| u is x]) 
                                                                     
 
 
                                                                       NP ([[pi]]) 
Figure B.4.1. A syncategorematic treatment of appositions.  
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The two interpretations are also associated with the distinct elementary trees in (B.3.4a) and 
(B.3.4b): 
(B.3.4) 
a.                   NP+ 
               
 
          Det
 
                                                N- 
      
        eine: λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
b.                            N+ 
                                     
 
           N-                                               NPapp 
                                                                    
 
                          Detapp                                                                                         NAdj+  
                                                                           
                                                                
 
                                    eineapp: λP’λPλx([v| ]; P(x); P’(x); [ | v is x]) 
 
With these assumptions, and assuming standard elementary trees and semantic interpretations for 
the other words in utterance 1.3, we get the LTAG analysis for eine Schraube, eine orangene mit 
einem Schlitz in (B.3.5). 
(B.3.5)                            NP  
                                                                      N’                                                                                                                      
                  
                                                  N’                                   NPapp   
           
           
 
                                                                                                      N’Adj    
                                                                                                                                                PPDat  
         
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                               NPDat 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
         Det              N                         Detapp              NAdj                                PDat             Det                   N 
 
                               
 
   eine         Schraube               eineapp                orangene                 mit              einem                 Schlitz 
The interpretation of the NP in (B.3.5) is arrived at through  the derivation in (B.3.6).  
(B.3.6)    
eineapp: λP’λPλx([y| ]; P(x); P’(y); [ | y is x]) 
orangene: λP λy([ |orange(y)]; P(y)) 
einem: λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
Schlitz: λy([ | slit(y)]) 
einem(Schlitz): λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x))( λy([ | slit (y)] )) =  
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            λP([x| ]; [ | slit(x)]  ; P(x)) 
mit: λPλx(P(λy[ | has(x,y)])) 
mit’(einem’(Schlitz’)) : λPλx(P(λy[ | has(x,y)]))(λP([z| ]; [ | slit(z)]  ; P(z))) =  
            λx(λP([z| ]; [ |slit(z)]; P(z))(λy[ |has(x,y)])) = 
            λx([z| ]; [ |slit(z)]; [ |has(x,z)])           /*renaming of variables 
      =    λx([y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; [ |has(x,y)]) 
Orangene’(mit’(einem’(Schlitz’))) : 
            λP λz([ |orange(z)]; P(z))( λx([y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; [ |has(x,y)]))  
            λz([ |orange(z)]; ([y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; [ |has(z,y)])) 
eineapp (orangene’(mit’(einem’(Schlitz’)))): 
            λPλx([z| ]; P(x); [ |orange(z)]; ([y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; [ |has(z,y)]); [ | x is z]) 
Schraube’(eineapp((orangene’)(mit’(einem’(Schlitz’))))):  
            λx([z| ]; [ |screw(x)]; [ |orange(z)]; x = z; [y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; 
                              [ |has(x,y)]) 
eine’: λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x)) 
eine’(Schraube’(eineapp((orangene’)(mit’(einem’(Schlitz’)))))): 
            λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x))( λz ([w| ]; [ |screw(z)]; [ |orange(w)]; [ | w is z]; 
                                           [y| ]; [ |slit(y)] ; [ |has(z,y)] )) 
   =      λP([x| ]; [v| ]; [ |screw(x)]; [ |orange(v)]; [ | v is x];  
                                            [y| ]; [ |slit(y)]; [ |has(x,y)]; P(x)) 
We assume this treatment here. We also note, however, that a second solution is also possible 
within PTT by relaxing the strict restrictions on semantic operations that operate in LTAG, and 
allow for type shifting –specifically, if we allowed  the interpretation of NPs to  be shifted by 
applying to it the following operator: 
                   NTNM (NP-TO-NOUN-MODIFIER): λP λP λx(P(λy[ | x is y]) ; P(x))  
which turns an NP (type <<e,t>, t>) into a noun modifier  (type <<e,t>, <e,t>>).  Then it would be 
possible to derive the meaning of eine Schraube, eine orangene as follows: 
(B.3.6)                                   NP         λP [z| ]; [x| ]; [ |orange(x)]; [ |screw(x)]; [ | x is z];  P(z)   
 
                               eine                                      N’  ( NTNM(λP([x| ];  [ |orange(x)]; P(x))) 
                                                                                                         ( λy( [ |screw(y)]) =  
                                                                                 λ y ([x| ]; [ |orange(x)]; [ |screw(x)]; [ | x is y])   
                                                              N’                                 NP:     λP([x| ];  [ |orange(x)]; P(x)) 
 
                                                         Schraube                 eine
                                                                  
NAdj 
                                                                                 λP’λP([x| ]; P’(x); P(x))         λv[ |orange(v)]   
B.3.3 Utterances with a dialogue control function 
Many utterances, particularly non-sentential ones, do not contribute to the specification of the 
content of a contribution (core speech act), or make contributions both the ‘official business’ of 
the contribution and to its ‘collateral structure’ (Clark, 1996) (see Section 2). The first turn of the 
example dialogue contains two such utterances: so in 1.1 and  ja in 1.4. The assumption in PTT is 
that at least some of these interpretations are contained in the lexicon, as well (which, we recall, is 
a default theory (Poesio, 1995; Poesio, To appear)) so that they are immediately accessed as the 
utterance is perceived and may be overridden by other interpretations. 
Turn-taking dialogue acts As already discussed in Section 3, the primary function of so in 1.1 
appears to be of a keep-turn turn-taking act (Traum & Hinkelman, 1992; Traum, 1994). This 
interpretation is encoded in the lexical update in (3.2.2), repeated here as (B.3.7). 
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(B.3.7) so→    [u,ce|u: utter(A,”so”), ce: take-turn(A), generate(u,ce)] 
The repertoire of turn-taking acts in PTT includes the four acts  take-turn, keep-turn, 
release-turn and assign-turn. As said in Section 3.4, many other non-sentential utterances also 
are assumed to be associated with lexical updates involving turn-taking acts: among them, well, 
now, okay, and also non-words such as filled pauses (umm and the like), all of which appear to 
admit of an interpretation as keep-turn. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that  these 
discourse markers are (a) extremely ambiguous, particularly so  if prosodic information is ignored 
(in which case competing updates would be possible)  and (b) often play more than one function. 
These two issues are  particularly evident  in the case of okay,  an utterance of which, depending 
on the context, may result in one or all of the updates   below: 
okay→  [ce|ce: keep-turn(A)] 
okay → [ce|ce: accept(A,ce’)] 
okay → [ce|ce: acknowledge(A,ce’)] 
(see below for a discussion of acknowledge;  note also that `backward-looking’ interpretations of 
utterances like okay include implicit references to a previous speech act ce’, one of the arguments 
supporting our  hypothesis that conversational events introduce discourse markers in the common 
ground).  And of course it could also be argued that assuming the same turn-taking translation for 
well, now, and umm is another big simplification. 
Grounding acts Ja in 1.4 is an explicit acknowledgment. Again, it is assumed in PTT that at 
least some such interpretations are lexically encoded. The interpretation used in 1.4 is shown in 
(B.3.8). 
(B.3.8) ja →     [u, ce, DU | u: utter(A,”ja”), ce: ack(A,DU), generate(u,ce)] 
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